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Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades, both the British and Russian states have sought to 
institutionalise relations with their Muslim communities through Muslim councils. 
However, such attempts at institutionalisation raise challenges for these 
organisations, which need to balance state demands for incorporation into religious 
governance and Muslim community expectations for more inclusive representation. 
Challenges of integration and representation have received considerable coverage in 
Western and Russian studies. However, little comparative research has focused on 
the behaviour of Muslim councils and how this is affected by different institutional 
settings. In particular, theories of social movements and interest groups suggest that 
strategies for dealing with this tension between integration and representation vary 
between more corporatist and pluralist state-religion relations. Russia and Britain are 
taken as exemplars of the two traditions, and thus help us to understand how these 
tensions manifest themselves and are responded to in the two different contexts.  
 
The project provides a comparative analysis of the strategies and discourses used by 
the Muslim Council of Britain and the Russia Council of Muftis in 1997-2013. It 
explores the conditions under which the councils engage with or disengage from the 
state. It also examines how the two organisations respond to criticisms from Muslim 
communities and undertake internal reforms to improve their legitimacy. A detailed 
analysis of the councils’ engagement with state authorities and Muslim communities 
is used to unpack the challenges of Muslim collective representation. The thesis 
contributes to research by providing new empirical data and theoretical insights on 
Muslim national organisations. It offers an innovative analytical framework by 
revisiting the concepts of pluralism and corporatism and applying them to the 
institutional context of state-religion relations in Britain and Russia. It draws on 
social movement theories and institutionalist approaches to understand how Muslim 
organisations deal with the dual pressure of co-optation and representation. It 
examines how Muslim councils behave like interest group organisations and offers 
theoretical insights that can be extrapolated to other kinds of institutions. Finally, the 
thesis integrates Western and Russian scholarship on the role of interest groups in 
general and religious institutions in particular. 
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Introduction 
 
The Empirical puzzle of Muslim collective representation 
 
 
The presence of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe from the early 1960s 
onwards has been the subject of many national debates on state policies towards 
those minority ethnic and religious groups, who had arrived from the former 
colonies. A series of discussions focused on the ways in which immigrant groups 
adapted to different Western political systems of state-religion relations and the 
extent to which national provisions on accommodating minority representation have 
been fair to Muslim communities.  
 
Over the last two decades, second and third generations of Muslims began to express 
a stronger desire for religious identity and belonging, questioning the state’s ability 
to reflect their interests at home and abroad, particularly in light of the tensions in the 
Muslim world. Their global outlook on Islam and the increasingly transnational 
nature of internet communication also deepened the intra-generational gap and 
challenged the role of Muslim community elders, mosque committees and 
organisations traditionally engaged in dialogue with state authorities. Increased 
government concerns over security, coupled with young Muslims making louder 
claims for recognition of their political and religious rights, increased the salience of 
Muslim identity politics and collective participation in state-religion relations. 
 
In this thesis, I examine the challenges of Muslim collective representation through 
the lens of national umbrella bodies acting on behalf of Muslims living in 
predominantly non-Muslim areas and mediating between Muslim minorities and 
state authorities. While the growing diversity of Muslim communities resulted in 
proliferation and differentiation of Muslim organisations, security and integration 
concerns in the aftermath of 9/11 created a series of similar challenges for those 
wishing to represent Muslim interests at the national level.  
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Introduction  2 
The 1990s-2000s witnessed the creation of national-based, umbrella organisations 
entrusted to regulate Muslim affairs and represent a variety of Muslim interests in 
different national contexts. In line with Islamic principles of consultation and 
Western rules defining the legal status of interest groups or civil society 
organisations, different Muslim institutions sprang up in various European countries, 
including Muslim Councils in Britain (1997), France (2003) and Sweden (1990), 
Islamic Councils in Italy (2004) and Spain (1992) or the Muslim Coordination 
Council in Germany (2006).  
 
A similar Muslim organisation was formed in Russia in 1996, although, as we shall 
see, in a different institutional context. Russia’s experience of Muslim representation 
has been a rather different affair. However, the Russia Council of Muftis (Sovet 
Muftiev Rossii, SMR), has increasingly played a key role in state-Muslim relations in 
Russia. In particular, it faced similar pressures to engage in public debates on 
integration, identity and religion, as well as address the threat of Islamic 
radicalisation and the growing tensions over religious provisions for Muslim 
minorities living in largely non-Muslim areas. 
 
 
Why study Muslim councils?  
 
It goes without saying that Muslim councils are very different institutions. They vary 
in their origins, compositional make-up, organisational structures and mobilisation 
strategies aimed at securing recognition of Muslim minority rights in different 
political and religious contexts. Their membership reflects not only the diversity of 
religious and ethnic groupings, but also some of the internal rivalries and political 
struggles. The ways in which their leaders have participated in state-religion relations 
have been shaped by different colonial legacies of the receiving or host states and a 
variety of historically contingent forms of Muslim representation. Whereas some 
may have been a direct product of state policies, such as the Conseil français du 
culte musulman, others were created at the grassroots level of self-organisation – for 
example the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). 
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Notwithstanding their internal variation, Muslim councils in Europe and Russia share 
a common set of challenges in light of the increased security and integration 
concerns. On one hand, towards the end of the 1990s, they have occupied a central 
place in state-Muslim relations. They have been entrusted with representing interests 
of Muslim minorities and articulating their collective expectations for equal 
treatment and protection of their religious and political rights. On the other hand, in 
light of their close cooperation with the state, they have become increasingly 
associated with negative connotations of facilitating state relations with Muslim 
communities. Their leaders were criticised for perhaps going too far in supporting 
state de-radicalisation measures and encouraging Muslim political loyalty.  
 
This thesis explores how Muslim councils have dealt with this inherent tension 
between representing Muslim interests while being co-opted by the state. Of 
particular interest is how such type of a Muslim institution reconciles community 
expectations for more nuanced representation with state pressures for security and 
integration. In different national contexts, these institutions have been endorsed by 
state authorities to act as official interlocutors between the government and Muslim 
communities. However, the councils have also put themselves in the service of 
Muslim communities and their primary aim is to articulate and promote Muslim 
religious and political interests. As they negotiate between state agendas and 
community expectations, their choices and actions are constrained by criticisms from 
both sides – government officials and Muslim communities. The government is not 
always happy with their contribution to preventing extremism and promoting 
integration. Different opinion polls and media reports confirm increasing doubts as to 
whether these institutions are the most suitable interlocutors to speak out on 
contemporary Muslim issues. 
 
In the past, these institutions (or their precursors) played a similar role of negotiating 
with authorities and supporting Muslim communities. However, they had enjoyed 
more room for manoeuvre, as their actions faced less scrutiny from the government, 
the media and Muslim communities themselves. An increasingly securitised 
government approach to national integration raised the level of state intervention into 
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the life of Muslim communities, particularly over the last ten years. This added extra 
pressure on Muslim representative institutions. It also contributed to the more 
discerning political and religious assertiveness of Muslim communities, which led to 
a degree of reassessment of these institutions, particularly their engagement with the 
government.  
 
The thesis examines how Muslim councils deal with this dual pressure in the national 
context of state-religion relations.  Of particular interest is how this tension is 
affected by institutional features of different approaches to interest mediation. As 
will be discussed later in the thesis, literature on interest groups and their 
engagement with the state suggests a variation between pluralist and corporatist 
arrangements of interest representation (Berger 1981, Schmitter and Lehmbruch 
1979, Wiarda 1997). Pluralist rules have been traditionally associated with a high 
number of competing organisations acting autonomously from the state. Conversely, 
a corporatist setting is characterised by a small number of organisations representing 
distinct group interests which cooperate with the state and are often incorporated into 
its decisional structures. A series of studies have drawn on this typology of societal 
interests to examine the nature of state engagement with labour, environment or 
migrant groups (Dryzek et al. 2003, Fulcher 1991, Odmalm and Lees 2006). A 
similar approach can be used to understand the challenges of religious minority 
representation in different national contexts of state-religion relations.  
 
 
Why study Muslim councils in Britain and Russia?  
 
The two countries share a series of similarities and differences concerning Muslim 
representation and the nature of state-religion relations. Both have sizeable Muslim 
minorities and face similar challenges of integrating Muslim communities. State 
authorities in the two countries are in search of successful ways of engaging with 
Muslim representative institutions and building bridges with Muslim citizens. 
Muslim communities in both countries have expressed desires for their religious and 
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ethnic interests to be articulated by organisations which are representative not only in 
name but also in actions.  
 
A key expectation of the thesis is that corporatist and pluralist environments create 
divergent opportunities and constraints for Muslim minority representation in 
different political systems. In this thesis, the British context will be considered as an 
example of the pluralist institutional environment, while the Russian case discussed 
as a more corporatist one. While acknowledging that the nature of Muslim 
communities and their organisations in Britain and Russia are rather different, I 
expect to find the institutional mechanisms of state-Muslim relations to be primarily 
influenced by the two countries’ political environment and their predominantly 
pluralist or corporatist approaches to interest mediation. In other words, the two 
cases will be differentiated in relation to the institutional arrangements of state 
engagement with religious organisations, including the organisational landscape of 
religious groups, their level of autonomy from the state, as well as opportunities for 
cooperation or competition between religious organisations and civil society actors.  
 
This distinction offers a useful lens to gauge the influence of the contextual factors 
on Muslim representation in general and the ways in which they shape the behaviour 
of Muslim organisations in particular. Therefore, I will discuss how the Muslim 
Council of Britain and the Russia Council of Muftis undertake their intermediary 
functions in the two countries in the pluralist and corporatist contexts of state-
religion relations. While I expect to observe divergence in how the two organisations 
engage with the state and (re)negotiate their role as community representatives in 
two different contexts, the thesis will also reveal some of the less obvious similarities 
in their institutional behaviour, in light of the changing nature of Muslim minorities, 
state approaches to religion and security landscape of state-Muslim relations.  
 
  
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Introduction  6 
A tale of two councils 
 
Before outlining a series of research questions to be examined in this study, it is 
important to provide a brief illustration of the two Muslim institutions. Key 
differences and similarities between the two organisations will become more 
apparent as the thesis unfolds, particularly in relation to historical legacies and state 
policies towards Muslim minorities, a rather complex organisational landscape of 
Muslim representation and the changing nature of Muslim communities themselves. 
In this section, however, I will show the basic differences between the two Muslim 
communities in Britain and Russia and explain the process in which the two councils 




The Muslim Council of Britain 
 
Muslims living in Britain constitute 4.8% of general population in England and 
Wales and 1.4% in Scotland (see Figure 1). Compared to other religious groups, 
Muslims are more affected by socio-economic factors, particularly those living in the 
economically-deprived areas, such as Tower Hamlets in East London where they 
make up 36% of local population (2011 Census). Many find themselves 
disadvantaged in relation to health provisions, housing and education (Hussain 
2008).  
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Figure 1. Religious affiliation in Britain1 
Religious 
affiliation 
2011 Census (England and Wales) % 
  
Scotland’s Census 2011 % 
 
Christian  59.3 54 
Muslim 4.8 1.4 
Hindu 1.5 0.3 
Sikh 0.8 0.1 
Jewish 0.5 0.1 
Buddhist 0.4 0.2 





No religion 25.1 37 
 
British Muslims belong to different ethnic and religious groups (see Figure 2), with a 
variety of interest-based organisations and associations (Ansari 2002, Peach 2005). 
The country’s own colonial legacies and state policies of multicultural integration as 
well as global developments help account for different cultural traditions, religious 
practices and political perspectives. Different migration waves, driven by work and 
education aspirations, family reasons, as well as the search for asylum and better 
living conditions have contributed to Muslim diversity in Britain.  
  
                                                 
1 This breakdown is based on the data provided by the Office for National Statistics (2011 Census: 
‘Key Statistics for England and Wales’, March 2011, Table 2: Religion) and the National Records of 
Scotland (Scotland’s Census 2011, Table KS209SCb – Religion). 
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The majority settled from South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) and 
East Africa, but many have also arrived from Turkey and later Somalia, 







Two thirds are Asian, with Pakistanis (38%) and Bangladeshis (15%) being 
the largest groups. 6.6% are of Arab origin and other white (e.g. Bosnian, 
Turkish or Turkish Cypriot) make up 4.8%.3 In Scotland, Pakistanis 
constitute 50% and make up the largest Muslim group (Scotland’s Census 
2011). 
 
The majority of British religious Muslims are Sunnis (Barelvis are the largest 
group, followed by Deobandis and those inspired by the Islamist ideas of the 





By the late 1990s, generational and cultural changes in Muslim social and political 
aspirations, coupled with domestic reverberations of the Rushdie Affair of 1988-9 
                                                 
2 Adapted from 2011 Census in England and Wales; Scotland’s Census 2011. 
3 Based on the analysis provided by British Religion in Numbers (2013). 
4 Barelvis and Deobandis belong to the two different movements of Sunni Hanafi Islam in South Asia, 
which originated in Bareilly and Deoband respectively. Jama’at-i-Islami is the Islamic revivalist party 
founded by Abdul A’la Maududi in 1941 in British India (modern Pakistan). 
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and British actions abroad, resulted in some Muslims feeling increasingly 
marginalised in British society and calling for greater representation of their interests 
(Ahmad and Evergeti 2010). While internal complexities and challenges of Muslim 
collective representation will be examined later in the thesis, it is important to note 
here that the rather fragmented nature of Muslim communities and the lack of official 
representatives encouraged community efforts to represent Muslim interests on the 
national level.  
 
The MCB was formed in 1997 as a large voluntary umbrella organisation engaged in 
negotiating Muslim interests with the state and representing Muslim interests in the 
public arena. The publication of Salman Rushdie’s controversial The Satanic Verses 
and the ensuing demonstrations throughout the Muslim World fuelled the debates in 
the British media on the freedom of speech, religious rights and the extent to which 
Muslim voices were being heard. The Council was created following a lengthy 
process of consultation with a number of Muslim associations and organisations 
seeking to provide collective representation of different Muslim interests and engage 
with British society on the issues of Muslim social exclusion and misrepresentation 
of Muslims in the media. The need for such an intermediary organisation was largely 
dictated by the previous failures of Muslim minorities to get their religious rights 
recognised in the public sphere, partly by the aftermath of the Rushdie Affair. 
Muslim community leaders inspired by the South Asian Islamic reform movements 
were particularly loud in expressing concerns that Muslims were unable to make 
their voices heard (Kepel 1997: 126-146).  
 
The growing violence of the Rushdie events, coupled with uncoordinated attempts by 
the various Muslim spokesmen to lobby the Home Office led the Conservative 
government of the day to pay closer attention to the situation (Archer 2009). Not 
only did it show the need to identify and engage with moderate and qualified 
interlocutors, but it also led to the desire to impose a certain degree of order and 
coordination on state-Muslim dialogue. While the Rushdie Affair exposed the 
vulnerability of Muslim communities and particularly their religious identity, the 
lack of connections with the government and the media highlighted the need for 
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moderate figures who could articulate Muslim claims (Pedziwiatr 2007, Radcliffe 
2004). 
 
Some of the leading Muslim figures, who had emerged through the struggles over the 
Rushdie Affair, such as Iqbal Sacranie or Chowdhury Mueen Uddin may have had 
Islamist roots and somewhat militant visions of Islam. However, against more radical 
manifestations of Muslim claims such as a public burning of Rushdie’s book in 
Bradford in January 1989, their middle-class background, professional nature and 
moderate discourse was welcomed by the government of the day. It was reported that 
Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, saw ‘disunity and absence of effective 
leadership as the main obstacle to Muslims advancement’ and called on Muslim 
groups to unite and speak with one voice (British Muslims Monthly Survey 1994a: 
17). 
 
During the first years of the Labour administration (in office 1997-2010), the MCB 
assumed the role of an interest group organisation mandated by the Muslim 
community (or at least those who supported the process of consultation) to articulate 
their grievances and fight against religious inequality. Alongside its more militant 
rhetoric on British foreign policy, it embarked on achieving social justice for British 
Muslims and developed a particular remit to engage with the government and the 
media on the issues of social exclusion, Islamophobia and legal protection for 
Muslim citizens. In the words of Pedziwiatr (2007: 273), the MCB acquired the 
status of an ‘insider’ in its attempt to influence the politics behind the scenes, while 
remaining an ‘outsider’ who, if required, was ready to take ‘a stand in the public 
sphere’ on Muslim issues. 
 
Today the MCB enjoys the status of a national umbrella body which includes around 
500 local, regional and national affiliates, such as mosques, educational and 
charitable organisations, women and youth group associations. The Islamic Society 
of Britain, the Muslim Association of Britain, the Federation of Muslim 
Organisations and the UK Islamic Mission represent some of its larger affiliates. The 
Council consists of different working committees and a board of counsellors, with 
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the General Assembly elected from the national, local and regional mosques and 
affiliated organisations every four years. In the British context of multiple 
organisations and pluralist forms of engagement which will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters, the MCB is continuously challenged by a plethora of different 
Muslim and non-Muslim civil society organisations. Some of the more vocal 
competing organisations, including the British Muslim Forum, the Quilliam 
Foundation and the Progressive British Muslims have criticised the MCB’s sectarian 
nature and Islamist legacies. In the thesis, I will examine how the Council has 
struggled to engage with the government by challenging its policies while remaining 
a legitimate voice of British Muslims.  
 
 
The Russia Council of Muftis 
 
Muslim communities living in the Russian Federation have had a long and 
complicated history of engaging with the Russian state (Hunter 2004). It is estimated 
that there are around 15-20 million Muslims in Russia, which constitutes up to 10% 
of population.5 In 2012, the ‘Levada-Center’6 conducted a sociological study on 




                                                 
5 These official figures are highly disputed, particularly because no questions on religious affiliation 
are included in the Census. As a result, Muslim population is calculated based on the ethnic dimension 
of the peoples who are considered to be ethnically Muslim.  
6 ‘Levada Center’ is a Russian independent, non-governmental polling and sociological research 
organisation. 
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Figure 3. Religious affiliation in Russia7 
 
Religious Affiliation Results for November 2012 % 
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No religion 10 
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Difficult to answer 2 
 
A key difference between Muslims in Russia and Muslims in Britain is that in spite 
of the increasing numbers of migrants from Central Asia, the majority of Muslims in 
Russia are not migrants, but are peoples who have resided in their present territories 
for centuries (see Figure 4). They include Russia’s ethnic Muslims who have 
traditionally concentrated in the Volga-Urals region, the North Caucasus, as well as 
large cities in the European part of Russia (Landa 2011, Yemelianova 2002).8 While 
the ethnic Muslims are more integrated into Russian society, Muslim migrants from 
Central Asia are vulnerable to xenophobic and anti-Muslim attacks, as well as poor 
socio-economic conditions.  
  
                                                 
7 This breakdown is based on the opinion poll by the ‘Levada-Center’ (2012). A sample of 1,596 
respondents from 45 regions was polled in November 2012. Although these figures are also contested, 
they provide a better illustration of Muslims as a religious rather than ethnic category. The percentage 
of Muslims population is lower than the national estimates not only because the question was 
specifically tailored to identify the number of believers, but also because it did not take into accounts 
Muslim migrants from Central Asia. For regional breakdown, see Research service ‘Sreda’ (2012). 
8 In Russia, the term ‘ethnic Muslims’ is used in relation to Russian citizens who were born into 
Muslim families and follow the Islamic tradition, in contrast to migrant population who adhere to 
Islam but are not Russian citizens. European part of Russia refers to the western areas of the country, 
bordered by the Ural Mountains in the east and Kazakhstan in the south. 
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A vast majority of Muslims are Russian citizens, but migrants from Central 
Asia also make up a large proportion of Muslim population. While many 
come illegally, Russia’ Federal Migration Service estimates that in 2011, 2 










Russia’s ethnic Muslims live in the Volga-Urals region and the North 
Caucasus, but many are dispersed throughout the country. Key ethnic groups 
include: Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ingush, Kabardinians, Karachai, 
Balkarians and numerous Dagestani peoples (largest groups are Avars and 
Dargins). Other groups include Azeris, small number of Arabs as well as 
Russian converts.  
 
Russian Muslims are predominantly Sunnis, although 5% (mainly Azeris) are 
Shi’a. Tatars and Bashkirs, as well as Muslim migrants who come from 
Central Asia, belong to the Hanafi school of Islam.  Shafi’i Sunnism and the 
Naqshbandi, Shadhili and Qadiri orders prevail in the North Caucasus.9 More 
radical Islamic ideology (e.g. Salafism) also gained influence (particularly in 
the North Caucasus.  
 
 
The federal nature of the Russian state, together with a wide range of regional 
variation in political and religious culture, has resulted in different levels of state 
intervention into the lives of its Muslim citizens. In the North Caucasus, economic 
                                                 
9 These are the Sufi orders which follow the teachings of the Sheiks: Bahauddin Naqshband, Abul 
Hasan Shadhili and Abdul Qadir Jilani respectively. 
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hardships, and regional instability in the aftermath of the two Chechen wars (1994–
1995 and 1999-2000) and the ensuing Islamic insurgency resulted in more repressive 
state policies towards Muslim organisations in the region (Souleimanov 2007, Ware 
et al. 2003). The importance of the state’s actions in the North Caucasus, its often 
repressive policies to counteract terrorist threats and its support for official Muslim 
organisations should not be underestimated. However, for the purposes of this study I 
will refer to them only indirectly, in as much as these developments have had an 
impact on the SMR’s engagement with the Russian authorities. In the thesis, I will 
focus mainly on the challenges facing Muslim organisations in the regions of the 
Russian Federation where Muslims represent a minority, particularly in many areas 
of the European part of Russia and in large cities.10 
 
The Russian context provides a curious setting for Muslim minority representation. 
On one hand, there is a long-established tradition of Muslim communities taking an 
active part in Russia’s multi-cultural, multi-faith and multi-ethnic co-existence 
between different peoples. On the other hand, the state has traditionally played a 
central role in managing religious and political diversity. Consequently, Muslim 
groups and organisations have had to adjust their activities in line with state 
expectations and the existing institutional provisions to accommodate Muslim 
interests.  
 
Traditional forms of Muslim representation through the system of Muslim Spiritual 
Boards (Dukhovnye Upravleniya Musul’man, DUMs) were officially 
institutionalised during the reign of Catherine the Great in 1788-89, particularly in 
respect of the Tatar and Bashkir communities. This system was subsequently 
modified under the Soviet Union and re-organised, following its collapse in 1991. 
While the late 1990s-early 2000s witnessed a proliferation of Muslim organisations, 
DUMs (also known as muftiyats11) have remained a key administrative unit for 
                                                 
10 On ethnic and religious complexities of Muslim communities in the North Caucasus, for example, 
see Bobrovnikov 2002, Makarov 2000, Yarlykapov 2010. 
11 Muftiyat is an administrative territorial unit under the supervision of a mufti. 
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regulating Muslim affairs (see Figure 5). The system of the DUMs does not include 
all Muslim organisations and many remain outside its centralised structures as 
individual units of administration and local organisations. However, over the years, 
the DUMs have served as the official channel of communication between state 
authorities and Muslim organisations. In particular, the DUMs have played the key 
role in Muslim religious governance in Russia, with over 60-70 of these self-
governing, centralised institutions, currently organised in a series of larger regional 
bodies.  
 






The problematic nature of such a system of Muslim representation and its legitimacy 
problems will be revealed later in the thesis. Bitter power struggles within the older 
                                                 
12 This is a rather simplified summary of the Muslim administrative structures in Russia, designed to 
illustrate how the different units of this centralised system fit together. Local community organisations 
(known as mahallas) are organised into larger administrative units (or mukhtasibats). Each 
mukhtasibat usually includes at least three local organisations. These larger organisations are brought 
together under the jurisdiction of the Muslim Spiritual Board (DUM) which is headed by a mufti or a 
council of muftis (mejlis). These centralised regional bodies form larger federal organisations, such as 
Russia’s Council of Muftis. 
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and newer members of the Muslim Spiritual Boards, coupled with a limited number 
of centralised organisations with access to the government, reflect the complexities 
of Muslim representation in Russia (Kurbanov 2010). However, in spite of the 
inherent inefficiencies and outdated nature of these institutions and their centralised 
structures of administration, this institutional framework has created mechanisms for 
Muslim representation in Russia and constituted a platform for any official 
organisation wishing to exercise any degree of influence in contemporary Russia.  
 
Russia’s Council of Muftis was created on 1 July 1996, largely as a result of these 
internal rivalries.13 Under the leadership of Ravil Gainutdin, a group of Muslim 
clerics from the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Central European Region of 
Russia (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Tsentral’no-Evropeiskogo regiona Rosii, 
DUMTsER) had split from the oldest and most influential organisation - the Central 
Spiritual Board of Muslims (Tsentral’noe Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man, 
TsDUM) and formed their own Muslim council. In 1998, DUMTsER changed its 
name to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Central European Region of Russia 
(Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Evropeiskoi chasti Rosii, DUMER). DUMER’s 
crucial contribution to the SMR’s institutional and organisational affairs will become 
clear as the thesis unfolds. 
 
From its early years, the SMR has distinguished itself from the TsDUM (and its 
leader Talgat Tadjuddin) by positioning itself as a more democratic Muslim interest 
group, seeking to protect the rights of Muslim minorities in Russia. Notwithstanding 
the personal ambitions of its senior leaders, the creation of the Council signalled 
moving away from the TsDUM’s uncritical and often conciliatory position towards 
the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The SMR’s leaders were 
increasingly unhappy with the privileged role of the ROC on the issues of religious 
prayer spaces. They positioned themselves as strong advocates of Muslim minority 
                                                 
13 On divisions within the Russian ummah see Laruelle 2005, pp.163-168, Tulsky 2003. For more 
controversial accounts and internal conflicts within the Muslim senior clergy, see also Silant’ev 2007.   
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rights against what they believed to be encroachments by the ROC and the lack of 
provisions for Muslim citizens to exercise their faith.  
 
Today it is a centralised religious organisation which brings together heads of 
different regional Muslim Spiritual Boards and represents a high proportion of the 
mosques and Muslim organisations in Russia. With the ongoing competition between 
the SMR and the TsDUM, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of their 
affiliates. Based on the recent information on the SMR’s in 2013, it has 1,400 
organisations under its jurisdiction.14 According to the Council’s figures, it brings 
together 18 regional Muslim spiritual boards, including the aforementioned DUMER, 
but also the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Asian part of Russia (Dukhovnoe 
Upravlenie Musul’man Aziatskoi chasti Rossii, DUMAChR) and the Spiritual Board 
of Muslims of the Saratov Region (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Saratovskoi 
Oblasti, DUMSO) as some of the larger affiliates. There are also a series of 
independent organisations and Muslim educational establishments which are 
currently affiliated to the SMR, such as the Moscow Islamic University and the 
newly created centralised Muslim organisation of the North-West (Obschina 
Musul’man Severo-Zapada).15 
 
With its central office in Moscow, the SMR seeks to represent Muslim interests in 
the public sphere and participates in national debates on citizenship, national values, 
threats of extremism and Islamophobia. The SMR is one of the five officially-
recognised Muslim centralised organisations, whose leaders are invited to official 
meetings with state officials and who participate in state-religion events. The other 
four organisations of Muslim representation in Russia are the TsDUM, the Spiritual 
Board of Muslims of Tatarstan (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Respubliki 
Tatarstan, DUMRT), the Coordination Centre of Muslims of the North 
                                                 
14 This is according to the figures on the online portal created by DUMER (2013). In 2011, the SMR 
claimed to have 2, 500 affiliates under its jurisdiction (Gainutdin 2011d). This included the ones under 
the jurisdiction of the DUM of Tatarstan (previously affiliated to the SMR). The TsDUM claims it 
currently has over 2, 500 affiliates (TsDUM Website). These figures will become particularly 
important in relation to the ongoing competition between the SMR and TsDUM (see Chapter 6).  
15 DUMRF.Ru provides further information on the individual members of the SMR and the TsDUM. 
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Caucasus (Koordinatsionnyi Tsentr Musul’man Severnogo Kavkaza, KTsMSK) and 
the Russian Association of Islamic Accord (Rossiiskaya Assotsiatsiya Islamskogo 
Soglasiya, RAIS). 
 
In the Russian context of centralised forms of Muslim representation, a strong role of 
the Orthodox Church and a growing gap between the state-endorsed official 
interlocutors and unofficial Muslim organisations, the SMR struggles to retain its 
privileged status in the eyes of the government and the support of Muslim 
communities. In the thesis, I will explore the ways in which it attempts to mobilise 
Muslim support and challenge the Russian government and society without 
overstepping the institutional boundaries of state-religion relations.  
 
The brief presentation of Muslim communities and the two Muslim councils in their 
respective contexts suggests that they are quite different Muslim institutions, not 
only in terms of their respective constituencies and priorities, but also in terms of 
their organisational composition and past experiences. The MCB is an umbrella body 
which was created following a long process of consultation with a number of Muslim 
associations and organisations. The SMR is a centralised religious organisation 
which consists of regionally established Muslim Spiritual Boards in the European 
part of the Russian Federation but claims to speak on behalf of all Muslims in 
Russia.  
 
At first glance, the different character of the two institutions might question the 
usefulness of comparing the two organisations and their representative strategies. 
However, over the last twenty years the two organisations have come to occupy a 
prominent, albeit similarly controversial place in state-Muslim relations. A series of 
converging challenges of engaging with state authorities and ensuring support from 
Muslim communities under different conditions of state-religion relations enhances 
the validity of such a comparison.  
 
The Muslim councils provide a good example of public organisations acting on 
behalf of Muslim communities as representatives of their interests. In this capacity, 
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both councils have to make decisions on the extent to which they can afford to 
cooperate with the government and civil society actors. Similarly, both councils have 
to respond to criticisms from sections of Muslim communities which view them as 
undemocratic, out of touch, and organised in a way that does not reflect the diversity 
of Muslim interests they claim to represent.  
 
While acknowledging the different rationalities in their representative activities, the 
project will compare and contrast the councils’ attempts to legitimise themselves as 
key state partners on issues of preventing extremism, combating Islamophobia and 
dealing with integration challenges. Both institutions share similar administrative 
responsibilities in ensuring that Muslim practices and religious rights are protected 
within the changing framework of state approaches to religion. For example, both 
institutions have increasingly engaged in lobbying their respective governments on 
the need to accommodate Muslim practices and introduce provisions to train imams, 
regulate halal provisions, and prevent Muslim discrimination on religious grounds.   
 
However, rather than examining the two institutions in the context of religious 
pluralism, the study will use a more differentiated framework of political, 
organisational and religious insights, designed to understand their behaviour under 
different conditions of cooperation and confrontation, collective representation and 
diversified engagement with different segments of Muslim population. Although a 
comparative analysis of different modes of religious pluralism emphasises the 
dynamic process of accommodating Muslim practices in the two countries, it is less 
helpful in uncovering the ways in which Muslim umbrella organisations respond to 
the challenges of co-optation and representation. 
 
Therefore, in the thesis I will discuss the councils’ engagement with the government 
and Muslim communities in relation to particular contexts of pluralist and corporatist 
approaches to state-religion relations. The study will explore the ways in which the 
two Muslim councils sought to provide more robust and differentiated representation 
of Muslim political and religious claims in the two countries. The interface between 
political, organisational and religious elements of Muslim representation will provide 
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a better understanding of the complex role the two Muslim umbrella organisations 
play in state-Muslim relations.  
 
 
Research questions and the structure of the thesis 
 
As was illustrated earlier, the two Muslim councils have acquired a rather complex 
status of being state-recognised partners on Muslim integration on one hand, while 
challenging the state on the issue of Muslim identity rights on the other. As 
intermediary institutions, they find themselves under pressure to reconcile their 
credibility as state interlocutors with being legitimate representatives of Muslim 
communities. With this duality in mind, the thesis explores how particular tensions 
between co-optation and representation influence the nature and scope of actions the 
Muslim councils have in mediating between the interests of the state and Muslim 
communities. 
 
Without a degree of access to the state and working relations with the government, 
Muslim councils face the risk of their proposals being neglected or rejected by state 
officials, while the failure to push their initiatives through may also cost them 
support of Muslim communities. Conversely, without the support from Muslim 
minorities, the government may view these interest group organisations as 
unrepresentative of Muslim opinions and concerns. If the institutions are not 
considered to be the appropriate and relevant interlocutor to engage with, they can 
become marginalised.  
 
Therefore, the central question of the thesis will address the interface of external and 
internal pressures on the two Muslim organisations, who have become firmly 
institutionalised in their respective contexts of state-Muslim relations, namely: 
 
How do Muslim councils manage pressures of co-optation and representation under 
the different conditions of corporatist and pluralist interest mediation?  
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The overall question will be divided into a series of smaller questions: 
 
1. In what ways are state-Muslim relations in Britain and Russia shaped by 
pluralist and corporatist forms of interest group mediation? 
 
2. How far and under which conditions do Muslim councils decide to engage 
with or disengage from the state? 
 
3. What challenges and constraints do Muslim councils face in securing support 
from Muslim communities and how do they deal with them? 
 
4. To what extent are their relations with the state and their efforts to engage 
with Muslim communities interdependent? 
 
Before examining the ways in which the two Muslim councils mediate between state 
authorities and Muslim communities, I will address the first question by outlining the 
institutional context in which this interaction unfolds. Drawing on the ideal types of 
pluralist and corporatist forms of interest group politics, I will reflect on the nature of 
state-Muslim relations in Britain and Russia in light of the institutional arrangements 
for state engagement with religious groups. This will allow me to subsequently 
explore the extent to which the councils’ interaction with the state and their 
engagement with Muslim communities conform to the pluralist or corporatist 
conditions. 
 
The study will then examine the influence of institutional arrangements on the 
councils’ engagement with the state. My expectation is that under the pluralist 
conditions of state-religion relations, the Muslim council will face less pressure to 
cooperate with the government than under the corporatist setting, with the 
specificities of the two contexts influencing the scope of engagement in each case. 
The notion of the state will be understood in broad terms and refer to different 
institutions exercising political authority, including government officials, 
representatives from interior ministries and committees on security and religion.  
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State-Muslim relations will be conceptualised as the external institutional 
environment in which state authorities engage with Muslim communities and their 
institutions within a wider field of state-religion relations. The process of 
engagement will refer to having a direct access to the government through regular 
consultations and meetings with government officials, face-to-face or in the presence 
of other representative organisations, and actively using this access to lobby the state 
to bring about improvements to the lives of Muslim citizens.  
 
The third question aims at exploring the ways in which the two councils engage with 
Muslim communities and identifying key factors influencing their efforts to build 
community support. Theories concerning the internal dynamics of interest groups or 
social movement organisations suggest that over time organisations may become 
increasingly concerned with maintaining their internal legitimacy and integrating 
themselves with their constituents. I expect to find a series of contemporary and 
historically contingent factors which may have created particular patterns of internal 
institutional arrangements and power-sharing practices in the two organisations from 
the days they were formed. Using the example of internal institutional reforms, I will 
compare the range of strategies the two councils proposed and implemented to 
legitimise themselves in the eyes of their affiliates and Muslim communities in 
general. 
 
Therefore, the study will compare and contrast the internal and external dimension of 
the Muslim councils’ role in the process of interest mediation. I will discuss the 
extent to which commitment to Muslim communities and cooperation with the state 
becomes an increasingly shared problem for the two very different organisations. 
The external institutional environment will be used to conceptualise the nature of the 
councils’ relations with the state and civil society organisations (e.g. competing 
Muslim institutions and other confessional groups). The internal institutional 
environment will refer to particular organisational structures and patterns of 
historically entrenched power dynamics within these organisations (or their 
precursors). I expect to see some convergence in how the external environment of 
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pluralist and corporatist state-religion relations influences the nature of internal 
measures of self-legitimation undertaken by the two councils. 
 
Before outlining the project’s contribution to existing literature about Muslim 
representation and integration in Britain and Russia, it is important to acknowledge 
the project’s preference for examining the behaviour of the two Muslim 
organisations on the national level. While discussing the intermediary role of the two 
institutions in the framework of Muslim participation in religious governance, the 
study can only offer a partial account of the local dimension of Muslim politics on 
the one hand and the transnational nature of Muslim communities on the other.  
A stronger comparative focus on particular local challenges and regional aspects of 
Muslim representation in the two countries might have provided a more nuanced 
approach to contextualising the individual specificities of Muslim communities and 
their respective engagement with the councils. However, this would have obscured 
the overall task of comparing and contrasting the ways in which the two councils 
sought to reconcile the duality of being interlocutors of the state on the one hand, 
while remaining legitimate representatives of Muslim communities on the other. 
Therefore, without neglecting the ways in which the two national umbrella bodies 
engaged with their local and regional affiliates and embraced their internal 
organisational issues (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6), a greater emphasis will be 
placed on the national arena of state-Muslim relations.  
Similarly, a largely state-centric approach was chosen as a more practical way of 
tracing differences and similarities in the councils’ efforts to achieve authenticity 
with Muslim communities under a particular set of nationally-bound conditions. For 
example, as will be illustrated in the thesis, the two councils used a similar strategy 
of incorporating universal discourses of Islamic teachings within the particular 
context of national approaches to organisational legitimacy and restructuring. 
Without neglecting the transnational element of Muslim populations, the project will 
make a series of references to specific efforts by the councils to connect not only 
with Muslims from different ethnic groups, but also to engage with young Muslims, 
acknowledging their global outlook on Islam and territorial belonging. However, 
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these references will be limited to emphasising key implications of the changing 




A series of challenges associated with Muslim integration and representation have 
received considerable coverage in Western scholarship. In the aftermath of 9/11, 
academic discussions focused on different ways of accommodating Muslim claims in 
state-religion relations, the existing institutional mechanisms of engaging with 
minority interests, security challenges and state policies towards radical Islam. 
Similarly, Russian scholars have discussed the challenges of state relations with 
Islam, Muslim diversity and the impact of Islamic radicalisation.16  
 
The value of this project lies in offering an original comparative study of the two 
Muslim councils in Britain and Russia. Its distinct contribution consists of 
uncovering rather unexpected similarities in external and internal mechanisms of 
Muslim representation in the two different contexts, traditionally associated with 
pluralist and corporatist approaches to state-religion relations. Rich empirical data, 
combined with integrated theoretical approaches to examining institutionalised forms 
of mobilisation and organisational legitimacy, highlighted some of the less obvious 
convergences in the two cases.  
 
Of particular interest are the two sets of findings relating to the councils’ engagement 
with state officials and Muslim communities. As will be discussed in the empirical 
chapters, the data indicated that the councils’ respective interactions with national 
governments were affected by the dynamic nature of state-religion relations and 
ideological shifts in government policies towards Muslim minorities. It also 
emphasised that in their relations with Muslim communities, the two organisations 
                                                 
16 Please see Maussen 2007 for a comprehensive overview of the Western academic research on Islam 
and Muslims in Europe. On Russian scholars and a series of past and recent studies on Islam, see 
Bobrovnikov 2007. 
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had embarked on the programme of internal reforms, notwithstanding their own 
organisational limitations and the growing criticisms of their activities.  
 
Therefore, by providing the dual perspective of council-state and council-community 
relations, the research has sought to contribute to a better understanding of the 
linkages between Muslim organisations’ engagement with the state and their efforts 
to respond to the changing needs of Muslim communities. While these and other 
findings will be discussed in greater detail in this thesis, in this section I will outline 





The project’s empirical value lies in its attempt to fill some of the literature gaps on 
Muslim representation in Britain and Russia. A series of general studies have shared 
a thematically similar interest in understanding the complex nature of Muslim 
communities and their changing relations with the British and Russian state (Ansari 
2002, Abbas 2005 and Gilliat-Ray 2010; Hunter 2004, Malashenko 2007 and 
Yemelianova 2002). They provided rich descriptions of the national specificities of 
state-Islam relations and a solid understanding of Muslim communities, interests and 
organisations. However, few studies have specifically focused on the Muslim 
councils and their organisational strategies, rhetoric and engagement in state-Muslim 
relations. In the thesis, I will draw on some of these general studies to explain the 
patterns of state-Muslim relations in the two countries. The project will also build on 
existing knowledge on the Muslim councils and provide new insights on their 
institutional behaviour. 
 
British studies on Muslim representation and integration have discussed the 
challenges of accommodating Muslim migrants within an increasingly securitised 
context of multicultural policies, preventing extremism and protecting Muslim rights 
in British political system, society and the media (Brighton 2007, Meer and Modood 
2009, Poole 2002). The changing nature of Muslim communities marked a change in 
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the scholarly agenda from examining issues of social exclusion, ethnic migration and 
policies of multiculturalism to focusing on the growing stratification within Muslim 
communities, increased Islamophobia and security threats (Hussain 2008, Lambert 
and Githens-Mazer 2010). While these studies addressed some of the issues affecting 
Muslim communities, they paid less attention to the changes that took place within 
the strategies of Muslim organisations. In this study, I will address a series of shifts 
which took place in the Muslim councils’ approaches to institutional legitimacy in 
response to the changing nature of Muslim communities. 
 
The two recent projects have explored the development of Muslim civil society and 
the growing importance of Muslim religious identity and participation in politics 
(Bolognani and Statham 2013, O’Toole et al. 2013). The first work discussed the 
ways in which Muslim organisations tried to ‘serve and represent Muslim 
communities while operating within a political environment shaped by contextual 
factors’ (Bolognani and Statham 2013: 232). For example, it showed that a particular 
combination of top-down political opportunities and bottom-up faith engagement 
contributed to different Muslim groups coming together.   
 
The second study focused on Muslim political participation in contemporary 
governance and explored practices of state-Muslim engagement in the period of 
1997-2013 in the areas of faith-sector governance, counter-terrorism and inequality. 
The research focused on monitoring shifts in Muslim political participation over the 
last two decades and highlighted the increased pluralisation of Muslim interests as an 
indicator of the ‘complexity and maturity of Muslim civil society.’ (O’Toole et al. 
2013: 28). Their analysis of Muslim organisations was based on exploring the 
shifting government approach on representation and the changing patterns of Muslim 
participation. A similar approach will be used in the thesis to better understand the 
changing context of state-Muslim engagement in Britain.  
 
British scholars have also provided accounts of the MCB and its participation in 
British politics. McLoughlin (2005) offered a detailed exploration of the MCB as an 
institution, its origins and the complexities of internal power struggles. Works by 
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Pedziwiatr (2007) and Radcliffe (2004) used the example of the MCB and its 
engagement with the government to discuss particular challenges of Muslim 
representation in Britain. Their studies focused on the MCB’s efforts to engage in 
Muslim activism and influence government policies at home and abroad. However, 
the fast-moving pace of state-Muslim relations meant that these works were written 
too early to reflect the changing fortunes of the MCB. With the Council’s waning 
popularity after the London bombings in July 2005, fewer works tended to examine 
this organisation on its own terms, rather than in the wider context of its participation 
in British politics. A number of researchers who provided more contemporary 
accounts of the MCB’s activities have become more critical of the organisation. (Birt 
2008, Glynn 2008). A longer timeframe used in the thesis will allow me to better 
understand the changing fortunes of the MCB as a Muslim interest group struggling 
to mediate between government and community expectations.  
 
Literature on Muslim communities in Russia has placed a strong emphasis on 
historical legacies and regional diversity of Muslim population. Many studies 
discussed federal specificities of the Russian state and its Muslim-dominated regions, 
thus providing rich accounts of Muslim diversity and differentiated state approaches 
to Muslim integration in Tatarstan and the North Caucasus (Bobrovnikov 2002, 
Dannreuther and March 2010, Nabiev et al. 2002, Pilkington and Yemelianova 
2003). Within the regional focus, other works have discussed the extent to which 
some Muslim groups had become radicalised and how this was dealt with by the 
state and Muslim communities (Hahn 2008, Malashenko and Yarlykapov 2009, 
Sagramoso 2007). 
 
Russian studies on the SMR have explored the Council’s institutional strengths and 
weaknesses in relation to historical legacies of Muslim administration and the system 
of Muslim Spiritual Boards (Kurbanov 2010, Silant’ev 2007, Tulsky 2003). 
Considering Russia’s long-term engagement with Islam, more historical approaches 
helped to establish a degree of continuity between past and present forms of Muslim 
representation in Russia. However, while some studies provided rather descriptive 
narratives on the nature of the SMR and its history, others may have adopted a less 
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neutral perspective. While these works highlighted particular weaknesses of these 
institutions, only few scholars discussed organisational reforms designed to make the 
institution more efficient and representative (Kurbanov and Mukhametov 2011). The 
thesis will try remedy some of these limitations by incorporating historical details 
with contemporary findings from interviews and statements from the SMR’s leaders 
and other Muslim representatives. 
 
This brief and by no means exhaustive overview of some of the relevant national 
studies on Muslim communities and Muslim councils suggests that despite some 
commonalities there exists a thematic gap between British and Russian scholarship 
on Muslim representation, participation and integration. Considering the different 
nature of Muslim communities and differences in political and religious traditions of 
the two countries, it is not surprising that some of these issues gained different levels 
of resonance within the two literatures. Whereas the British works appear to have 
focused on examining state policies in relation to Muslim claims and the 
development of Muslim civil society organisations, the Russian studies paid 
particular attention to the role of the state in managing religious provisions for 
Muslim communities.  
 
A more integrated approach will be used in the thesis to examine the impact of state 
policies and civil society expectations on Muslim interest organisations.17 The study 
will seek to provide a more nuanced typology of the changing organisational context 
of state-religion relations and its influence on Muslim minority organisations in 
Britain and Russia. It will discuss the role of civil society in shaping the councils’ 
scope for engagement with state authorities and Muslim communities in the two 
countries. Moreover, it will highlight a series of opportunities and constraints 
furnished by working together with civil society organisations in general and Muslim 
                                                 
17 For national studies on Muslim councils in other European countries, see Caeiro 2005, Laurence 
and Vaïsse 2005 on the Muslim council in France, or a detailed study of by Rosenow-Williams (2012) 
on Muslim organisations in Germany.   
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segment of civil society in particular.18 It will also explore the complex politico-
religious nature of the two institutions by focusing on the ways in which the two 




Contribution to comparative research  
 
Alongside its empirical contribution, the value of the thesis lies in developing an 
analytical framework which would allow the comparison of different aspects of 
Muslim representation through the lens of these complex organisations. While 
extending the comparative leverage of the Western studies on Muslim representation, 
the project's contribution lies in overcoming a geographical bias and exploring the 
extent to which the findings can be generalizable in different national contexts. 
 
Comparative studies on Muslim councils in Europe are rare and there are no apparent 
studies to date that compare Western Muslim councils with their Russian 
counterpart. The two scholars who provide a comparative snapshot of different 
councils in the European context are Silvestri (2005) and Laurence (2009). Silvestri 
examined the role and functions of Muslim councils in Britain, France and Italy in 
the context of integration and securitisation. Laurence discussed the establishment of 
‘quasi monopolistic Islam Councils’ by interior governments in seven European 
countries (Austria, Spain, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy and Germany). He 
analysed the process of Muslim political participation in relation to institutional 
developments in (neo)-corporatism. In my project, I will try to explain corporatist 
                                                 
18 In this study civil society is broadly defined as the collection of voluntary associations and non-
government organisations seeking to foster a sense of cooperation and engagement among members 
of society in order to encourage government accountability and keep interests of the majority in check 
(see Putnam 1993, 1995 and Seligman 1997). Therefore, discussions on the nature of state-religion 
relations in Britain and Russia will refer to civil society in terms of different religious and civic 
organisations and networks. However, the project will also make a particular reference to Muslim civil 
society as an integral part of wider civil society, playing a key role in shaping state-Muslim relations 
in the two countries (to a larger or smaller degree). 
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features of state-Islam relations in Russia. I will add a contrasting example of 
institutional pluralism to understand the nature of state-Muslim engagement in 
Britain. 
 
Over the last decade, comparative works on the ethnic dimension of Muslim identity 
have become complemented by the increased focus on its religious component and 
state-Islam relations. For example, Statham et al. (2005) discussed the processes of 
accommodating Muslim migrant claims in Britain, France and Netherlands, 
indicating a problematic relationship between Islam and the state. Klaussen (2005) 
emphasised the implications of complex politico-religious perspectives of Muslim 
spokesmen on general processes of Muslim integration. However, the internal 
dimension of how religious notions affect institutional legitimacy of Muslim 
organisations has not received sufficient attention. 
 
The study will also discuss the extent to which the need to accommodate the 
religious dimension of Muslim claims has resulted in a series of changes in 
traditionally pluralist or corporatist approaches to state engagement with Muslim 
communities in Britain and Russia respectively. Moreover, an exploration of policy 
shifts in promoting an increasingly corporatist recognition of religious pluralism not 
only in Russia, but also in Britain suggests the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of the two approaches, currently missing in the existing literature on 
accommodation of Muslim rights and practices.  
 
A more common approach among European scholars has been to examine Muslim 
organisations in light of broader processes of integration, participation and 
representation. Some works emphasised the importance of structural factors and 
institutional settings of the receiving societies (Cesari and McLoughlin 2005, 
Loobuyck et al. 2013, Triandafyllidou et al. 2011). Other studies prioritised 
mobilising strategies and claims-making processes of migrant groups and their 
dynamic interaction with institutional structures (Koopmans and Statham 2005, 
Martiniello and Statham 1999, Schrover and Vermeulen 2005).  
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A more recent project on cultural interactions between Muslim immigrants and the 
receiving states (EURISLAM)19 aimed at providing a deeper understanding of cross-
national variations in top-down factors of Muslim integration and bottom-up 
dynamics of Muslim self-organisation (Cinalli and Giugni 2013). In the thesis, I will 
seek to develop a more integrated comparative framework to better understand the 
organisational behaviour of Muslim councils in different political contexts. 
 
The two comparative studies that bring together institutionalist approaches and the 
theory of political opportunity structures on group mobilisation are Maussen (2009) 
and Odmalm (2005). Maussen’s study on mosque building in France and the 
Netherlands examined institutionalisation of Islam as the outcome of political 
processes in which Muslim groups were to ‘enter into relations of cooperation and 
conflict with a range of actors, institutions and governments’ (Maussen 2009: 18). 
However, his main argument was grounded in historical institutionalism. Maussen 
analysed colonial past and path-dependent legacies that had shaped public policies as 
key factors responsible for divergent approaches to governance of Islam in the two 
countries. In his study on migration policies and political participation in Western 
democracies, Odmalm (2005) combined analysis of institutional environment with a 
detailed examination of a particular set of political opportunities and constraints 
which help account for the variance between different national arrangements. In turn, 
these were used to define the nature and scope of actions available to migrant 
organisations in Sweden and the Netherlands. Institutional arrangements in the two 
countries were contrasted with those in Britain, France and Germany.  
 
Western comparative studies have examined a variety of theoretical and empirical 
challenges of state-Islam relations and Muslim institutions. However, there is a 
tendency to select cases which are either politically and geographically similar or 
culturally and linguistically familiar. Therefore, findings are drawn primarily from 
                                                 
19 EURISLAM is a European comparative project, co-funded by the European Commission within 
Seventh Framework Programme. Conducted between 2009 and 2012, it examined incorporation of 
Islam in European Member States. 
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the European or American contexts, where the immigrant nature of Muslim 
communities, pressures of integration and security concerns can be held constant 
(Bleich 2010, Cesari 2009, Kepel 1997). There is little cross-fertilisation between 
Russian and Western studies, with analysis of Russian Muslim communities and 
institutions being rarely incorporated into a wider comparative study.  
 
There exist, however, a handful of studies which either bring together different 
experiences in one thematically-based volume, or seek to compare Russia’s 
engagement with Islam with how these similar processes have been addressed in a 
different political regime. A collection of articles considered shared challenges 
facing young Muslims in Britain and Russia (Shterin and Spalek 2011). Although it 
did not attempt to draw a direct comparison between the two countries, it illustrated a 
series of findings on radicalism, ethnicity and faith. Works by Pain and Suslova 
(2012) and Suslova (2012) discussed the issues of state efforts to curb xenophobia 
and Islamophobia in Russia and the United States. Their work contrasted the Russian 
paternalistic approach with the cooperative nature of state-Islam relations in America 
(Suslova 2012: 19). Although their research made references to Muslim 
organisations, the main focus was on anti-Muslim feelings in the two states. With a 
large set of differences in political systems and the complex nature of Muslim 
communities themselves the limited scope of such comparisons and their rarity is not 
surprising. This project will contribute to remedying a persistent geographical bias 
by widening the comparative scope and incorporating a seemingly different 
experience of state-engagement with Muslim communities in Russia. 
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A more nuanced theoretical framework 
 
The thesis will provide an integrated theoretical approach to explore the complexity 
of Muslim councils as already-established institutionalised organisations engaged in 
articulating minority interests. Its theoretical contribution is expected to be three-
fold.  
 
First, the project will seek to make contribution to theories of social movements and 
institutionalist approaches to organisational change and internal legitimacy. Without 
neglecting individual theoretical positions represented by each approach, I will try to 
provide a more dynamic framework based on the interaction between the two 
approaches. Structural and discursive elements of political opportunities have been 
successfully addressed in claims-making literature on citizenship and ethnic 
representation (Koopmans and Statham 2000). However, insights from historical 
institutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) can deepen our understanding not only 
of political opportunities but also long-term constraints on organisational 
development of interest group actors.  
 
Second, the study aims at extending the existing approaches on political opportunity 
structures by including a religious dimension in the existing typology on state-society 
relations. It seeks to expand the theoretical leverage of the comparison by providing 
two contrasting examples of interest mediation in pluralist and corporatist settings of 
state-society relations. In the existing literature, the two settings tend to be theorised 
in political terms, rather than in relation to religious arrangements. The proposed 
study will expand the existing typology by including the religious dimension and 
applying it to the context of religious governance and minority representation. To 
better understand the two contrasting contexts of state-Muslim relations in Britain 
and Russia, the thesis will develop a more nuanced theoretical framework by 
combining insights on claims-making and mobilisation together with the contextual 
institutionalisation of interest group organisations.  
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Third, the theoretical contribution of the thesis lies in conceptualising the behaviour 
of each Muslim council in the two different institutional arenas, the external 
environment of state-religion relations and the internal environment of Muslim 
communities and their organisations. The suggested framework provides a dual 
perspective to examine the ways in which the two Muslim councils negotiate with 
the state and seek to represent Muslim communities. Moreover, the dual perspective 
allows us to explore a series of more general theoretical expectations on agency and 
structure in political research. In particular, this is addressed in relation to the 






The proposed thesis will first outline some theoretical and methodological 
considerations of the study. It will then provide a detailed analysis of the empirical 
data on the two Muslim councils in relation to their engagement with the state and 
Muslim communities. Finally, it will provide a comparative summary of the key 
findings and draw a series of conclusions. 
 
Chapter 1 will provide a theoretical framework for the thesis. To reflect the 
institutional complexity of the two councils, the study suggests framing them as 
institutionalised social movement organisations contesting the nature of state-Muslim 
relations, while fighting to maintain their own legitimacy with Muslim communities. 
The project’s preoccupation with the interplay of contextual factors and the 
institutions’ own actions and rhetoric in engaging with their external and internal 
environments requires a broad institutionalist framework to address the variety of 
challenges facing the two councils. The chapter will discuss the ways in which 
different social movements and institutionalist approaches can be used to elucidate 
particular processes and challenges of interest mediation in state-Muslim relations. 
 
The theory of political opportunity structures will help conceptualise a series of 
opportunities and constraints which influence the ways in which the two councils 
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decide to engage with or disengage from the state. A series of insights from 
organisational approaches will help theorise the ways in which the two interest group 
organisations struggle to maintain legitimacy with their own affiliated members and 
the wider constituency of Muslim communities. The historically sensitive lens of 
historical institutionalism will be outlined to reveal the extent to which internal 
decision-making is influenced by the events in which the two councils had been 
created. I will emphasise the usefulness of a historical perspective to determine the 
extent to which particular political affiliations, preferences and approaches to power-
distribution may have continued to influence the councils’ present strategies.  
  
The aforementioned theoretical insights will be applied to analyse the empirical data 
collected on the two councils. Chapter 2 will provide a summary of methodological 
challenges raised by the project. It will focus on comparative considerations behind 
the project and discuss the issues associated with research design and data collection. 
 
The empirical part of the thesis will provide a detailed exploration of the ways in 
which the two Muslim councils have tried to reconcile their commitment to Muslim 
communities with state expectations. Each case study will consist of two parallel 
chapters on the council’s engagement with the state and the council’s engagement 
with Muslim communities in each country. The analysis will be informed by 
theoretical insights on political opportunities and mobilising strategies, 
organisational contingencies and historical constraints.  
 
Chapters 3 will explore how the MCB engages with the British government. First, I 
will outline the pluralist nature of state-religion relations in Britain by using the 
concepts of formal and informal opportunities and constraints. I will then examine 
the extent to which the Council’s strategies of cooperation and confrontation with 
state authorities have been influenced by shifts in formal approaches to religion and 
the widening religious cleavages, exemplified by the growing Islamophobia and 
discrimination of Muslim communities. I will also explore the ways in which the 
Council has changed its rhetoric in response to the changing configurations of 
competing organisations and allies.  
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Chapter 4 will discuss the MCB’s struggle to represent the diverse nature of Muslim 
interests in Britain and to establish itself as a legitimate voice of British Muslims. I 
will apply insights from organisational sociology on institutional development to 
discuss strategies used by the MCB to build support for its organisation, reform its 
internal processes and make its institutional structures more accountable and 
inclusive. I will also analyse historically contingent resistance to the proposed 
reforms in relation to traditional structures of power sharing relations in mosque 
committees. 
 
Chapters 5 will examine the SMR’s relations with the Russian state. First, I will 
explain the corporatist nature of state-religion relations in Russia, in light of its 
institutional opportunities and constraints. Similarly to the British case, I will then 
explore the extent to which the Council’s engagement with state authorities conforms 
to the corporatist expectations. In particular, I will discuss how far its strategies and 
rhetoric have been affected by shifts in formal approaches to religion and changes in 
religious cleavages, exemplified by public recognition of religion on one hand and 
the growing discrimination of Muslims migrant communities on the other. 
 
Chapter 6 will focus on the ways in which the SMR has struggled to represent a 
variety of Muslim interests in Russia. As in the British case, I will apply insights 
from organisational sociology and institutionalist approaches to examine the 
Council’s efforts to improve its reputation among Russian Muslims. In particular, I 
will discuss a series of internal reforms designed to make the Council’s 
organisational structures more efficient, consolidated and inclusive. Finally, I will 
examine the scope and nature of these reforms in light of the historically contingent 
patterns of Muslim representation through the traditional structures of the Muslim 
Spiritual Boards. 
 
In the concluding chapter, I will bring together the insights from the two case studies 
and focus on the interplay between cooperation and representation, mobilisation and 
institutionalisation. I will summarise the key findings and outline some of the more 
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interesting and less obvious areas of convergence between the two cases. I will also 
tease out more general implications of the thesis for future research about Muslim 
intermediary institutions. While the study discusses individual elements generally 
associated with pluralist and corporatist forms of interest mediation, it will also 
highlight that the boundaries between the two types are not necessarily fixed, but 
open to internal modification. Finally, the study will emphasise the dilemma of 
Muslim minority representation through such national umbrella bodies. In particular, 
it will show the inherent tension between the Muslim councils’ ability to act as a 
reliable partner of the state, while remaining a representative voice of Muslim 
communities.
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Chapter 1 





The thesis examines how the two Muslim councils respond to the dual pressure of 
working with the state and representing Muslim communities in Britain and Russia. 
In order to explain the ways in which the two organisations engage with the state and 
legitimise their actions in the eyes of Muslim communities, I will draw on two 
theoretical approaches. The first approach is grounded in theories of social 
movements and linkages with contentious politics, discursive framing and political 
opportunity structures (Kriesi et al. 1995, McAdam et al. 1996, Tarrow 1998). The 
second approach brings together institutionalist insights on organisational behaviour 
and historically contingent understanding of change and power relations (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Pierson 2004).  
 
The first group of theories will be applied to analyse how the two councils negotiate 
and engage with the external environment of state-religion relations based on the 
corporatist or pluralist arrangements. Social movement theories are instrumental in 
understanding how interest group organisations engage in contentious yet peaceful 
strategies to articulate Muslim claims. Particular configurations of political 
opportunity structures are likely to account for divergent strategies of engagement. 
Building on different models of political opportunity structures, I will develop a 
typology which could be applied to understand how the different patterns of state-
religion relations influence the councils’ strategies.  
 
Institutionalist approaches will be used to better understand the organisational 
dynamic and rhetoric of how the two councils engage with their own constituents and 
other Muslim organisations in light of their own past practices and current changes in 
the nature of Muslim communities. Discursive approaches and insights on the 
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processes of institutionalisation will be used to examine how the two councils frame 
their actions to improve their legitimacy. While political opportunities, negotiated by 
the challengers, may encourage the choice of a particular course of action, they may 
also constrain it. Another theoretical expectation is that the councils’ decisions 
(particularly in relation to their own organisations) are likely to be contingent not 
only on their own skills and resources, but also on historically entrenched internal 
power struggles and previous patterns of engagement. 
 
The interaction between social movement and institutionalist approaches allows for a 
dynamic, yet context-sensitive framework to explore the linkages between Muslim 
councils’ actions and their institutional environment. It provides an opportunity to 
conceptualise the intermediary role the two councils play in state-Muslim relations 
and to understand how their actions and discourses are mediated by the context. The 
project draws on the two sets of literature to provide a deeper understanding of the 
similarities and differences in how the two councils challenge the state and mobilise 
support within a particular set of past and present opportunities and constraints. 
 
In this chapter, I will first outline how far the two Muslim councils conform to a dual 
function of being involved in contentious politics and minority interest mobilisation, 
while acquiring some attributes associated with institutionalised interest group 
organisations. Second, I will use insights from social movement theories to suggest 
the ways in which political opportunities are likely to structure state-religion 
relations. I will then explore more discursive strategies which the two councils are 
likely to use to mediate between what they believe to be Muslim interests and what 
they understand to be state expectations. Finally, I will highlight the importance of 
historical factors as further constraints on the councils’ scope of actions and ability to 
respond to the changing nature of Muslim representation. 
 
The underlying argument of the theoretical framework is that social actors are 
subject to external and internal opportunities and constraints which influence 
political outcomes. Institutional environments matter in shaping the choices actors 
make by facilitating or constraining a particular course of action. In the famous 
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words of March and Olsen (1984: 747) ‘the organization of political life makes a 
difference.'  I suggest conceptualising the councils’ intermediary functions in relation 
to the process of interaction which occurs between a social movement organisation 
and its institutional environment. However, from a constructivist perspective (which 
will be discussed in the next chapter), actors makes sense of their own environment 
by interacting and engaging with its opportunities and constraints. Therefore, the 
theoretical framework is also designed to capture interrelations between agency and 
structure in line with Meyer’s (2004: 128) famous remark that: 
 
The wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices – their 
agency can only be understood and evaluated by looking at the 
political context and the rules of the games in which those choices 
are made – that is, structure. 
 
 
Muslim councils: between mobilisation and institutionalisation 
 
Before theorising how particular combinations of political opportunities can 
influence the ways in which Muslim organisations respond to the pressures of co-
optation and representation, it is important to explain their complicated institutional 
status. Both organisations challenge the existing attitudes towards Muslim 
communities and lobby the state to ensure a fair treatment of Muslim minorities. 
Both articulate the need to protect Muslim identity from Islamophobia and mobilise 
support for their actions. Therefore, both councils show attributes of social 
movement organisations and are subject to a similar set of exogenous rules and 
political opportunities as more radical global actors (e.g. Islamist groups) who 
challenge the system from the outside. However, their close interaction with state 
institutions, a degree of organisational maturity and conventional strategies suggest 
that they have become institutionalised actors. They campaign on behalf of Muslim 
communities by challenging state-religion relations from within.  
 
Theories of social movement organisations (McAdam et al. 1996, Tarrow 1998) and 
ideas on how organisations integrate themselves with their environment (Meyer and 
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Rowan 1977) offer a series of insights to conceptualise how the two councils 
oscillate between mobilisation and institutionalisation. Literature on social 
movements examines violent protest and contention as well as peaceful bargaining 
strategies available under different political conditions. Tarrow (1998: 199) 
maintains that political opportunities ‘play the strongest role triggering general 
episodes of contention’ as they may produce instability among the existing alliances 
and inconsistency of state repression’ (Ibid: 199). If contention over particular 
grievances becomes institutionalised, social movements or interest groups are 
encouraged to combine contention with participation in institutions. Moreover, 
‘movements institutionalize their tactics and attempt to gain concrete benefits for 
their supporters through negotiation and compromise’ (Ibid: 101). 
 
Notably, Tarrow (1998: 84) argues that cooperation with the state and non-violent 
contention may be a double-edged sword, as ‘it deprives organizers of the potent 
weapon of outrage.’ If a social movement organisation is too alienated from its 
institutional environment, it risks becoming too sectarian. However, if it collaborates 
‘too closely…and take[s] up institutional routine’ it becomes indoctrinated with its 
values (Ibid: 208). Tarrow’s argument partly supports the logic of ‘institutionalised 
organisations’ as elaborated by Meyer and Rowan (1977). They suggest that to 
ensure their survival, organisations seek to legitimate their conduct by incorporating 
practices which are already institutionalised in society. 
 
Zald and McCarthy (1979: 2) distinguish a social movement organisation from other 
types of organisations or interest groups by defining it as ‘a complex, or formal, 
organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement’. 
Although social movement organisations may have bureaucratic features, they differ 
from bureaucratic organisations because ‘their goals are aimed at changing the 
society’ as they wish to restructure the society rather than provide it with a regular 
service (Zald and Ash 1966: 329). On one hand, Muslim councils are involved in 
providing regular services for Muslim communities to ensure they can practice their 
religion. On the other hand, their goal is to change societal attitudes to Islam and 
encourage a more favourable treatment of Muslim communities by the state. 
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Therefore, they are appropriately seen as social movement organisations in this 
sense. 
 
As intermediary institutions, Muslim councils are involved in simultaneous 
interaction with their constituents and authorities. For example, at times of 
contention, intermediary institutions may act more like social movement 
organisations, but with time they develop formal elements akin to institutionalised 
interest groups. However, maintaining both relationships at the same time presents a 
particular challenge. Muslim councils continue to engage in the same activities of 
lobbying authorities. However, once the initial phase of contention is over, they tend 
to focus on their organisational structure. This may include institutional reform and 
strategies to maintain membership and ensure their organisational advantage.  
 
Social movement theories explain mobilisation of minority interests that may lead to 
periods of violent or peaceful contention between organisations and state structures. 
A number of scholars within this theoretical approach also try to bridge the gap 
between collective behaviour theories and analysis of individual organisational 
strategies. For example, Kriesi (1996) distinguishes between internal and external 
structuration of a social movement organisation. He maintains that internal 
structuration refers to internal mechanisms and possible directions its organisational 
composition can take. Based on the Weber-Michels model of organisational change, 
he suggests that internal structuration of a social movement organisation may result 
in its institutionalisation, making it similar to a party or an interest group (Ibid: 156).  
 
A close analysis of the internal mechanisms of organisational maintenance provides a 
useful way to theorise the process in which the two councils seek to boost their 
legitimacy not only among its affiliated organisations but also within Muslim 
communities. Internal measures may include ‘the development of its internal 
structure, the moderation of its goals, the conventionalisation of its action repertoire, 
and its integration into established systems of interest intermediation’ (Kriesi 
1996:156). While the process of institutionalisation may not necessarily result in 
maintaining community support, it provides an easier access to public authorities 
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because ‘government bureaucracies prefer to deal with organizations with working 
procedures similar to their own’ (Ibid: 158). This reveals the inherent challenge of 
intermediary institutions of being co-opted by the state, while remaining 
representative of particular group of interests. Additional insights from theories on 
organisational legitimacy will be applied to explore how each council undertakes a 
series of internal changes (Meyer 1977). In the thesis I will explore the extent to 
which organisational reforms conducted by each council have reflected external 
norms of corporatist and pluralist interest mediation. This may have particularly 
important implications for the question of Muslim integration. 
 
Kriesi’s approach to external structuration takes into account three dimensions, 
namely the social movement organisation’s ‘engagement with its constituency, its 
allies and the authorities’ (Ibid: 155). State support provides public recognition and 
gives access to public resources and decision-making which provides crucial 
resources and representation for the organisation (Ibid: 156). However, being 
integrated into a conventional system of interest intermediation ‘may impose limits 
on the mobilization capacity … and alienate important parts of its constituency, with 
the consequence of weakening it in the long run’ (Ibid). I will explore these 
assumptions in light of the councils’ engagement with state officials, other Muslim 
organisations, as well as representatives of other faith groups which may be their 
competitors, as well as allies.  
 
Authorities often use co-optation as an effective tool of social control to 
institutionalise the leadership of social movements, restrict its range of aggressive 
strategies and reduce the level of contention. A classic definition of co-optation by 
Selznick (1949: 13) identifies this as a ‘process of absorbing new elements into the 
leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting 
threats to its stability or existence’. For example, co-optation implies winning 
consent of popular leaders or organisations which may be opposed to state policies 
(Ibid). It can also refer to giving disfranchised groups a temporary representation ‘to 
win their solidarity in a time of national stress’ or responding to the demands of a 
particular group by meeting their interests (Ibid: 14). Therefore, the cost of co-
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optation may be relatively high as it imposes a considerable restraint on their 
activities and reduces a number of protesting strategies available to them.20  I expect 
the level of co-optation to be different in the two cases. However, as will be 
illustrated by the empirical data, this apparent divergence conceals a series of internal 
fluctuation between increasing and decreasing levels of state involvement in Muslim 
affairs and the implications this has for the councils’ engagement with authorities.21 
 
Social movement organisations become increasingly institutionalised as they modify 
more threatening claims into more modest reforms. Inclusion and participation into a 
policy making process may be a positive step for receiving access to decision-
makers. However, the challengers may be subject to what Coy and Hedeen (2005: 
417) call the ‘paradox of collaboration’. In other words, once a challenging 
movement gains access into policy making, ‘continued participation may become a 
goal in and of itself.’ The group’s own participation in the process gives it a sense of 
‘ownership and it is unlikely that, it would desire to leave the process of 
collaboration’ (Ibid: 418).  
 
In the next section, I will draw together a series of insights from social movement 
theories concerning political opportunities and constraints which are expected to 
influence the behaviour of Muslim intermediary organisations. This is particularly 
relevant in relation to the choices available to them on mobilising against particular 
grievances or institutionalising their representational practices. 
  
                                                 
20 A further exploration of how the concept of co-optation can be applied in relation to interest 
mediation can be found in a study of community mediation in the United States by Coy and Hedeen 
(2005). They argue that ‘co-optation becomes possible when a challenging group or social movement 
opposes the practices, initiatives or policies of more powerful social organization or political 
institution’ (Ibid: 406). Their model of social movement co-optation includes engagement, 
appropriation of language and assimilation of challenging movement leaders.  
21 Debates on the enabling or restrictive qualities of co-optation as a mode of participatory governance 
have been explored in relation to either promoting active citizen participation or enforcing top-down 
engagement to safeguard and legitimise state interests (see O’Toole and Gale 2014 and Newman 2005 
respectively). In this thesis, I will contribute to the existing discussions on co-optation processes by 
providing a more dynamic account of the interaction between state approaches to religious governance 
and the ways in which Muslim councils interpreted these measures as interest group organisations. 
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Political opportunity structures and contentious politics 
 
Institutional environments play a key role in shaping actors’ decisions and mobilising 
supporters. The underlying assumption of this thesis is that political opportunity 
structures can facilitate or restrain the group’s capacity to engage in protest activity 
and influence its choice of engagement or disengagement strategies. Different 
combinations of these factors account for the extent to which the political system 
remains open or closed to the entry of new challengers as well as continues to affect 
the already established organisations. Before conceptualising how political 
opportunity structures can shape the institutional context of state-religion relations, it 
is important to outline how they can facilitate and constrain activities of social 
movements and interest groups in relation to contention.  
 
American and European scholars have applied different approaches to examine the 
impact of political opportunities on contentious politics (McAdam et al. 1996: 3, 
Meyer 2004: 129-131). American scholars have been traditionally interested in how 
different movements have emerged and why some have succeeded where others 
failed (Costain 1992, Tarrow 1989, 1998 and Tilly 1978). The relevance of their 
contribution for my project lies in the longitudinal value of their work, with 
particular emphasis on the evolutionary processes of social movements and protest 
activities. For example, Eisinger (1973: 15) suggested that the protest or contention 
is most likely to happen ‘in systems characterised by a mix of open and closed 
factors.’ Their research indicated that protest and mobilisation occurred when the 
challengers’ claims were neither sufficiently accommodated, nor completely 
repressed. This curious hybrid of mixed measures is particularly relevant to the study 
of Muslim Councils and state reaction to Muslim mobilisation in the two countries.  
 
European scholars have applied some of the core notions of opportunity and 
constraint, facilitation and repression to their cross-national studies of social 
movements. They have developed a comparative dimension by examining variation 
in social movements in different national contexts (Kitschelt 1986, Koopmans and 
Statham 2000, Kriesi et al. 1995, and Oberschall 2000). For example, Kitschelt’s 
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research on anti-nuclear movements in France, Sweden, Germany and the United 
States elaborated a detailed explanation of national variation between these 
movements to reveal how ‘political opportunity structures influence the choices or 
protest strategies’ (Kitschelt 1986: 58). Similarly, research by Kriesi and his 
collaborators (1995) focused on new social movements and their interaction with the 
existing environment. The significance of this strand of research for my theoretical 
framework is two-fold. First, it provides a comparative foundation for the study. 
Second, its inclusion of non-disruptive, more conventional strategies and peaceful 
claims can be developed and applied to the study of the two organisations in the 
institutionalised contention. 
 
The aforementioned social movement theorists share an interest in understanding 
how and under which conditions new or existing challengers use political 
opportunities and to what extent their actions are restricted or facilitated by their 
environment. A more nuanced and widely-accepted definition of political 
opportunities and constraints is advanced by Tarrow (1998: 20): 
 
By political opportunities, I mean consistent – but not necessarily 
formal, permanent, or national – dimensions of the political 
struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics. By 
political constraints, I mean factors – like repression, but also 
authorities’ capacity to present a solid front to insurgents – that 
discourage contention.  
 
Tarrow notes that while authoritarian regimes repress social movements and 
representative ones facilitate them, ‘there are aspects of repressive states that 
encourage some forms of contention, while some characteristics of representative 
ones take the sting out of movements’ (Tarrow 1998: 80). He acknowledges the 
distinction between repressive authoritarian and facilitating democratic states. 
However, his model of political opportunities is more complex as it includes the 
opening of access to participate for new actors and ‘a decline in the state’s capacity 
or will to repress dissent’ (Ibid: 76). His research provides a more differentiated 
linkage between the nature of the protests and the centralisation of political authority, 
by arguing that whereas centralised states ‘attract collective actors to the summit of 
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the political system…decentralized states provide a multitude of targets at the base’ 
and encourage ‘many alternative pockets for participation’ (Ibid: 81). This way of 
framing state facilitation and repression is more relevant to understanding the 
behaviour of Muslim councils under the different conditions of cooperation and 
confrontation with authorities and other actors. 
 
Tarrow’s approach to the opening/closing of access to the political system can be 
applied to the process of interaction between the councils and their institutional 
environment. A change in particular patterns of political opportunities and 
constraints is the driving mechanism behind people’s decisions to engage in 
contentious politics (Ibid: 19). Once this happens, actors ‘create new opportunities, 
which are used by others in widening cycles of contentions’ (Ibid). Although the 
notion has been used to explain the processes of mobilisation within a single context, 
Tarrow’s focus on the importance of political conditions at a precise moment and 
short-term changes that result in opening up access to participation is particularly 
relevant to understanding the creation narratives of the two Muslim councils. 
Paradoxically, this dynamic conceptualisation of political opportunities as moments 
of institutional change bears resemblance to more static interpretations of political 
processes offered by historical institutionalists (Pierson 2004, Thelen 1999). Tarrow 
(1998: 199) notes that: 
 
political opportunities…play the strongest role in triggering general 
episodes of contention in which elites reveal their vulnerability, 
new social actors and forms of conflict appear, alliances are struck, 
and repression becomes sluggish or inconsistent.  
 
In the last section of the chapter I will discuss how historically contingent 
institutionalist approaches emphasise the importance of particular points in time 
(critical junctures) in triggering a new sequence of events and its institutionalisation 
along a particular path. The two seemingly different approaches can be used to 
identify particular points of contention and cooperation between Muslim 
organisations and the state. Moreover, a better understanding of particular changes 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Institutionalist framework of interest mediation 48 
happening within the external environment helps understand particular decisions the 
two institutions took on reforming their own organisational structures. 
 
Finally, there is a tendency among social movement theorists to focus on the 
emergence of particular new movements or organisations on the grounds that this is 
the critical point when new conflicts are introduced into the existing system. This 
may lead to insufficient attention being given to the already established (or mature) 
organisations which still participate in contentious politics but use less contentious 
strategies. The structure of political environment influences not only the emergence 
of the protest movement or organisation, but also that the same ‘enduring and 
volatile features of a given political system, can be expected to continue to play a 
major role in shaping the ongoing fortunes of the movement’ (McAdam et al. 1996: 
13). Therefore, a large part of the project will focus on how the two Muslim councils 
have continued to lobby the government and develop their organisational structures 
after they had already articulated their position on fighting for Muslim rights. 
 
In this project I am also mainly interested in examining the dynamic nature of 
political opportunity structures, particularly in relation to how a series of shifts in the 
institutional structures (external and internal) can trigger changes in the councils’ 
engagement strategies. This is in line with an assumption that ‘a focus on changes in 
the structure of political opportunities can contribute to our understanding of the 
shifting fortunes of a single movement’ (McAdam et al. 1996: 13). An added feature 
of the continuous or ongoing interaction is that political opportunities become 
negotiated and appropriated by the challengers. Mature movements and their 
established organisations rely on discursive framing to mobilise support for their 
claims, as will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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Political opportunities and constraints of state-religion relations 
 
In light of the different ways of conceptualising political opportunities, a number of 
scholars sought to simplify the typology by combining some of its elements to make 
the theory more inclusive not only of the new movements and actors but also of the 
existing challengers. The project will following the synthesising efforts by McAdam 
et al. (1996) working within the American tradition and Koopmans and Statham 
(2000) working within the European approach. It will use four elements to outline 
political opportunities of state-religion relations which are likely to affect the 
council’s choices of engagement strategies. They include formal institutional 
structures, national cleavages, informal institutional structures, and alliance 
structures. The first two dimensions are traditionally conceptualised as stable 
structures of political opportunities which are particularly beneficial for drawing 
cross-national comparisons. The last two elements are more volatile and offer a 
degree of dynamism to the suggested comparison.  
 
This typology provides an attempt to conceptualise a series of opportunities and 
constraints responsible for structuring state-religion relations in the two countries in 
general and its implications for Muslim minority representation in particular. The 
significance of each factor will be explained in relation to interest mediation. In light 
of the politico-religious nature of Muslim councils, all four factors structure the 
external environment in which the two institutions engage with the state and 
religious organisations. I expect particular configurations of these factors (and their 
internal shifts) to help account for a different level of cooperation and the nature of 
engagement between Muslim councils and the state in the pluralist and corporatist 
contexts of interest mediation. Moreover, some or all of these external factors may 
also influence the councils’ internal organisational strategies aimed at gaining 
support from their internal audience – affiliated institutions and Muslim communities 
in whose name they claim to engage with the state (see previously discussed linkages 
between the external and internal environment). 
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Formal institutional structures  
 
Formal structures help account for the most obvious divergence between the two 
cases as they represent key features of each political system and shape the openness 
of access to the state. Traditional interpretations of formal institutional structures 
consider the number of institutional actors, while specific dimensions of this 
opportunity structure often include a level of centralisation and conventional 
channels of access for the challengers (Koopmans and Stratham 2000: 34). 
 
As was noted earlier, the state uses inclusive or exclusive strategies in either 
facilitating or restricting the actors’ engagement in contentious politics or community 
mobilisation. Heeding Tarrow’s warning on the limited value of linking facilitation 
and repression purely with the level of state strength and its ability to coerce, I 
suggest extending the theoretical leverage of formal rules to include pluralist and 
corporatist mechanisms of interest mediation based on respective principles of 
competition and participation. A traditional pluralist/corporatist dichotomy has been 
successfully applied to the study of competition and political participation of 
different political parties and interest groups in policy making (Lehmbruch 1982, 
Odmalm 2005).   
 
To explain the ways in which formal structures shape the strategies of Muslim 
councils it is important to provide a more nuanced understanding not only of their 
political and ideological, but also their organisational, or institutional environment. 
Clearly, the authoritarian or liberal nature of the state creates its own rules on how 
minority religion organisations interact with the government and each other. 
However, I suggest that pluralist/corporatist distinction may be more useful here to 
explain the institutional mechanisms of organisational competition in religious 
governance. Whether Muslim institutions have to compete for state support or 
attempt to increase popularity by outmanoeuvring their competitors, their behaviour 
is likely to be shaped by the prevailing rules of cooperation and competition in state-
religion relations.  
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In the introductory chapter, I suggested that Britain and Russia were chosen on the 
grounds of generally corresponding to two types of interest mediation which may be 
categorised as pluralist and corporatist. Mechanisms of pluralist arrangement of 
interests include ‘intergroup competition and bargaining, voluntary membership 
…multiple and overlapping organizational jurisdictions’ (Berger 1981: 21). 
Schmitter (1974: 93) juxtaposes a corporatist system of interest representation by 
emphasising that its ‘constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed by the state.’ These actors are 
offered ‘a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation 
of demands and supports’ (Ibid).  
 
The project will apply this classification to the two case studies. Pluralist rules of 
multiplicity of interest groups, autonomy from the state and horizontal approaches to 
resolving internal conflicts will be used to describe the British context. Conversely, 
Russia’s approach to state-religion relations, including such elements as co-optation 
of leaders and state patronage, fewer interest groups and vertical policy of 
compartmentalisation of religious interests will be considered as corporatist. Not 
only does this help theorise key differences in the two cases, but also contributes to 
extending theoretical leverage of such a categorisation in light of the gathered 
empirical evidence. While these definitions provide rather crude and ideal types of 
differentiation, the two systems are not fixed, and some blurring of the boundaries is 
inevitable. Some of the subsequent modifications of definitions on pluralism and 
corporatism are discussed in Wiarda (1997) and Berger et al. (1981).  
 
However, for the purposes of my study what matters here are the general 
mechanisms, configuration of interests and their relations between themselves and 
vis-à-vis the state. For example, the presence of competition is generally associated 
with the pluralist system, rather than the corporatist arrangement. However, 
competitiveness between Muslim organisations and other faiths is present to larger or 
smaller extent in both countries. What is relevant for my study is not the presence or 
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the lack of competition as such, but rather the way in which it is present or absent in 
the relations between faith groups and the state in general and in the council’s own 
engagement with the state and other religious groups in particular. Moreover, the 
nature of civil society itself, including mainstream and Muslim organisations, is an 
important formal structure determining the level of autonomy Muslim councils can 
exercise from the state and the level of influence they hope to enjoy from Muslims 
communities. 
 
A key expectation of this pluralist/corporatist dichotomy is that the number of 
religious organisations, their degree of autonomy from the state and the influence of 
the established religion can create divergent opportunities and constraints on the 
behaviour of the two councils. The councils’ strategies are also likely to be affected 
by the changes in the pluralist and corporatist conditions.  
 
 
National cleavages  
 
National cleavages structure the political space within which the challengers are able 
to introduce new conflicts and use the existing divisions to mobilise contention. 
Following Rokkan’s typology (1970), scholars of social movements traditionally 
identify politicised conflicts and divisions in society over the issues of class, religion, 
ethnicity, or centre-periphery relations as being endowed with  ‘mobilizing potential’ 
(Klandermans and Oegema 1987). The extent to which social groups are able to 
mobilise depends on the degree of closure of social groups which are divided by a 
cleavage. For example, in his analysis of national cleavage structures, Kriesi et al. 
(1995) identify two elements of national cleavages which are likely to increase the 
potential for mobilisation.  
 
First, they use Oberschall’s argument on the notion of closure and integration of 
particular groups and highlight that members of a group which is closed on the basis 
of a traditional cleavage will be more open to the idea of mobilisation. This is due to 
‘their distinctiveness – that is their collective identity and common interests, their 
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loyalty to the group, and their shared consciousness of belonging to a distinct group’ 
(Kriesi et al. 1995: 7). Second, they emphasise the salience of traditional cleavage to 
particular groups and ‘the degree to which it dominates the conflicts in the political 
arena’ (Ibid). Cleavages are salient if they are not institutionalised and pacified 
through the established procedures or incorporation of the challengers into the 
political and administrative structures or addressed in state policies. 
 
As was noted in the beginning of the thesis, a growing body of research suggests that 
over the last ten to twenty years, religion has become a crucial marker of Muslim 
collective identity in the public sphere, arguably overtaking ethnic, class and regional 
distinctions. Increasing global tensions over the role of Islam coupled with fears over 
national security and the media’s often oversimplified identification of terrorism with 
Muslim faith contributed to the growing politisation of the Muslim agenda. General 
perceptions of injustice and mistreatment of Muslims by the authorities or negative 
representations in the media have given rise to the mobilising potential of religious 
divisions, thus encouraging the challengers to gather support for their own actions in 
representing Muslim interests. The conflict over religion becomes particularly salient 
with the threat of growing Islamophobia.  
 
In the project, I will explore the extent to which the religious divisions are affected 
by the pluralist and corporatist frameworks. Although the role of the established 
Church is important in both cases, its influence is expected to be lower in the 
pluralist context and higher in the corporatist setting. Therefore, in the pluralist 
context I expect tensions over religious issues to be lower, whereas the mobilising 
potential for minority groups to introduce new issues to be higher. Conversely, in the 
corporatist context, religious tensions should be higher, while the mobilising 
potential for minority groups to introduce new conflicts to be lower. 
 
I will also examine the extent to which the behaviour of Muslim councils can be 
affected by the changes in religious cleavages. On one hand, state policies towards 
religion and positive promotion of faith are likely to facilitate the councils’ 
engagement with the government and ease the existing tensions by engaging Muslim 
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leaders in state-religion dialogue. On the other hand, securitisation of Muslim faith 
and the rise of anti-migrant feelings, coupled with competition for state funding and 
religious spaces, are likely to deepen the existing cleavages and embolden Muslim 
councils to use these tensions to articulate Muslim claims and increase support for 
their own actions. Theoretical framing of salient cleavages between groups with a 
strong sense of distinct identity suggests that politicisation of religious discrimination 
offers a strong mobilising potential for the challenger.  
 
Informal institutional structures 
 
Informal structures and prevailing strategies generally refer to historically emerged 
rules for resolving conflicts and managing political challengers (Koopmans and 
Statham 2000: 34). These structures are important to my theoretical framework 
because they help conceptualise two different traditions of diffusing tensions 
between the state and institutional actors: consensual or polarising. In both cases, the 
state has at its disposal a series of ‘exclusive’ or ‘integrative’ strategies for 
responding to challengers (Kriesi 1995 et al. 33-34). The ways in which these can 
restrict or facilitate the councils’ ability to manoeuvre in lobbying the government 
are expected to play out differently in the two institutional environments. While in 
the proposed typology, informal institutional structures will be used as another 
independent variable, their inevitable linkages with formal structures need to be 
acknowledged.22  
 
In the pluralist context, a horizontal, decentralised approach to state-society relations 
and a high number of players implies that the central government’s backing of 
particular organisation or partnership is more unpredictable and less likely. This is in 
line with the decentralised mode of state-society relations and a tradition of resolving 
                                                 
22 In the next chapter, I will outline my preference for a more flexible methodological approach to 
isolating important variables. This will explain why some blurring between formal and informal 
structures was allowed. Although each variable was examined in its own right, I was not interested in 
isolating a particular variable or a factor that would alone explain the councils’ behaviour. Instead, 
more importance was attached to the cumulative impact of different contextual structures on the 
councils’ strategies of engagement or disengagement. 
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issues locally, rather than creating centralised channels or bodies such as national 
umbrella-based organisations. Mobilising public support on a contentious issue is 
particularly difficult within a more competitive environment where different groups 
offer their own programmes and solutions to experienced or perceived grievances. 
 
The corporatist regime, particularly within its more authoritarian dimension, is 
highly bureaucratic and vertically structured, with the lower or middle level officials 
being dispensable, should things go wrong. This provides a safety-valve to manage 
conflicts without offending senior religious leaders or government officials. 
Although the state is not formally able to sack religious leaders it does not like, it is 
able to use its internal resources to limit access to particular consultative bodies or 
funding, should a conflict unfold. The same process works in reverse. If the 
challenger shows loyalty to the government, for example by refraining from 
criticising the state, it can expect to be rewarded with greater access to decision-
making process and implementation.  
 
The project will explore the extent to which informal rules of communication 
between the government and religious organisations influence the strategies of the 
two councils in their respective contexts. A more decentralised system implies that 
different religious and political platforms may be used locally to resolve internal 
conflicts. Conversely, a system characterised by high levels of state patronage and 
bureaucratisation may encourage a search for more formal strategies of engagement. 
In other words, interfaith local initiatives and informal consultations may be 
favoured in the pluralist context of state-religion relations, while in the corporatist 
setting, state-Muslim relations are expected to remain formal with decisions likely to 
be taken only at the highest level. My expectation here is that stronger levels of state 
patronage and centralisation mean higher risks for the councils to disengage from the 
government. The lower the levels of state patronage and centralisation, the lower are 
the risks of disengaging from the state. 
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Alliance structures 
 
Alliances refer to particular power relations between different actors and are 
generally considered to be the most volatile dimension of political opportunity 
structures. In its traditional interpretation oriented towards social movements and 
political systems, alliance structures imply divisions among political elites, such as 
political parties and established political actors. By forming strategic alliances with 
these actors, the challengers can shift the balance of power in their favour and 
mobilise support for their claims. The already established political actors are likely to 
facilitate the claims-making process of the new ones (Kriesi 1995: 81).  
 
What makes this a particularly unpredictable and therefore more dynamic feature of 
the POS-based approach is its reference to a particular balance of power at certain 
moments in time. The presence or the absence of potential allies is a significant 
factor in helping the challengers to decide what course of action to take. Periods of 
weaker or stronger engagement between the challenger and the state are likely to be 
influenced by the presence or the lack of powerful allies who would support their 
claims. Moreover, I expect alliance structures to be also conditioned by formal 
institutional rules. In a corporatist system, where the number of allies is restricted, 
the challenger may be more likely to continue its engagement with the state, unless it 
manages to find allies outside the given institutional environment (e.g. foreign 
assistance). In the pluralist setting, high numbers of different actors are beneficial for 
the creation of alternative, independent networks of support. 
 
To apply this dynamic to Muslim representation and state-religion relations, I 
suggest framing it within the context of the challengers’ relations with other faiths as 
well as other Muslim organisations. The established Church can act as an ally, 
similarly to how in a political context a political party may form a temporary alliance 
with the challenger. What distinguishes it from a purely political ally is that it does 
not necessarily need to be in opposition to the state. A common ground between a 
challenger and its ‘already-established’ ally lies in the temporary meeting of their 
respective agendas. However, if the same allies become dependent on support from 
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the state, their cooperation may come to an end and turn into a competition for 
financial resources and patronage. The latter is more likely to happen in the 
corporatist, rather than pluralist context. 
 
Another way of looking at the alliance structures is to focus not so much on the 
structural components of state-religion systems but to examine the potential for intra-
Muslim cooperation. Friendly relations with other Muslim organisations may provide 
powerful partners to establish a shared agenda and mobilise support from Muslim 
civil society to engage in a collective struggle against social injustices. Whereas the 
pluralist context with a high number of challengers encourages formation of such 
alliance networks, the corporatist setting is more likely to reduce such benefits. This 
may be due to a more personal nature of competition which exists between fewer 
actors aim to secure equal treatment of Muslim citizens. Moreover, well developed 
structures of Muslim civil society may also serve as a barrier to the level of support 
Muslim councils can mobilise among Muslim communities in light of the growing 
number of alternative Muslim and non-Muslim civil society initiatives and players, 
keeping their activities in check. 
 
If the challenger works together with other Muslim organisations and other faiths, its 
reliance on the state should be weak. Conversely, in case of weak cooperation with 
other Muslim groups and competition with other faiths for state support, its 
engagement with the state becomes more likely, whereas its efforts for securing 
support among civil society actors may be restricted. The first expectation is likely to 
correspond to the pluralist setting, while the second to the corporatist one. 
 
The following summary (see Figure 6) provides a meta-typology which illustrates the 
divergence between the two ideal types of pluralist and corporatist modes of state-
religion relations. The four key components of this typology will be applied to 
Britain and Russia. Each will be explored in light of the data discussed in the 
empirical section of the thesis to help understand a series of contextual opportunities 
and constraints which have shaped the councils’ behaviour in the two countries. 
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Figure 6. The POS-based approach to state-religion relations 
Type of POS Pluralist  Corporatist  
   
Formal institutional structures   
Autonomy from the state Higher Lower 
Number of interest groups Higher Lower 
Religious cleavages   
Influence of the established religion Lower Higher 
Opportunities for new conflicts Higher Lower 
Informal institutional structures   
Level of state patronage Lower Higher 
Level of centralisation Lower Higher 
Alliance structures   
Cooperation with other faith groups Higher Lower 
Cooperation with Muslim groups  Higher Lower 
 
 
Integrating approaches: discursive framing and structural opportunities 
 
Theoretical approaches to political opportunities have been criticised for favouring 
the institutional dimension of opportunities at the expense of their discursive 
qualities. However, some theorists have increasingly acknowledged the importance 
of the ‘interpretivist’ turn and tried to theorise ‘the translation of political opportunity 
structure into movement action’ by incorporating ‘mediating mechanisms’ (Kriesi et 
al. 1995: 245). A better understanding of how the challengers frame their decisions 
and mediate political opportunities helps understand how structural factors can be 
transformed into mobilising strategies.  
 
Discursive framing provides an important meeting point between structuralist and 
culturalist approaches by creating a linkage between political opportunities and their 
mediation. The extent to which political opportunities constrain or facilitate 
collective action is partly contingent on how these political opportunities are being 
interpreted and used by movement actors to mobilise supporters (Koopmans and 
Duyvendak 1995). In other words, just as contextual factors shape the available 
choices, particular framing of contentious issues allows the challengers to mobilise 
their supporters and gain maximum legitimacy for their actions.  
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McAdam et al. (1996) and Tarrow (1998) have emphasised the importance of 
integrating political opportunity structures with framing approaches to understand the 
shared meaning actors use to mobilise their supporters. Koopmans and Statham 
(2000: 37) have integrated the two approaches to political contention on migration 
and ethnic relations into a single theoretical framework. While institutional 
opportunities determine the chances of access and the level of repression and 
facilitation from those who are in power, discursive opportunities determine ‘which 
collective identities and substantive demands…gain visibility…to resonate with the 
claims of other collective actors, and to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse’ 
(Ibid: 19). 
  
The original concept of discursive framing and collective action belongs to Snow and 
Benford (1988, 2000). They concluded that social movements ‘frame particular 
meanings’ and ‘interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists’ (1988: 198). They have identified three integral frames of 
collective action: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. The first frame applies to 
the process in which ‘movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some 
problematic condition…in need of change’; the second considers ‘attributions 
regarding who or what is to blame’; and the third frame implies ‘articulat[ing] an 
alternative set of arrangements…to affect change’ (Snow and Benford 2000: 615).   
 
The diagnostic frame is often identified in the literature with the idea of unfair 
treatment and ‘injustice’, originally formulated by Gamson et al. (1982). However, 
the feeling of injustice does not just derive from a particular issue: it is jointly 
interpreted, defined and redefined by social actors, the media and general public 
(Klandermans 1997: 44). In this process, collective action frames may ‘underscore 
and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust 
and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable’ (Snow 
and Benford 1992: 137). Within the context of state-religion relations, actors often 
frame Muslim concerns by questioning excessive victimisation of anti-terrorist 
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policies, anti-migrant feelings or inadequate provisions for exercising religious 
rituals.  
 
The second frame identifies the ‘source(s) of blame and culpable agents (Snow and 
Benford 2000: 616). In light of competition between different actors, the attributional 
aspect of collective action frame is often subject to dispute. Gamson’s notion of 
‘adversarial framing’ (Gamson 1995) may be more appropriate here as it implies 
delineating the boundaries between the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as a way of distinguishing 
between the ‘collective action’ of protagonists and the negative impact of the 
‘aggregated ills’. This may be particularly useful in trying to understand how the two 
councils are likely to manoeuvre between state demands and community 
expectations. For example, while trying to avoid a direct attack on the government, 
they may find more abstract targets, such as Islamophobia in the media or anti-
extremist measures. By successfully manipulating the good/evil dichotomy and 
tailoring their messages to a particular audience, the challengers may also seek to 
gain access to the government by setting themselves apart from more radical (‘bad’) 
groups, while maintaining their ‘good’ status in the eyes of the communities by 
attacking unpopular state policies. 
 
The third frame envisages motivating supporters and taking a course of action to 
remedy the situation. Framing political goals and strategic decisions ‘almost always 
draws upon the larger societal definitions of rights and responsibilities’ (Zald 1996: 
267). However, in their efforts to persuade the audience of the righteous nature of 
their cause, challengers have to consider ‘an external and internal competition for 
defining the situation and what is to be done’ (Ibid: 269). The external dimension 
may relate to conventional, non-violent strategies of lobbying the authorities, 
advocating alliances with other religious organisations and engaging with the media. 
The internal dimension consists of providing a persuasive narrative of their own 
organisational legitimacy and ability to represent their interests. 
 
Although the process of framing provides a dynamic way of analysing the ways in 
which challengers understand and engage with their environment, there is a danger of 
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interpreting ‘all contention as struggles over meaning’ (Tarrow 1998:  199). The 
contextual opportunities and constraints within which collective action is embedded 
can determine whether a particular framing strategy can succeed or fail. Resonance is 
one of the most powerful facilitators or restrictors of collective action. To resonate 
with the audience, the words and strategies must be salient and credible (Snow and 
Benford 2000: 619).  
 
In line with this argument, the salience of the issue depends on the extent to which 
the target audience can identify with a particular claim made by the challenger. 
Mobilisation of target groups becomes directly proportional to the groups’ ability to 
tap into particular beliefs, ideas and narratives and make them relevant for people’s 
own everyday experiences’ (Ibid: 621). Muslim actors face a double challenge of 
mobilising support for religious issues within the discourse of equal rights as well as 
integrating Muslim values within the national narrative based on common cultural 
traditions.  
 
Another aspect of resonance is credibility which can be broken down into three 
factors: ‘frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame 
articulators’ (Ibid: 619-620). Put differently, the extent to which credibility of the 
challengers’ actions can facilitate mobilisation depends on the following three 
factors: a fit between the actors’ deeds and words, the critical nature of the issues, 
and the actors’ authority. Conversely, a disparity between behaviour and rhetoric, a 
wrongly chosen grievance and the lack of well-respected leaders risk stifling any 
efforts to mobilise support. 
 
The project will explore how the two councils have used discursive framing to adapt 
to particular demands of their external and internal environment in order to legitimise 
themselves with the state as well as in the eyes of Muslim communities.  
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Historical institutionalism and gradual change 
 
Theories concerning political opportunity structures and the behaviour of interest 
group organisations are mainly preoccupied with explaining contemporary 
divergences in contextual and institutional arrangements respectively. Although they 
acknowledge the importance of historical legacies and their impact on the emergence 
of a social movement or an interest group organisation, they pay less attention to 
examining particular historical mechanisms which might have conditioned its 
institutional character and development in the first place. A historical dimension 
often gets neglected in two ways. First, these theories do not sufficiently explore how 
formal institutional arrangements have been shaped by previous episodes of 
contention or engagement between the state and the challenger (or its precursor). 
Second, they fall short of considering historically embedded, institutionalised 
processes as a key constraint on the actors’ ability to implement organisational 
change and mobilise internal support. 
 
To provide a better understanding of how the choices of Muslim councils are 
constrained by previous patterns of institutional behaviour, it is important to 
incorporate a historical institutionalist perspective. Theoretical insights from these 
studies (Pierson 2004, Steinmo 1992, Thelen 1999) throw light on more constraining 
factors shaping the behaviour of Muslim councils, such as historically entrenched 
interests and particular configurations of power. Historical approaches are criticised 
for their structural rigidity and focus on institutional continuity rather than 
institutional change (Peters 1999). However, it is precisely this preoccupation with 
institutional stability and resistance to change which offers a greater explanatory 
leverage to understanding the nature of external and internal constraints.  
 
Historical institutionalism offers an eclectic set of theoretical tools to analyse 
different historical narratives and power configurations (Hall and Taylor 1996, 
Steinmo et al. 1992). As a neo-institutionalist approach, it focuses on formal and 
informal rules that structure the relationships between different actors and their 
environment. While its two institutionalist relatives (sociological and rational choice 
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institutionalisms) provide respective explanations on institutionalised power-sharing 
arrangements, namely through the efforts to reduce transactional costs (North 1990) 
or the concept of organisational inertia (DiMaggio and Powel 1983), they do not 
explore historically contingent patterns of power sharing.23  
 
Conversely, historical institutionalists embrace the distributional effects of power 
configurations by embedding them within particular historical narratives. Doing so, 
they can explain how particular series of past events may have shaped the current 
outcomes. They ground their research in the concept of path dependence which is 
explored through the mechanisms of critical junctures and positive feedbacks. Path 
dependence implies that specific events or combination of events ‘place institutional 
arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter’ (Pierson 
2004: 135). These events work as a catalyst which locks in particular patterns of 
institutional behaviour and development.  
 
Within the context of state-Muslim relations, these mechanisms act as constraints on 
the challengers’ attempts to bring about organisational change or alter the nature of 
their engagement with authorities. The length of previous engagement by the same 
challengers or their precursors may also affect their ability to develop a new, more 
beneficial relationship with the state or modernise their own organisation. Increased 
institutionalisation in state-religion relations may also increase the challenger’s 
reluctance to alter its course of action. In other words, it is important to consider 
previous incidents of successful or failed collaboration with authorities which may 
have shaped the challenger’s strategy of engagement or disengagement. 
 
Critical junctures help elucidate the ways in which events and interactions join into 
causal sequences at particular moments in time and develop along different 
                                                 
23 The three institutionalist approaches are discussed in comparative perspective in Hall and Taylor 
1996 and Peters 1999. See also Levi 1997 for how rational choice institutionalists understand the 
entrenchment of vested interests as a way of maintaining the existing power equilibrium. See also 
Hannan and Freeman (1984: 540) for how sociological institutionalists argue that organisational 
structures are notoriously difficult to change, once they become ‘a source of resistance to institutional 
change.’  
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trajectories (Pierson 2004: 135). They are conceptualised as particular periods when 
the usual rules and constraints on action are lifted (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). As 
was mentioned earlier, there is a linkage here with the way in which some social 
movement theorists (Tarrow 1998) conceptualise short-term changes which may 
facilitate or constrain the challenger’s recourse to action. Historical institutionalists, 
however, are not only interested in the changed trajectories and potential 
opportunities this can bring, but also how original ‘choices during the critical 
juncture trigger a path-dependent process that constrains future choices’ (Ibid 2007: 
348). While a temporary opening of access may work as an opportunity or an 
exogenous shock, it may be not significant enough to act as a critical juncture. A 
short-term period of institutional instability does not necessarily mean that once the 
challenger enters the system its presence will automatically become institutionalised.  
 
While the concept of critical junctures helps explain the exogenous shocks that lead 
to the entry of new challengers, the notion of positive feedbacks provide a more 
robust theoretical concept for my project because it can be applied to the already-
established actors. Positive feedbacks operate on the idea of increased returns, 
similar to the notion of transactional costs advanced by rational choice 
institutionalists. According to Pierson, once an actor takes a particular path, it 
produces ‘consequences that increase the relative attractiveness of that path for the 
next round’ (Pierson 2004: 18). As these ‘effects begin to accumulate they generate a 
powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity’ which is difficult to reverse, with earlier 
events being more important than the later ones (Ibid). Therefore, once a particular 
institutional configuration has been introduced, it becomes locked-in since the cost of 
replacing is higher than preserving. 
 
This idea is critical to why organisations may actively resist change. The cost of 
switching to alternative arrangements becomes increasingly high over time. Pierson 
adapts this argument from one of the characteristics of positive feedbacks he borrows 
from Arthur (1994). The latter defines ‘inflexibility’ as a feature of positive 
feedbacks by arguing that ‘the farther into the process we are, the harder it becomes 
to shift from one path to another’ (summarised in Pierson 2004: 20). This is why it is 
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important to adapt a historical approach to see how this plays out within the internal 
environment of each council as it helps explain ongoing resistance to introduce 
structural rather than cosmetic reforms.  
 
Pierson notes that the ‘allocation of political authority to particular actors is a key 
source of positive feedback’ (Pierson 2004: 36). These actors become increasingly 
interested in using the institution to reinforce their own original preferences and 
power within the institution. Although Pierson acknowledges the importance of 
learning and self-correction being an important vehicle for change, he concludes that 
the impact of these processes is limited (Ibid: 41). He identifies two obstacles which 
are particularly relevant to politics: ‘the short time horizons of political actors’ and 
‘the strong status quo bias associated with decisions governing most political 
institutions’ (Ibid). While the first obstacle can be applied to individual decisions, the 
second conceptualises institutional resistance to change, as ‘actors…create rules that 
make existing arrangements hard to reverse’ (Ibid: 43). 
 
The brief outline of these ideas suggests that historical institutionalists provide a 
good foundation to explain the ways in which institutional factors constrain the 
challengers’ strategies to implement organisational change. And yet, this does not 
mean that no change is possible. Once the institution feels under threat and its sense 
of equilibrium is overturned, the costs of ignoring exogenous developments might be 
higher than doing something internally to respond to new challenges. For example, 
once the threat of losing community support or losing out to competitor organisations 
becomes high, the challengers may decide to embark on a course of limited reform, 
provided these steps are seen as a means of self-legitimating. 
 
Historical institutionalism has been traditionally criticised for not providing 
sufficient explanations as to why changes happen and how they unfold. In response 
to some of these criticisms, a recent study by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) seeks to 
redress the balance. Drawing on ideas by Pierson, they use historical institutionalism 
to explain the process of gradual change. While this approach is sensitive to 
institutional resistance, it helps explain why and how limited change is still possible 
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and what forms it can take. This is particularly applicable to the idea of 
organisational maintenance and institutionalisation of particular practices discussed 
earlier in the chapter.  
 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 8) suggest that change comes not only from exogenous 
shifts, but also from endogenous sources such as the mechanisms of internal power 
distribution. They attach particular importance to incremental, gradual processes of 
changes that can be achieved internally. The most relevant aspect of this work for my 
research is explaining what choices are available in the challenger’s particular 
institutional environment. I am interested in examining what types of reforms are 
possible within the institutional constraints of vested interests.   
 
Mahoney and Thelen delineate four types of institutional change: displacement, 
layering, drift and conversion (Ibid: 15). Following their typology, displacement 
implies the removal of existing rules; layering – the introduction of new rules 
alongside the existing ones; drift – subtle changes in the overall framework of the 
existing rules or their impact; and finally, conversion – the changed enactment of 
existing rules due to their redeployment. Layering takes place when organisations 
lack the capacity to actually change the original rule and instead, they have to work 
within the existing system by adding new rules alongside the old ones (Ibid: 17). 
This is particularly relevant when there is strong resistance to change from the 
powerful veto players or interests within the institution.  
 
Mahoney and Thelen apply the processes of layering to account for how challengers 
seek to change the rules in their external environment. And yet, the same idea can be 
used in reference to their internal environment as well. For example, once confronted 
with reduced legitimacy, Muslim councils may embrace the need to implement (or 
appear to be implementing) internal reforms. Leaders may become aware that more 
profound changes are needed. However, they do not want them to come at the 
expense of restricting their own authority or upsetting the powerful interests within 
the institution. Unlike other modes of change (e.g. displacement) layering does not 
introduce completely new rules, but rather ‘involves amendments, revisions, or 
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additions to existing ones’ (Ibid: 16). Moreover, processes of layering can occur 
when the challengers lack the capacity to convince the organisational defenders of 
the status quo to fully accept them. Layering provides a useful theoretical tool to 
explain the nature of internal constraints that affect the decisions Muslim councils 





This chapter aimed to develop a more nuanced theoretical framework in which to 
explore the mediatory strategies available to the two Muslim councils. By combining 
theoretical insights on co-optation, mobilisation and institutionalisation, it 
conceptualised the two interlinked dimensions of these semi-co-opted and semi-
representative institutions. It has emphasised the importance of institutions in 
structuring organisational behaviour and provided a synthesised approach to theorise 
the influence of political opportunities and constraints on Muslim representative 
organisations.  
 
Drawing on social movement theories, it created a compound typology of political 
opportunity structures to distinguish between the two approaches to interest 
mediation: pluralist and corporatist. This typology was developed to embrace the 
increasingly important religious dimension of Muslim identity, particularly in the 
context of state-religion relations. Moreover, with their strong emphasis on 
contextual factors, these theories helped identify a series of theoretical expectations 
to explain the divergent outcomes in the councils’ behaviour in the two cases. 
 
The processes of discursive framing were explored to theorise the ways in which the 
two councils are likely to embrace political opportunities and negotiate institutional 
constraints. A better understanding of these processes is particularly important in 
examining the councils’ agency and the ways in which they construct individual 
narratives in lobbying the state and harnessing the support of their affiliated 
institutions or grassroots supporters. Finally, historical institutionalism offered a way 
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to outline historical legacies and suggest that the councils’ choice of actions is also 
likely to be constrained by the previous forms of representation. 
 
The underlying objective of this chapter was to build a theoretically robust and 
dynamic framework to identify a series of external and internal factors likely to 
structure or at least influence the ways in which Muslim councils interact with the 
state and Muslim communities. The next chapter will discuss how these theoretical 
insights were operationalised by designing a comparative methodology and engaging 
in qualitative research. 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Research design and methodology  69 
Chapter 2 




As was set out in the previous chapter, the research project was designed to examine 
how Muslim councils respond to state pressures and expectations from above, while 
trying to represent Muslim interests from below. I found that theoretical assumptions 
concerning opportunities and constraints that structure the choices these 
organisations make could be best explored through a comparative use of case studies. 
In order to provide a robust but also context-sensitive comparative framework, a 
series of methodological decisions were considered. In this chapter, I will first 
explain the reasons behind selecting a case study method and applying a 
constructivist approach based on qualitative research and comparative analysis. I will 
then explain the ways in which the data was collected, using documentary analysis, 
elite interviews and non-participant observation. Finally, I will provide a short 
discussion of how the data was analysed thematically, as well as with the help of 
discourse analysis and process-tracing.  
 
 
Case studies, comparative framework and qualitative approach 
 
The research was grounded in the constructivist epistemology which provided a 
flexible framework to develop a rich and multi-dimensional picture of how the two 
councils mediate between state policies and community interests. A constructivist 
approach is based on the assumption that the social world is inter-subjectively 
constructed (Wendt 1999). Different scholars using constructivist methods seek to 
understand ‘the complexities of decision-making processes’ and examine the ways in 
which different choices are shaped by ‘perceptions of external and internal 
constraints’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 39-40). As they examine institutional 
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processes and meanings, they embed individual and collective preferences in a 
particular social, political and historical context in which these meanings have been 
created, understood and framed by the actors.  
 
Constructivist perspectives range from rational choice assumptions to more 
discursive approaches (see Wendt 1999 and Risse 2000 respectively).24 In this thesis 
I applied a middle-ground approach advocated by Adler (1997, 2005) and Checkel 
(1999, 2005) whose research has provided a dynamic understanding of how different 
interests make sense of and interact with particular institutional practices or context 
to which they belong. Warning against ‘methodological individualism’, Checkel 
(1999: 546) emphasised the importance of positioning oneself ‘between positivist 
and agent-centred rational choice, on one hand, and interpretative and structure-
centred approaches on the other.’  
 
Therefore, constructivist assumptions influenced my use of process tracing and 
discursive framing. Both were used to better understand how the two Muslim 
councils interpreted the nature of state-religion relations and communicated their 
strategies in light of particular institutional opportunities and constraints. Moses and 
Knutsen (2007: 223) note that: 
 
Constructivists do not use comparisons to uncover law-like 
generalities in the social world…they march towards meaning 
rather than laws, and they search for meaning by examining 
individual cases closely (and the contexts within which that 
meaning is situated). 
 
By examining the interface between the structuring context and organisational 
behaviour, I tried to provide a more nuanced understanding of how the two councils 
                                                 
24 On different positivist and discursive trends within the constructivist school, see the Special Issue of 
the Journal of European Public Policy on ‘The Social Construction of Europe’, 1999, 6:5. While most 
of the empirical arguments are made in relation to the study of Europe and European integration, the 
compilation of articles delineates different constructivist perspectives concerning theoretical and 
methodological approaches.  
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had made and framed their decisions under the contrasting conditions of pluralist and 
corporatist settings.  
 
The constructivist framework also informed my approach to case selection and 
comparative analysis. The thesis used case studies to explore a series of theoretical 
assumptions made about how Muslim councils behave in different institutionalist 
contexts. A case study is an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context’ (Yin 1994: 13). For a methodologically-
rigorous scholar, it offers theoretical leverage to make far-reaching generalisations 
about particular instances, contexts or behaviour of actors which are significant 
beyond the case boundaries (Gerring 2004). As an empirical unit of analysis, it also 
provides a series of context-sensitive observations and thick descriptions for a 
qualitative researcher who is more interested in offering more detailed and valid 
accounts of a particular phenomenon or an actor (Ragin 1989). The method used in 
this thesis is based on the assumption that the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive.25  
 
The case study method was used to provide a deeper understanding of the two 
Muslim councils and to explore more generalizable patterns of their behaviour as a 
particular type of an institution engaged in Muslim representation. In other words, 
the two councils were studied in depth to capture their unique character and enrich 
the existing knowledge of these rather under-researched organisations. At the same 
time, the case study method provided an opportunity to examine the councils’ 
strategies and internal processes in different institutional contexts. This has allowed 
for a more detailed exploration of theoretical assumptions on social mobilisation, 
legitimacy and interest mediation. A Muslim council in Britain and a Muslim council 
in Russia were selected on the grounds of exemplifying two different scenarios of 
interest mediation in pluralist and corporatist approaches to state-religion relations.  
 
                                                 
25 For evaluation of different approaches to the case study method, see Gomm et al. 2000. 
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The project aimed to identify causal mechanisms and explain the ways in which 
particular combinations of contextual features have shaped the behaviour of the two 
councils. Although scholarly approaches to case studies vary, there is a general 
agreement that case study methods provide a useful compromise for research in 
which ‘experiments cannot be performed’ and ‘historical accounts may be too 
limiting’ (Yin 1994: 8). They are praised for ‘achieving high conceptual validity’ and 
providing ‘a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal 
mechanisms in the context of individual cases’ (George and Bennett 2005: 19).  
 
The event-based analysis could have provided an alternative framework to 
understanding the councils’ strategies of engagement and representation.26 This 
approach would have been useful in identifying the diverging or converging 
strategies of Muslim claims-making in the pluralist and corporatist contexts by 
offering a snapshot account of particular developments and their impact on Muslim 
institutions. However, it would have been less revealing of the changes in the 
councils’ strategies of engaging with state officials and improving their 
organisational legitimacy over a period of time.  
 
A particular focus on events such as 9/11 or the Danish cartoons controversy might 
have highlighted linkages between the globally-significant developments and the 
national contexts of interaction between home-grown Muslim institutions and the 
state. However, this would have obscured the project’s primary objective of 
examining specific challenges faced by the two Muslim institutions in their 
domestically-institutionalised role of mediating between state interests and 
community expectations. For example, in spite of their universal significance, the 
extent to which the events of 9/11 resonated with the two Muslim councils was rather 
                                                 
26 This method was successfully applied to examine the impact of dramatic events on Muslims claims-
making activities and public debates on Islam in Europe, see Cinalli and Giugni 2013, Vanparys et al 
2013). 
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different.27 The difficulty in selecting international events with equal relevance for 
the two organisations might risk diminishing the project’s comparative value. 
 
The project’s approach was to embed the comparative analysis of the individually-
significant national events within the rich empirical fabric of the two cases. When 
considering the councils’ respective responses to the London bombings or the 
Mosque controversy in Moscow, the study sought to contextualise these 
developments within the larger institutionalist framework of state-Muslim relations. 
In line with theoretical expectations, these events were treated as focal points or 
critical episodes emphasising the nature of relations and punctuating the process of 
engagement between the councils, the state and Muslim communities. A more 
rounded nature of the case-oriented method offered a contextually-sensitive 
comparison of the councils’ changing strategies and rhetoric.  
 
A similar way of thinking was applied to using a qualitative approach based on a 
small-n comparison to ‘explain political phenomena in terms of the combined effect 
of several factors’ (Hopkin 2002: 263). Rather than identifying a single variable 
responsible for how the two councils engage with the state and Muslim communities, 
the research focused on a more holistic method of uncovering a ‘combination of 
characteristics’ (Ragin 1989: 3). Following a distinction between the case-oriented 
method and variable-oriented method, the project was built on the assumption that 
the former is particularly useful in providing ‘multiple, conjectural causation’ based 
on empirically-rich accounts (1994: 302). While the case-oriented method does not 
need to exclude any analysis of variables, it allows for greater flexibility in exploring 
‘combinations of conditions’ and ‘causal complexes’ (Ragin 1989: 52). 
 
With the aim of explaining the two councils’ relations with the state and Muslim 
communities, independent variables influencing the process of engagement were 
                                                 
27 Arguably, the initial effects of 9/11 were more important for the MCB in Britain than for the SMR, 
which, at the time, was more preoccupied with the events in Chechnya. 
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grouped together under external and internal factors. The project explored the extent 
to which the behaviour of the two councils was shaped by a series of institutional 
changes which occurred within its external and internal environment. As discussed 
previously, the external context was theorised through past and present political 
opportunities and constraints based on the suggested dichotomy of predominantly 
pluralist and corporatist mechanisms of interest mediation. It included formal 
structures of state-religion relations, religious cleavages, informal structures for 
resolving conflicts and opportunities to strike alliances with other religious, political 
or civil society groups.  
 
In particular, I examined the changes which occurred in the pluralist and corporatist 
approaches over time. In the British case, this method helped to trace an interesting 
shift from the pluralist nature of state-religion relations to a more corporatist 
approach under the Labour Party’s first administration, followed by the return to the 
pluralist conditions under the Coalition. In the Russian context, the period in 
question revealed a rather atypical pluralist episode of state-religion relations under 
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, followed by the increasingly corporatist conditions 
under the successive administrations of President Putin (with a short pluralist 
interlude under the presidency of Medvedev). In the concluding part of the thesis, the 
implications of the comparison will be discussed in relation to the theoretical 
expectations of the project.  
 
A series of assumptions was also made in relation to the changes in the councils’ 
internal environment, namely in the nature of Muslim communities and historically 
contingent structures of Muslim organisation and configuration of power. A careful 
examination of how particular shifts and changes within these factors may have 
influenced the councils’ internal strategies helped explore the theoretical leverage of 
the aforementioned institutionalist assumptions. This was designed to provide a more 
nuanced typology of the ways in which Muslim councils operate under the external 
and internal pressures of state co-optation and minority representation. 
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Positivist methodology exemplified by Mill’s ‘method of agreement’ (1848) and 
comparative analysis by Przeworski and Teune (1970) of ‘most different/most 
similar systems’ may have provided a better way of isolating a single explanatory 
factor to account for divergence or convergence between the two cases. In fact, 
scholars of comparative politics who favour more robust scientific approaches (see 
discussions in Landman 2000, Lijphart 1971, Peters 1998) criticise the findings of a 
small-n comparison on the grounds that fewer cases result in selection bias, 
unrepresentative results and atheoretical conclusions. However, in this project a more 
flexible methodology was used to offer a richer typology of the diverse factors which 
have shaped the councils’ internal and external strategies. 
 
A way to mitigate potential limitations of this approach was to select particular cases 
which can predict ‘similar results’ or provide ‘contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons’ (Yin 1994: 46). Although these concerns may be less relevant for a 
qualitative study, methodological justification for this comparison was based on the 
presence of similarities and differences between the two cases. On one hand, Britain 
and Russia were selected because both countries have sizable Muslim populations 
whose ethnic, social and religious composition has become more complex and 
diverse. In light of the increased tensions over minority representation and challenges 
of integration and security, the two states sought to develop more robust, yet 
religiously-sensitive ways of integrating Muslim minorities. Moreover, the nature of 
state-Muslim relations in the two cases has been also affected by global implications 
of the transnational nature of Islam, exogenous events and rising levels of 
Islamophobia. Therefore, the two cases have shared a series of similar challenges the 
Muslim councils have to deal with as they juggle the growing pressures of co-
optation and representation. 
 
On the other hand, the two councils have engaged with state authorities and Muslim 
communities under the different institutional and organisational conditions. For 
example, in the British context of religious pluralism and better-developed civil 
society, there is a multitude of different religious organisations, charities and 
interfaith groups which are largely independent from the state and constitute the rich 
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fabric of British society. The Russian case, however, has been characterised by high 
levels of state intervention into religious matters. Contrary to the British case, the 
number of religious organisations and minority groups in Russia is smaller and these 
bodies tend to be larger in size and less autonomous from state authorities. The thesis 
will discuss the extent to which the Muslim councils’ behaviour has been shaped by 
these seemingly diverging pluralist and corporatist contexts. 
 
Therefore, the preferred method of comparison for this project was a binary, or 
‘paired’ (Tarrow 2010) comparison which offers a compromise between a more 
representative study based on a large number of cases and a more valid, ‘thick’ 
description derived from a single case study (Geertz 1973). For example, Peters 
(1998: 67) acknowledges that ‘some of the potential for extraneous variance’ in 
binary comparisons can be reduced by ‘focusing on a single institution, policy of 
process … [g]iven that these … perform many of the same functions.’ In his 
illuminating analysis of using paired comparisons, Tarrow (2010: 239-246) argues 
that this method draws on ‘deep background knowledge of the countries being 
examined’ and, therefore, can endow the study with a ‘degree of intimacy and detail 
that inspires confidence that the connections drawn between antecedent conditions 
and outcome are real.’  
 
Moreover, he praises the ‘full and varied potential of paired comparisons’ as it 
provides a way to reconcile the most different and most similar system designs by 
seeing them as complementary rather than competing methodologies (Ibid: 254). 
Therefore, unlike statistical analysis and quantitative methods, the comparative study 
based on a small number of cases does not claim to reveal representative 
generalisations of how all similar Muslim organisations are likely to behave in 
different national contexts. Instead, its comparative value lies in developing rich 
typologies to deepen our understanding of political processes and explore a series of 
assumptions by keeping a series of factors constant.  
 
The original research design included a third example of the French Muslim council 
and the French institutionalist context which was identified to contain some elements 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Research design and methodology  77 
similar to the Russian corporatist context and others more comparable to the British 
pluralist setting. However, I decided to limit the cases to two and compare and 
contrast the behaviour of the MCB and the SMR in their respective contexts. The 
importance of the reduced scope was two-fold. First, it offered two clearly-defined 
and different institutionalist scenarios in which to investigate the dual dynamic of co-
optation and representation. Second, the chosen comparison presented a more 
practical and manageable way to collect data and create rich typologies of the 
councils’ engagement with the state and Muslim communities. 
 
 
Data collection: interviews, documents and observation 
 
The data collection process consisted of qualitative elite interviews, documentary 
analysis and non-participant observation. Each method has its own benefits and 
limitations on the grounds of validity, representation and reliability (Bryman 2008, 
Burnham et al. 2004). The project used triangulation to minimise data distortion and 
enhance its validity (Denzin 1978: 291). Evidence from official reports, speeches and 
written communications was cross-referenced with insights gained from personal 
observation and individual interviews. Moreover, the interviews were conducted not 
only with those directly involved in the processes and discussed in the documents, 
but also with commentators who disagreed with the official line taken by the 
councils’ leadership.  
 
A key strength of using case studies is their flexibility of combining data collection 
techniques which allows the researcher to present ‘more rounded and complete 
accounts of social issues and processes’ (Hakim 2000: 59– 61). While there were 
some informational discrepancies in the findings collected from a variety of sources, 
these disparities helped understand particular tensions between real and perceived 
actions (Gomm 2008: 242-244; Peters 1998: 97-102). For example, a discrepancy 
between official statements and views voiced in confidential interviews helped reveal 
motivation of the councils’ leaders and explore their views on particular chain of 
events or individual instances of communication with the state.  
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Elite interviews and selection of participants 
 
Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were used to examine the ways in which the 
two councils build relations with state officials and Muslim communities and 
interpret specific challenges of Muslim representation in each country in question. 
Thirty interviews were conducted in the course of research in October 2011 and 
January-February 2012 (18 in Russia and 12 in Britain). They were carried out in 
Russian and in English. Most of the interviews were digitally recorded, apart from 
the two instances where participants declined to be recorded on grounds of 
confidentiality.  
 
While the discussions were not envisaged to involve any particularly sensitive issues, 
ethical treatment of participants was ensured in two ways. First, the interviewees 
were contacted beforehand and emailed a short description of the project and a series 
of questions to be discussed. Second, the interviews were translated and transcribed, 
with prior consent gained to use the data anonymously.28 While some interviewees 
did not have reservations about their names being used, the majority preferred to 
provide evidence on a no name basis. This helped facilitate a more detailed and 
honest response.  
 
Participants were selected using purposeful and snowballing methods of sampling 
which were particularly useful in locating key individuals and senior representatives 
from Muslim organisations based on the articles in the media (particularly the 
Muslim press) and personal recommendations from friendly contacts. The selection 
criteria included senior representatives from the two councils (e.g. senior 
management figures, heads of internal departments and chairs of individual 
committees) and their individual affiliates (e.g. holding positions of president of 
association or head of Muslim spiritual board, as well as representatives from other 
                                                 
28 The research was carried out in accordance to the University of Edinburgh ethical guidelines, please 
see, ‘Postgraduate Research Ethical Procedures’. Available at: 
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/research/ethics/postgraduate_research_ethical_procedures (accessed 7 April 
2014). 
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friendly and competing Muslim organisations and civil society groups (e.g. founders, 
directors of organisations or mosque imams). Other participants included public 
figures engaged in state relations with Muslim minorities, senior politicians (e.g. 
members of the House of Lords), journalists and academics writing on Muslim 
communities in the two countries. 
 
Some participants were selected because they were likely to voice a typical 
perspective associated with a particular organisation or a group, while others were 
chosen on the assumption that they can provide alternative, more critical views 
(Patton 1990: 169-186). For example, I interviewed a senior representative from the 
TsDUM’s office in Moscow and a former member of the MCB in London. Both of 
these individuals expressed views very different from the main line formulated by 
the leadership of the two councils. A small selection of these dissenters in the two 
cases and people ‘outside the range of those at the centre of the study’ helped enforce 
the validity of the study by providing an effective way to ‘check…against drawing 
easy conclusions’ (Seidman 2013: 57).  
 
Snowballing sampling was used to access hard to reach respondents (Burnham et al. 
2004: 91). In Britain, it enabled me to extend the network of contacts in different 
regional locations. In Russia, recommendations from scholars facilitated access to 
senior Muslim figures by way of personal introduction. Interviewing senior leaders 
from competing organisations and academics with more critical views on the SMR 
and its cooperation with the Russian government helped collect more representative 
data. Although I was unable to interview state officials directly involved in state-
Muslim affairs, I was successful in interviewing policy advisors in Britain and some 
prominent members in the House of Lords who had played an active role in state-
Muslim relations in the past. In Russia, I interviewed some public figures who were 
instrumental in state relations with official Muslim organisations, although they were 
not directly working for the government at the time. The primary focus of the project 
was on the Muslim councils and their role in state-Muslim relations. This is why the 
lack of individual interviews with senior government officials was not found to be 
detrimental to the project. Nevertheless, further data on government expectations was 
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collected from official statements, speeches, policy papers and transcripts of 
meetings between state officials and senior Muslim representatives.  
 
Participants from different age, ethnic and religious groups were included in the 
sample. Generational, ethnic and religious markers of Muslim identity were expected 
to be particularly important in explaining the changing nature of Muslim 
communities in the two countries. Therefore, the individuals were selected to reflect 
that diversity of interests. Although the majority of Muslim leaders and spokesmen 
were men, I also interviewed four women. The proportion of men and women 
reflects the issue of representation in senior positions within the two councils, 
particularly in relation to the MCB and its internal efforts to improve female 
participation. Whereas in the Russian context, I found many women working in the 
council, this was not the case in its British counterpart and women were 
underrepresented in the head office. As will be mentioned in the subsequent 
empirical chapters on the MCB, this was presented as an issue which was being 
addressed. The question of gender was not, however, the main focus of my research 
as the key question centred on institutional mechanisms of state-Muslim relations 
and general approaches to organisational restructuring and increased participation 
from all sections of Muslim communities. 
 
Representativeness of the sample also depends on its geographical spread. In Britain 
participants included representatives from Muslim civil society groups and 
organisations, Muslim spokesmen and politicians, mosque leaders, local community 
figures and academics from London, Bradford and Leicester. The four locations were 
chosen partly because there are large Muslim communities living there and they have 
well-established Muslim organisations. They were also chosen for practical reasons 
and easy access as a result of personal recommendations.  
 
In Russia, the interviews were conducted mainly in Moscow, because key centralised 
organisations have their offices and representatives in the capital. For example, while 
it was not possible to travel to the city of Ufa (home to TsDUM, a key rival 
institution of the SMR), I interviewed their representative in Moscow. Similarly, 
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while I did not to travel to the North Caucasus for security reasons, I conducted some 
interviews with Muslim representatives of Dagestani and Chechen communities also 
in Moscow. For the purposes of this project and its particular focus on state-Muslim 
relations, Moscow was considered to be a suitable location to gather data on the 
Muslim institution which is based in the capital, but claims to speak on behalf of 
Muslims across Russia. However, further data was also collected in Kazan, the 
capital of Tatarstan, a key Muslim region in Russia and a place with which the 
SMR’s leaders share strong ethnic and religious ties. For more conclusive findings 
on Muslim communities in Russia, future data should be gathered from a wider set of 
locations. 
 
The process of data collection was informed by the skills gained and lessons learnt 
from earlier data collection in Russia.29 Research experience gained in the course of a 
pilot study helped inform this project, create an overall picture of the topic and 
sharpen the initial research questions. For example, some of the earlier interviews in 
Russia brought to light a series of particular pitfalls of qualitative interviews, 
including asking leading questions, mismanaging power relations and 
underestimating the different meanings of concepts. 
 
During one of the first interviews with an official from the SMR in 2008, I was 
interested in testing the idea of the council being a legitimate intermediary body 
between the Russian state and Russian Muslims. However, introducing this idea very 
early in the interview partly limited the validity of the participant’s answers as he 
interpreted everything through this particular lens. Moreover, I did not foresee that in 
the Russian context the term ‘legitimacy’ may also have a different connotation 
associated with simply ‘not doing anything illegal.’ This was a clear example of 
‘conceptual stretching’ which happens when similar concepts do not ‘travel’ well in 
different contexts (Hantrais 209: 90-91, Sartori 1970). In my later interviews, I tried 
                                                 
29 For example, four extra interviews mentioned in this research have come from my personal and 
group interviews conducted in Russia in October 2008, while working on the ESRC-funded project, 
‘Radicalisation and violence: The Russian Dimension’ (Ref No. RES-181-25-0020). 
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to avoid leading questions and allow for sufficient space for the interviewees to share 
their own ‘meanings, interpretations and understandings’ (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 7). 
A deeper understanding of the subject has helped me keep the interviews focused, 
without letting the respondents stray too far into unrelated or less relevant concerns 
whenever possible (Burnham et al. 2004: 213).  
 
My own identity as a researcher had a series of implications on the interviewing 
process. Initially I was concerned that being a woman and a non-Muslim would 
hinder my credibility in the eyes of some Muslim religious leaders. The researcher’s 
ability to share social characteristics with respondents plays an important role in 
establishing trust and generating valid data (Dunne et al 2005, Halperin and Heath 
2012: 301-303). The question of gender did not present a particular obstacle in my 
research and I was able to have constructive discussions with men and women. 
Occasionally, gaps in my own knowledge on Islam resulted in somewhat patronising 
and more superficial responses than I would have liked. However, the fact that I was 
not a Muslim provided an opportunity to ask additional questions to clarify some 
statements, thus enhancing the richness of the data.  
Interestingly, the duality of my national identity helped overcome some of these 
issues. For example, many respondents paid more attention to me being a foreigner 
than being a woman. Being raised in the two countries enabled me to use the 
‘insider-outsider’ card to my advantage. Sharing some linguistic and familiar cultural 
characteristics of the British and Russian identity helped create a good rapport with 
the respondents. On the other hand, some representatives from British organisations 
saw me as a Russian researcher and were happy to compare experiences of Muslim 
migrants in Britain with Muslims living in Russia. Similarly, Russian representatives 
were interested in learning about British Muslims and their struggle against 
Islamophobia or increased pressure from state authorities. The value of cross-
national lessons encouraged respondents to share their views more openly. 
A key trade-off in the interview process can be between the depth and breadth of the 
obtained information. Legard et al. (2003: 147) distinguish between ‘content 
mapping’ which involves aiming for a ‘breadth of coverage of issues’ and ‘content 
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mining’ that implies ‘exploring the detail which lies within each dimension.’ In my 
interviews I tried to manage both. More contextual and historical questions asked 
earlier in the process were designed to provide an overall understanding of the issues, 
while more specific, action-related probing was used to delve deeper into particular 
motivations and decisions. The latter was increasingly difficult to achieve in the 
Russian context with senior figures reluctant to divulge information. For example, I 
had a particularly difficult interview in Russia, not so much because of the sensitivity 
of the topics addressed, but because of the rather sensitive status of the organisation 
itself. The respondent was reluctant to be recorded and was very reticent with the 
answers.  
 
The problem of that specific interview was the issue of power relations, typical for 
interviewing members of the elite. The researcher ‘may not be able to control the 
format, or direction of the interview’ as ‘it is the interviewee who has the power [to] 
control the information the interviewer is trying to eke out’ (Richards 1996: 201). 
One of the solutions is to remain flexible and ‘stay alert to see which way the 
direction goes’ (Ibid). Although it was difficult to establish sufficient credibility ‘by 
asking relevant questions which are seen as meaningful by the participant’ (Legard et 
al. 2003: 143), the interview was still informative about the nature of the 
organisation, its own perception of its status and its views on other institutions. By 
shifting the focus of the interview away from a rather problematic issue of state 
endorsement, I was able to gain some valuable information on generational 
differences, intra-Muslim relations and the changing attitudes towards migrants. 
 
I found the issue of power relations to be less problematic during my interviews in 
Britain. On one hand, many of the respondents had already been familiar with the 
topic of my research because of similar projects done on the role of Muslim 
organisations in state-Muslim relations. On the other hand, a less detached style of 
leadership, combined with stronger ties with the academic community and civil 
society groups, made British organisations more approachable. By contrast, some of 
the more familiar questions were met with a degree of fatigue which I tried to 
counteract by offering insights into how the issue of representation and similar 
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expectations have been addressed by Muslim organisations in Russia. For example, 
in light of the media focusing on the controversial role the MCB in British society in 
the aftermath of the 7/7, there was a feeling that the senior leaders were tired of 
answering the same set of questions in relation to their engagement with the British 
government. I tried to make my questions more interesting and engaging for them by 
offering parallel examples from the Russian context. The interviews reached a 
saturation point once it was not only the questions that were being repeated but also 
an increasingly limited variety of answers from different perspectives, organisations 
and commentators.  
 
 
Documentary analysis and non-participant observation 
 
Documentary analysis provided a large corpus of the contextual data to understand 
the nature of state-Muslim relations and the role of Muslim councils. While extensive 
documentary analysis was carried out before the two sets of interviews, many 
documents were collected during and after the two trips. This proved invaluable to 
understanding the changes which have occurred in Muslim representation in the 
course of the research project, not only in terms of modified discourses used by the 
institutions but also in relation to internal changes in the two organisations.  
 
A wide range of primary and secondary documents were used to gain an insight into 
the ways in which Muslim councils respond to community expectations and engage 
in verbal and written exchanges with state officials (Burnham et al. 2004: 167). 
Primary sources included official statements and communications from the two 
councils, transcripts of their meetings with state officials, particular speeches and 
statements made during official meetings with affiliated institutions, as well as more 
general Muslim events.  
 
While hard copies of organisational booklets and council-endorsed publications on 
Islam were collected from the two organisations, most of the official documents were 
online, including policy papers and written responses to government consultations. 
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Online data may not always be a reliable source as the content gets changed and 
deleted. While this in itself can be significant in analysing the changes in how the 
organisations wish to be perceived, special care was taken to download online 
documents and keep a record throughout the course of research. This was another 
lesson learnt from the pilot study on Muslim communities in Russia in 2008, as the 
SMR’s website underwent rebranding and some of the materials and articles were 
subsequently removed.  
 
Further secondary sources included commentaries and analyses of particular events 
in Muslim newspapers and websites. For example, I collected a series of different 
perspectives and opinions on the issue of the ‘Prevent’ agenda for the British case 
study and the question of mosque shortages for the Russian counterpart. The written 
documents were cross-referenced with each other and assessed according to the 
extent to which they provided reliable, authentic and credible accounts (Scott 1990: 
30-31). Official documentation in relation to the two councils was complemented by 
critical statements, articles and reports produced by rival organisations and think 
tanks. Secondary sources also included academic studies and articles on the two 
institutions and the issues facing Muslim communities in the two countries.  
 
Written and verbal exchanges between the councils’ representatives and government 
officials during the periods of disagreements were of particular interest. A series of 
letters between the MCB and Labour ministers and transcripts of meetings between 
Russian government officials and senior representatives from the SMR have 
highlighted particular points of tension in state-Muslim relations and revealed the 
ways in which they were understood, interpreted and communicated by the councils’ 
leaders. These documents and written exchanges were available online, not only 
published in online newspapers and forums, but also many were available on the 
websites of the two institutions themselves. Documents are rarely free from external 
influences, and should be considered as ‘situated products, rather than as fixed and 
stable ‘things’ in the world’ (Prior 2003: 26). In analysing these exchanges I tried to 
put them into the overall context by ascertaining the purpose of statements and their 
intended audience.  
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Moreover, the documents were not simply treated as ‘transparent representations of 
organisational routines, decision-making processes or professional practices’ but 
rather as ‘social facts’ with their own ‘formal properties… and their rhetorical 
features’ (Atkinson and Coffey 2011: 79-90). For example, while examining written 
communications and official statements between the councils’ leaders and their 
affiliated institutions, a special emphasis was placed on identifying and analysing the 
phrases used to boost public support. Official communications and press releases 
from the councils were examined to see how the two councils tried to increase 
support for their strategies by ‘bring[ing] people from different groups together to 
negotiate and coordinate common practices’ (Brown and Duguid 1996: 9).  
 
In addition to the interviews and documentary analysis, non-participant observation 
was used to experience the internal dynamic within the institutions and their affiliates 
and cross-reference what was said by the interviewees with how it was observed by 
the researcher. Non-participant observation is similar to Gold’s definition of 
‘observer-as-participant’ (1958: 221). The value of this kind of observation becomes 
particularly apparent in the context of ‘one-visit interviews’ where the contact with 
informants and participants is rather formal and brief (Ibid).  
 
Observation ‘allows to collect data from the context in which it occurs’ and “[t]he 
researcher is part of the process’ (Dargie 1998: 66). Brief amounts of time spent in 
the organisation before and after the interview can give the researcher ‘a feel for 
organisational environments and the roles of actor within them that cannot be 
achieved through an interview situation’ (Ibid). Observational evidence was 
collected in two ways. First, I tried to observe the behaviour and institutional 
practices within the organisations before or during the process of interviewing. 
Second, by attending, but not actively participating in community-based or academic 
seminars, I observed the ways in which particular ideas were presented to or 
discussed by representatives from the Muslim councils.  
 
For example, while waiting to interview a representative from a Moscow-based 
organisation which positioned itself as an alternative, state-endorsed voice to the 
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SMR, it was important to observe how small and under-staffed that organisation was 
and under what conditions it had to operate. Without the personal visit and 
observation it would have been easy to mistake its far-reaching rhetoric in the public 
sphere with its real opportunities to engage with Moscow Muslims. Observational 
evidence was also useful while conducting interviews with multiple organisations in 
Bradford and Leicester. Aided by personal recommendations, it was possible to 
observe internal communication processes and the work of these organisations, as 
well as the ways in which different affiliates of the MCB and their leaders interacted 
with each other. Therefore, non-participant observation has provided additional 
opportunities to contextualise the insights gained from written documents and 
individual conversations with participants. Conversely, as these observations were 
non-participant and rather brief, they were also triangulated with the data derived 
from documents and interviews. 
 
 
Data analysis: themes, discourses and process tracing 
 
The data analysis was informed by theoretical assumptions discussed earlier in the 
chapter. The gathered data was analysed thematically, tracing particular changes in 
discourses and reconstructing a series of events and causal mechanisms which were 
likely to influence particular decisions. As will be discussed in the empirical section 
of the thesis, these decisions involved the level of engagement with the government 
and other religious and non-religious actors, as well as the nature of organisational 
reforms designed to establish strong connections with Muslim communities to gain 
their support.  
 
Thematic analysis involved recognising patterns in the data collected from different 
sources and organising them into categories to uncover ‘connections between the 
various categories that might be called themes’ (Seidman 2013: 127). The process of 
coding proceeded in a series of steps. First, the data was coded in relation to the 
councils’ interaction with state officials and other religious groups and their 
particular organisational strategies within their respective internal environments. 
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These were large categories of arguments and findings put together. Second, a more 
nuanced re-coding was used to identify particular segments of data in line with 
particular set of contextual opportunities and constraints. These were later re-coded 
into individual factors identified within the external and internal contexts. Third, I 
grouped together the data referring to particular actions and strategies taken by the 
two institutions. Consistency of comparative analysis was ensured by grouping the 
data in relation to the same set of identified factors relevant for the two cases and 
using the same wording to pinpoint particular themes. 
 
With the project’s interest in discursive strategies used by the two organisations, a 
large part of analysis focused on tracing discursive frames and examining the ways 
the actors used rhetoric in their written documents as well as verbal communications 
to justify their actions in the eyes of the government and Muslim communities. For 
example, in light of the two institutions acting as social movement organisations, 
particular discursive frames were identified to see the extent to which each council 
has sought to foster ‘a shared understanding’ among their communities ‘vital to the 
effectiveness of [them as an] institution’ (Brown and Duguid 1996: 9). A detailed 
analysis of the written exchanges between the councils’ leaders and public figures 
helped uncover the ways in which the processes of engagement or disengagement 
have unfolded.  
 
A constructivist approach to process tracing was also incorporated into the data 
analysis. It provided a useful way to understand internal mechanisms of particular 
shifts in the council’s behaviour over a short period of time (Bennett and Elman 
2005, George and Bennett 2005, Checkel 2005). As Collier (1993: 112) famously 
noted, ‘within-case comparisons are critical to the viability of small-n analysis.’ For 
example, I focused on particular chains of events leading to the points when relations 
between the council and the government had altered. Combined with a careful 
analysis of the changing rhetoric, it helped identify critical junctures and trace the 
steps following which these relations had become rather tense. This was particularly 
relevant in the British case. However, in the Russian scenario, a careful tracing of the 
aftermath of rather confrontational events on the issue of mosque shortages offered 
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another interesting sequence leading to the normalisation of the SMR’s relations with 
the government. 
  
Similarly, while analysing the data on the processes and events in which the two 
councils were created, it was possible to identify how and why more conservative 
approaches to power-sharing have become entrenched. Process tracing was also used 
to understand how the two councils have engaged in preparing, communicating and 
delivering internal reforms. It has provided an evolutionary approach to explaining 
how ‘institutionalised patterns’ can be established and ‘new political identities’ 





This chapter has addressed a series of informed choices made in relation to case 
selection and methods to collect and analyse the data. By outlining a constructivist 
framework, it discussed the ways in which the two case studies were compared using 
qualitative methods. Document analysis, semi-structured interviews and non-
participant observation were triangulated to create two rich typologies of the 
councils’ engagement with the state and Muslim communities in the two largely 
contrasting contexts of state-religion relations. Consistent application of the methods 
to explore the two cases was used to enhance the project’s validity. It was also 
designed to ensure a future replication of the results in a larger number of cases to 
deliver more representative findings.   
 
Individual methods were applied to match the underlying theoretical assumptions. 
Thematic analysis was relevant to explore a combination of theoretical insights and 
was used as the main strategy of analysing the data. Discourse analysis was 
particularly helpful in exploring the ways in which the two institutionalised 
challengers have framed their actions. Process tracing, which is a key methodological 
tool of historical institutionalists, enabled me to trace a series of events which were 
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likely to influence particular decisions, or were largely responsible for ‘locking-in’ 
specific patterns of power relations between the councils’ leaders and their affiliates.  
 
The next part of the thesis will offer a detailed analysis of the two councils and their 
relations with the state and Muslim communities. It will explore the theoretical 
assumptions by applying the methods discussed and present the findings in light of 
the empirical data collected during the fieldwork trips. The first case study will focus 
on the MCB and the British pluralist context. I will examine conditions under which 
the council engages or disengages from the government, what strategies in adopts 
and how it frames and negotiates its actions towards state officials and religious 
groups (Chapter 3). I will then examine the ways in which it tries to build support 
with Muslim communities and adapt its own organisational structures in light of the 
changing nature of Muslim expectations in Britain (Chapter 4). The second case 
study will look at the SMR and the Russian corporatist context. Similarly, I will first 
examine the SMR’s engagement with the Russian government and other religious 
groups (Chapter 5). I will also explore the SMR’s efforts to improve its reputation in 
the eyes of Russian Muslims by undertaking organisational reforms (Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 3 




The MCB’s relations with the British state over the last two decades has been subject 
to increasing controversy and debate. In this chapter, I will examine the changing 
nature of the MCB’s cooperation with British state authorities in light of the 
aforementioned expectations on pluralist forms of interest mediation. The chapter 
will discuss the extent to which the MCB’s engagement with the British government 
conforms to the pluralist rules of state-religion relations. Before tracing the changing 
nature of the MCB’s relations with British authorities, including not only its actions 
but also its rhetoric, I will contextualise the four dimensions of political opportunity 
structures. Based on the religious dimension of the institutional context, I will outline 
the pluralist forms of religious mediation, religious divisions present in British 
society, informal ways and practices of resolving conflicts in state-religion relations 
and opportunities available for making alliances with religious groups and other civil 
society organisations.  
 
In particular, I will examine the extent to which the Council’s engagement with the 
government has been shaped by the pluralist setting, exemplified by low level of 
state intervention into societal life, strong civil society and a high number of 
voluntary and autonomous civil society organisations. The POS theory suggests that 
the pluralist nature of the British context is likely to hinder the processes of singling 
out and co-opting particular organisations to represent Muslim interests to the state. 
However, should such a partnership be formed, the risk of disengagement would be 
low because of the availability of alternative platforms from which Muslim interests 
can be articulated and represented. In light of these institutional conditions, I expect 
the MCB’s engagement with the government to be rather weak, whereas its 
cooperation with other religious and non-religious organisations to be strong.   
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I will explore these assumption in light of the data gathered in 2011 in three different 
locations in Britain, namely in London, Bradford and Leicester. Although some 
references will be made to the events in 2013, most of the analysis will cover the 
period from 1997 to 2012. After explaining some of the pluralist elements of the 
British context, I will discuss the MCB’s engagement with the government during 
the so-called ‘honeymoon period’ of the first Labour administration (1997-2001) 
which was marked by close cooperation. Next, I will examine the tensions in state-
council relations between 2005 and 2009 which can be classified as a period of 
contention. I will investigate the ways in which exogenous shocks and pluralist forms 
of representation offered alternative channels for articulating Muslim interests, once 
informal connections with government officials became problematic. In the final 
section, I will analyse the MCB’s relations with the Coalition government in light of 
the increasingly diversified approaches to religious governance.   
 
A key argument advanced in this chapter is that the MCB’s relations with the British 
government were influenced by the shifts that took place in institutional patterns of 
religious governance and official interpretations of the existing religious divisions. 
The first shift involved a rather unusual incorporation of corporatist elements of 
state-religion mediation under Labour and state efforts to pacify religious divisions 
by mainstreaming faith in public policies. The second change resulted from 
increasingly negative perceptions of Muslim communities in British society in light 
of the growing concerns about terrorism and the state’s attempt to diversify its 
engagement with official Muslim organisations and return to pluralist forms of 
interest mediation. I will examine how the MCB has responded to these changes by 
adjusting its rhetoric and making new alliances to rebalance its status within an 
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Britain’s pluralist context: past legacies and recent shifts  
 
State-Muslim relations in Britain have developed in a context which can be generally 
characterised as pluralist. In this section, I will apply the POS-based approach to 
explain a series of institutional and organisational features of state-religion relations. 
The pluralist nature of the British case has been marked by religious organisations 
being autonomous from the state, although the Anglican Church has officially 
remained the established Church. It has been also exemplified by a strong preference 
for a horizontal (or network) approach to resolving community tensions within the 
local settings and strong opportunities for cooperation between different faiths, civil 
society and minority interest organisations. A better understanding of the religious 
divisions which manifested themselves at the public and societal level, coupled with 
a strong role of civil society and multicultural policies aimed at integrating Muslim 
communities, provide an insight into the nature of formal opportunities and 
constraints of the British context. At the same time, multiple opportunities for 
cooperation between different religious, ethnic, and cultural groups and informal 
practices of resolving inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions on the local level 
constitute some of its more informal approaches and opportunities for making 
alliances. 
 
State-religion relations in Britain are characterised by cooperation between the state 
and different religious groups (Cesari and McLoughlin 2005, Fetzer and Soper 
2005). The nature of religious cleavages and tensions in British society has been 
rather complex. On one hand, the religious pluralism and the less imposing character 
of the Anglican Church did not hinder the development of different Muslim 
organisations. On the other hand, the Anglican Church has traditionally enjoyed a 
privileged position of being the ‘established’ religion within the multi-faith society, 
while persistent inequalities in legislation were rather slow in accommodating the 
religious dimension of Muslim identity. A close link between the state and the 
church has been accompanied by certain benefits and burdens, including the 
Anglican bishops’ unique constitutional position to vote on legislative matters in the 
House of Lords and the state’s reciprocal right to exercise control in appointing or 
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confirming the leaders of the Anglican Church (Cumper and Edge 2006). Although 
many elements of this relationship remain nominal, some commentators have called 
for a disestablishment of the Church to provide fairer representation and protection 
of minority religions (Modood 1994).  
 
Religious divisions in British society have been marked by two contrasting 
dynamics. For many non-Muslim British citizens, the importance of religious 
affiliation has become less important (as was indicated by the changes revealed in the 
national Census in 2001 and 2011). However, this has been less the case for British 
Muslims. While for some Muslims a religious label attached to their identity has 
been less important, for others their ‘Muslim self-identification and others’ 
perception of them’ have made them ‘intensely sensitive to how their religion [has 
been] represented in the West’ (Parekh 2008: 9). Initially, state policies were 
designed to protect Muslim racial and ethnic rights, without acknowledging the 
importance of their religious beliefs.30 Against the backdrop of the lack of attention 
towards Muslim religious rights, some members of Muslim communities articulated 
a strong sense of identity-based politics and considered themselves as a distinct 
religious group. They regarded insufficient provisions on faith schools, the lack of 
protection from anti-Muslim feelings and increased levels of community policing as 
discriminatory.  
 
Britain’s formal approach to integrating Muslim communities formed as a result of 
colonial legacies, immigration pressures and a series of re-interpretations of its 
liberal brand of multiculturalism as a guiding principle to promote ethnic and 
increasingly religious equality (Meer and Modood 2014). Whereas state policies of 
multiculturalism underwent a series of changes to create greater cohesion and 
integration of different communities, the level of state involvement or direct 
interaction between the government and Muslim communities remained relatively 
weak up to the end of the 1980s. Following a series of reports that highlighted a 
growing sense of economic deprivation and social alienation among British Muslims, 
                                                 
30 This issue was not resolved until the Single Equality Act of 2010. 
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the state attempted to build stronger connections with its Muslim citizens by fighting 
social exclusion and improving living conditions through urban regeneration 
programmes.  
 
Increasingly, debates on integration highlighted some of the dangers associated with 
the multiculturalist approach, especially in relation to creating increasingly 
segregated Muslim communities, detached from mainstream British culture. These 
discussions were sparked by Trevor Philips’ (2005) comments on Britain 
‘sleepwalking into segregation.’ Criticising the excessive focus on the ‘multi’ and 
not enough attention on the common culture, his words were later echoed by Bhikhu 
Parekh’s distinction between positive multicultural-ism and negative multi-
culturalism.31 Consequently, the British pluralist approach to engaging with minority 
groups underwent a series of transformations from the laissez-faire policies of 
respecting and praising multicultural differences (originally defined in relation to 
race and ethnicity) to emphasising the need for national cohesion, underpinned by 
inter-religious and inter-cultural cooperation. However, notwithstanding these 
internal variations and reformulations of multiculturalism and the increased 
monitoring of Muslim activities in light of the terrorist threats, the overall level of 
state intervention into religious life remained relatively low. New Labour’s policies 
on religion, however, made an exception to the rule, as will be discussed in the next 
section.   
 
The informal structures of the British pluralist approach can be traced in its 
decentralising dynamic and a strong emphasis on dealing with the issues of minority 
representation locally. In the recent years, this has been challenged by Muslim 
communities increasingly calling for national initiatives to mainstream provisions 
which would guarantee their minority rights. Whereas this has been partly achieved 
through legislation (e.g. Race Relations Acts of 1960s-1990s and the Racial and 
                                                 
31 Bhikhu Parekh (2006) identified two types of multiculturalism: negative multi-culturalism that 
stands for cultural isolationism or ghettoisation, and positive multicultural-ism that envisages a 
dialogue between different cultures. 
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Religious Hatred Act of 2006), the process of engagement with Muslim communities 
and their organisations has remained largely the remit of local authorities. In the 
1980s, the funding of multicultural initiatives and ethnically-defined bodies was cut, 
giving space for Muslim organisations to exercise their right to participate in local 
politics. A horizontal attachment to local-level politics entailed allocating resources 
to local authorities to tackle any arising tensions within the communities. Mutual 
efforts by community representatives and government officials to provide some 
opportunities for Muslim local representation by working with municipal authorities 
have led some scholars to label this a ‘municipal drift in British multicultural public 
policies’ (Meer and Modood 2009: 479). British multiculturalism ‘has been heavily 
localised’ and ‘linked essentially to issues of managing diversity in areas of 
immigrant settlement’ (Singh 2005). 
 
Another important element of the British pluralist context is its well-developed civil 
society, consisting of religious and non-religious groups and associational interests. 
The lack of centralised provisions to manage cultural and religious diversity has 
encouraged more flexible forms of institutional arrangements between state 
authorities and different civil society organisations. This has led to a co-existence of 
many different minority-based organisations, religious as well as secular. Some 
organisations have embraced identity politics and engaged in articulating Muslim 
concerns in relation to political advocacy and representation, religious provisions and 
welfare, as well as campaigning against social exclusion and Islamophobia. Others 
have lobbied the government on issues of poverty, social exclusion and equality as 
part of British mainstream efforts, aimed at combating general grievances affecting 
British society as a whole.  
 
The openness and flexibility of British civil society has also facilitated the work of 
Muslim organisations by providing different platforms for articulating issues, 
cooperating with (and between) institutions and charities, political, religious, or 
social organisations. In the words of a strong advocate of multiculturalism as a civic 
idea: 
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it is a positive virtue that there is internal variety within any group 
and that (organised) members of any one group will want to locate 
themselves in different parts of the representational landscape - 
secular, religious, close to government, distant from mainstream 
political parties - for that is true integration; new groups should 
have similar opportunities to old groups and will not need to 
conform to a special minority perspective (Modood 2007: 144-
145). 
 
With a growing number of Muslims entering politics and their strong presence in 
business, legal and cultural sectors, the number of channels through which Muslim 
issues can be addressed has also dramatically widened over the years. This reflects 
the plurality of British society in general and of the Muslim field in particular. 
Access to different political venues and interests creates a diverse pool of potential 
partners to engage with, not only for the different organisations themselves, but also 
for the government.   
 
The more flexible character of religious pluralism and well-developed civil society 
does not necessarily reduce tensions between different interests and organisations. 
However, it provides greater institutional opportunities for interfaith cooperation at 
the national, municipal and local levels which are arguably more accommodating to 
Muslim communities in Britain. There are currently over 260 interfaith networks and 
organisations recorded in the Directory of Inter Faith Organisations by the Inter-Faith 
Network for the UK. The Church of England has also considered possibilities and 
guidelines for multi-faith worship for its increasingly diverse parishioners. Although 
there is little consensus on whether joint religious services are indeed compatible, 
some justification to accommodating different religious practices has been provided 
on the grounds of Christian hospitality (Sudworth 2009).32 As we shall see later, this 
is quite different from the Russian context where such forms of informal religious 
cooperation are less likely. 
                                                 
32 For example, these recommendations included having ‘multi-faith gatherings where faith groups 
observe respectfully while other believers worship and take their own turn’ (Multi-Faith Worship – A 
guidance paper 2008: 4). 
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This brief analysis of the pluralist elements of state-religion relations in Britain and 
their impact on state-Muslim relations was designed to provide a snapshot of 
political opportunities and constraints likely to influence the MCB’s engagement 
with the British state. In line with POS theory, a key expectation of the thesis is that 
actors’ strategies are determined not only by political opportunities but also by 
internal shifts which take place within these formal and informal structures. While 
state-religion relations in Britain have remained largely shaped by the pluralist rules, 
a series of changes occurred in state policies on religion, particularly in relation to 
the level of state involvement. Strongly influenced by ideological considerations of 
the government in power, these fluctuations in policies under Labour and later under 
the Coalition have influenced the nature of the MCB’s engagement with the state. A 
key shift which will be discussed in the following section involved a short interlude 
of corporatist elements being introduced into religious governance under Tony 
Blair’s administration.  
 
Similarly, the chapter will explore the changes in the nature of religious cleavages 
and the ways in which they have been interpreted by the MCB. The first change 
entailed state efforts to mainstream faith in an attempt to limit what was considered 
to be the real or perceived discrimination against Muslim religious rights in relation 
to other faith communities, namely the Christian, Jewish and Sikh. While these 
measures helped to resolve some of these tensions, the events of 7/7 and the ensuing 
securitisation of how Muslim communities were treated under the anti-terrorist 
legislation reopened some of the partially healed divisions, thus altering the existing 
conditions for state-Muslim engagement. This was particularly evident in relation to 
the MCB’s efforts to lobby the government on the issues of Muslim discrimination.  
 
In the next two sections, I will discuss the impact of these changes in formal 
structures and religious cleavages, together with the more volatile elements of 
informal relations and alliances on the MCB’s engagement with the British 
government. Pluralist elements in state-Muslim relations in Britain would suggest 
that the MCB should experience low pressure to cooperate with the government. 
Moreover, the opportunities for building alliances with other groups (which can be 
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beneficial for its efforts to lobby the government) should be high. However, the data 
indicates that the nature of the MCB’s engagement with the government was more 
complex in light of the aforementioned shifts and fluctuations in state policies and 
interpretations of religious tensions. 
 
 
The MCB’s engagement with New Labour: mainstreaming faith  
 
The creation of the MCB coincided with Labour coming to power in 1997. While the 
impetus for such an umbrella body came under the previous Conservative 
administration, the importance of the MCB as a representative institution speaking 
on behalf of Muslim communities was fully embraced by Tony Blair’s government. 
The research suggests that a strong sense of cooperation was made possible because 
of the initial alignment between the government’s agenda on faith and integration 
and the MCB’s lobbying efforts to protect Muslim rights. A match in expectations 
was grounded in a series of shifts in formal structures of state-Muslim relations and 
perceptions of religious divisions. The first shift focused on the importance of 
Muslim collective representation through an officially-recognised single faith group 
organisation, which was in line with the corporatist ideology of the first Labour 
administration. The second change involved a desire to recognise faith as a strong 
identity marker to bridge some of the religious divisions in relation to state policies. 
As will be illustrated in the next section, this was aimed at developing a positive 
recognition of Islam and pacifying the divisive issues between Muslims and other 
faith communities.  
 
 
The corporatist spirit of civic religion 
 
Labour’s efforts to incorporate a faith dimension in policies aimed at promoting 
multiculturalism and creating social cohesion between different communities is well-
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documented.33 In 2000, the Commission for Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, chaired 
by Lord Parekh, developed a vision of British multiculturalism as the one that 
‘treat[s] people both equally and with due respect for difference’ (Runnymede Trust 
2000). Some of the Report’s recommendations on cultivating a sense of membership, 
belonging, and shared citizenship, were embraced by the Blair administration in 
relation to the need to heal existing national divisions on the issues of national 
identity and integration.  
 
During its first years in power, Tony Blair’s government took a series of steps 
designed to improve its relations with Muslim communities by widening the scope of 
protective legislation on race and ethnicity and including religion in debates on 
British identity and national values. This signalled a shift towards pacifying religious 
differences by politicising state recognition of faith and the latter’s positive 
contribution to British society. The greater ‘receptivity to faith’ (Birt 2006) was 
partly dictated by New Labour’s ideology, partly by Tony Blair’s personal religious 
convictions. For example, the government set up the Faith Community Liaison 
Group with a particular remit to consult different departments ‘for the effective long-
term involvement of the faith communities' perspectives and needs in policy 
development across government’ (Hansard 2003).  
 
New Labour’s willingness to give faith communities a stronger recognition in the 
public sphere can also be attributed to its ‘communitarian’ preferences which 
emphasised ‘social cohesion….over the resolution of conflict between competing 
interest groups’ (Birt 2006: 691-692). In 2001, in a speech on faith in politics, Tony 
Blair (2001) stressed the importance of major faith traditions ‘in supporting and 
propagating values which bind us together as a nation.’ The desire to create a public 
space where civic religion would help cement the scars of ethnic and racial divides 
resulted in what some scholars called a neoliberal incorporation of ‘community 
organisations into partnership structures’ (Glynn 2009: 5). The focus shifted from 
                                                 
33 For a more nuanced exploration of Labour’s policies on faith, see Allen 2011 and O’Toole et al. 
(2013). 
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recognising racial differences to celebrating cultural diversity and promoting 
peaceful coexistence of faith communities (Peach 2005). 
 
The research supports a widely-held view that the Blair government ‘has brought up 
faith as a fairly central policy issue’ (Interview 27). A newly-discovered emphasis on 
the value of a multi-faith society provided a positive drive towards recognising the 
religious dimension of Muslim identity. New Labour’s ideology as regards faith, 
social cohesion and communitarianism provided a powerful incentive for the creation 
of the ‘interfaith industry where you… get funded for interfaith activity’ and benefit 
from ‘state patronage’ (Interview 28). It permeated political discourse on community 
cohesion and integration and has become a common language between government 
figures and the MCB’s spokesmen.  
 
Therefore, the MCB’s engagement with New Labour was facilitated by the 
government’s shift towards increasingly corporatist attempts to mainstream faith in 
the public sphere. New Labour’s approach to religious governance contained a series 
of features which are more readily identified with a corporatist mode of engagement 
with specifically co-opted organisations. For example, rather than engaging with a 
variety of voices, early policies under New Labour aimed at empowering particular 
organisations to represent different faiths. As will be illustrated later in the chapter, 
between 1997 and 2005, the MCB was supported and encouraged to be such a key 
representative voice (or a ‘peak’ organisation to use Schmitter’s terminology) 
entrusted to speak on behalf of all Muslims in Britain.  
 
The Review undertaken by the Department for Communities and Local Government 
acknowledged the present use of a ‘decentralised model’ (Home Office Faith 
Communities Unit 2004: 75). However, it also announced the government’s drive to 
develop a more central role to support faith communities (Ibid). Some of the key 
recommendations included ensuring that ‘faith-based organisations [would] not face 
unnecessary additional barriers when applying for funding under Government 
programmes’ and that the government maintained ‘a close relationship with faith 
leaders and representatives (Ibid: 77). Previously, the state was removed from 
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engaging in faith issues and the Church of England, was ‘working as an interlocutor 
for other faiths’ (Interview 28). This model was replaced by Labour’s multi-faith 
approach of the 1990s (Ibid). The role of the Church of England would regain its 
significance under the Coalition government after 2010. 
 
It would appear that whenever there was a match between the state’s approach to 
faith and the MCB’s own agenda of promoting Muslim interests, the level of 
cooperation was strong. Labour’s singling out of the MCB as its key interlocutor to 
speak on behalf of Muslim citizens may have been atypical for the British pluralist 
context of interest mediation. And yet, it paved the way for a closer engagement 
between the MCB and government ministers. 
 
There were previous incidents of using co-optation for resolving issues on the local 
level by engaging with particular community representatives. However, Labour’s 
readiness to deal with religious groups rather than individual citizens and to embrace 
faith as a multicultural category marked a shift in British pluralism. The 
government’s preferential treatment of the MCB and strong personal ties between its 
spokesmen and government ministers was more in line with the managerial state of a 
corporatist style of engagement.  
 
The newly-found emphasis on religious equality provided the MCB with an 
opportunity to represent the needs of the Muslim community as a singular category 
on the grounds of parity with other faith groups, rather than within the previously-
used ethnic and racial labels. For example, in the words of one interviewee: 
 
I think for democracy to work and to cater for everybody 
effectively, you need to have that intermediary or representative 
voice for any group of people who have a common agenda or 
interest (Interview 31). 
 
A rather intriguing pacification of religious divisions by promoting the importance of 
faith in public policies gave the MCB a greater opportunity to promote Muslim 
religious and social concerns in public debates and discuss the issue of Islamophobia 
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and Muslim marginalisation with government officials. The next section will 
demonstrate how these changes in formal structures and approaches to religious 
cleavages provided favourable conditions and incentives for stronger cooperation 
between the government and the MCB. By adding more volatile political 
opportunities, such as building alliances and using informal relations, it will analyse 
the MCB’s initial interaction with the government, generally categorised as a 
‘honeymoon period’ when ‘the relationship was strong’ (Interview 27). A brief POS-
based analysis of the MCB’s efforts to include a question of religion in the 2001 
Census provides an insight into how the MCB engaged with the state-religion 
environment to mobilise and protect Muslim interests. 
 
 
A case for cooperation  
 
As was mentioned earlier, the New Labour administration welcomed the creation of 
the MCB as a unified organisation, collectively representing Muslim interests in 
Britain. It was seen as instrumental in reducing community tensions and promoting 
‘moderate’ forms of Islam. Initially, the MCB was consulted on a regular basis. The 
government encouraged its contributions on counteracting Islamophobia, preventing 
extremism and facilitating interfaith activities. The MCB praised the government for 
keeping its election promises to establish Muslim faith schools, introduce NHS 
chaplains and make ‘provisions of a funded Muslim advisor for the Prison Service’ 
(MCB 1998).  
 
The honeymoon period between the government and the MCB was marked by 
regular consultations and personal visits of senior ministers to the MCB’s events. 
The findings suggest that the MCB made the most of these early opportunities to 
lobby the government. The earlier editions of the MCB’s newsletters had a separate 
section, specially dedicated to ‘Whitehall encounters’ which listed different official 
and informal meetings that took place between the MCB and different government 
departments. Moreover, the MCB’s own committees were formed to mirror the 
existing government departments.  
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Further evidence of the MCB’s institutionalisation as an official partner of the 
government comes from regular encounters between members of the MCB 
committees and government officials, ranging from the Foreign Office to discuss 
‘policy issues of concern to Muslims’, consultation with the Treasury on eradicating 
poverty or discussions with Department of Health on NHS Chaplains (The Common 
Good 2001: 9). While listing some of the MCB’s achievements, Iqbal Sacranie (one 
of the MCB’s key founders and Secretary General 2002-2006), spoke proudly of ‘the 
regular bilateral meetings with the Secretary of State for all major Government 
departments’ as an ‘opportunity to raise issues of concern at the very highest level of 
government machinery’ (Muslim Weekly 2004). 
  
Interestingly, the MCB articulated its claims by mirroring the words used by the 
government. For example, in his letter to Tony Blair on the importance of faith 
schools, the leader of the MCB linked the ‘controversy about faith schools’ to Blair’s 
programme of ‘national inclusion and integration’ warning the Prime Minister of 
‘certain circles’ [wishing] to derail the agenda (MCB 2002b: 8). While the MCB 
tried to use a newly found emphasis on religion to its advantage by realigning its 
objectives with those of the government, the written and verbal exchanges between 
Iqbal Sacranie and Tony Blair revealed the importance of personal relations in 
promoting the Muslim agenda. The MCB’s success in engaging with the government 
was made possible through good informal connections between Iqbal Sacranie and 
Tony Blair and Jack Straw (Interview 27). 
 
Strong personal relations served a powerful informal structure facilitating the 
Council’s engagement with the government in the domestic sphere. The MCB has 
never stopped lobbying the government on a number of issues in foreign policy, such 
as Iraq, or the Israel-Palestine question, or on the problem of excessive policing of 
Muslim communities following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, until the 
London bombings in 2005, these disagreements did not appear to constrain MCB-
government engagement. For example, as early as 1999, the MCB expressed 
concerns about MI5’s attempt to recruit a religious leader as an informer and strongly 
demanded that ‘Home Secretary Jack Straw [give] a categorical assurance that the 
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security services [will] not use any member of the community to spy on another’ 
(MCB 1999b). However, the MCB remained hopeful that ‘security policy [will] not 
be used to destabilise and alienate the community’ (Ibid). The mild overall tone of 
the statement stands in sharp contrast to the MCB’s later statements on the ‘Prevent’ 
agenda. 
 
What was particularly important for the MCB during the earlier period of New 
Labour’s administration was the opportunity to have direct access to the government 
and be able to make Muslim concerns heard – be it in relation to providing funding 
for community initiatives, rooting out religious discrimination or voicing disapproval 
of particular foreign policy actions. Strong personal connections and a match in the 
government and MCB’s expectations created a strong sense of cooperation: 
 
We were consulted more, we were accepted as the only 
representative organisation and there was also a desire on the part 
of the government in terms of their policies and engagement that 
there should be an authentic, credible, democratic, transparent 
voice through whom they would do the business of talking to the 
community (Interview 31). 
 
However, by endorsing the MCB as its key partner, the government helped 
institutionalise its official status. For example, the MCB monopolised the position of 
‘Muslim partner organisation’ in the report on government engagement with 
different faith communities, in such diverse matters as burial or fireworks regulation 
(Communities and Local Government 2005). There were regular information 
exchanges and it was generally felt that the MCB’s concerns were being heard and 
addressed. Overall, this was the period when the MCB was successful in working 
from within the institutional environment of state-religion relations, challenging the 
government on the issues that needed to be addressed to improve religious 
representation of Muslim communities and speaking out against unjust treatment of 
Muslim communities and excessive burdens of integration.  
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The 2001 Census: creating a new faith constituency  
 
The MCB’s campaign for a religious question to be included in the 2001 Census 
provides a good example of how a positive change in religious cleavages and formal 
procedures of state-religion relations affected its engagement with the government. 
Coupled with favourable opportunities created by inter-religious alliances and 
personal connections the campaign marked an important milestone in lobbying the 
government to improve religious provisions for Muslim communities.  
 
A five-year effort to include a category of religion in the 2001 Census involved the 
MCB lobbying the government, participating in consultations, writing letters and 
issuing joint press releases with other religious groups. Its success was also due to 
the shift towards a greater recognition of faith in the public sphere. For Jamil Sherif, 
the MCB’s representative on the ‘Census 2001: Religious Affiliation Group’,34 this 
campaign ‘marked the emergence of a new faith constituency’ (Sherif 2003: 2). 
Instead of ‘characterising people by what they looked like – their race or ethnicity – 
allegiance to moral and ethical values [became] more important in some contexts’ 
(Ibid). 
 
Sensing the government’s sensitivity to matters of faith, the MCB focused its 
campaign on appealing to the government’s notion of equality and social cohesion. 
As an interest group campaigning on behalf of Muslim communities, the MCB 
articulated Muslim collective concerns about being treated as the ‘invisible’ element 
of British society. Moreover, the Council emphasised the relevance of its campaign 
by claiming that more and more people ‘identify themselves in terms of their religion 
and culture’, whereas ‘the basic classifications of Black, White or Asian are simply 
out of date’ (MCB’s statement to Jack Straw on 2 December 1998, cited in Sherif 
2003: 7).  
 
                                                 
34 The Group included religious organisations of various faiths, academics and other representatives 
campaigning for the inclusion of a question on religious affiliation in the 2001 Census. 
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Moreover, the MCB made an explicit link between acknowledging Muslim religious 
presence and ‘pav[ing] the way for proper provision of public services in areas such 
as education, health, housing and employment’ (MCB 2000). In his earlier speech 
during the Prime Minister’s reception, Iqbal Sacranie made a powerful appeal to 
include religion to show policymakers how many Muslims in Britain suffer from ‘the 
high rates of educational underachievement, the crippling levels of unemployment, 
and the suffocating social exclusion’ (Sacranie 1999). 
 
The importance of personal connections became apparent once the Census 
(Amendment) Bill was to pass through both Houses of Parliament. Iqbal Sacranie 
wrote to Tony Blair urging him for ‘direct intervention…to ensure that a few hours 
of Parliamentary time is given to this important Bill’ (cited in Sherif 2011: 10). 
Further opportunities to make the Bill pass were provided by the interfaith 
cooperation between different leaders of Muslim, Jewish, Christian and Sikh 
communities. By working together with different faiths, as well as by creating a 
particular narrative of how the question of religion was introduced in the Census, the 
MCB proved successful in lobbying the government to achieve greater recognition of 
British Muslims as a faith community.  
 
Interfaith cooperation on the issue of the Census began in the mid-1990s with the 
‘Inner Cities Religious Council’, ‘Churches Working together’ and the ‘Inter-faith 
Group’ examining the religion question in the Census. With the creation of the 
Religious Affiliation Sub-Group 2 of the Census Content Working Group under the 
leadership of Professor Leslie Francis, different religious representatives worked 
together on the wording of the question. During the negotiations, Muslim 
participation was first represented by the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs 
(UKACIA), the founding body of the MCB, and from 1997 the MCB itself. 
 
The significance of having strong allies to lobby the government became apparent 
once there was a risk that the Bill might be delayed and not pass in time to ‘allow the 
proposed religion question to be included in 2001 Census in England and Wales’ 
(MCB 2000). In his capacity as Chair of the Sub-Group, Professor Leslie wrote to 
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the Treasury warming the minister that ‘if a question on religious identity is not 
asked in the Census, there will be no credibility in future Ministerial declarations of 
intent to ensure the needs of different faith communities are appropriately met’ (cited 
in Sherif 2003:12). Similarly, it was believed that the respected Sikh broadcaster 
Indarjit Singh managed to ‘convince Lord Weatherill to propose the matter in the 
Lords’ (Ibid: 12).  
 
In his study of the MCB and its new role in the public sphere, Pedziwiatr brings to 
light the MCB’s attempt to ‘aggregate and mobilise people of often quite different 
subjective positions in a common cause’ to create ‘a category of a single Muslim 
community’ (Pedziwiatr 2007: 275). My findings suggest that whenever there was a 
match between the state approach to engaging with Muslim communities and the 
MCB’s agenda to promote Muslim issues, there was a stronger chance for 
cooperation between the government and the institutionalised Muslim organisation. 
A newly-discovered emphasis on the value of multi-faith society provided a positive 
drive towards recognising the religious dimension of Muslim communities. The 
MCB was successful in positioning itself in the eyes of the government as the 
intermediary or representative voice of the newly recognised Muslim faith category. 
There may have been disagreements over foreign policy, but the shared agenda on 
religion ensured that the first five years of the MCB’s engagement with the 
government were marked by good relations and a strong sense of partnership.  
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Labour’s disengagement from the MCB: securitising Muslim faith  
 
A key turning point in the MCB’s engagement with the government came in 2005, 
following the London bombings in July that year. The aftermath of 7/7 imposed a 
considerable constraint on the MCB’s cooperation with key Labour ministers. Buzan 
and Waever (1998: 23-24) suggest that any public issue can first become politicised 
which means ‘requiring government decisions and resources’ and ‘in a more extreme 
version of politisation’ it can be securitised, which means it is ‘presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the 
normal bounds of political procedure’. In this section I will first outline how 
religious divisions became more visible as in light of increasingly negative 
connotations attached to Islam in British society and state policies. I will also focus 
on how the MCB’s spokesmen made sense of these changes and articulated them in 
their discourse. My findings help explain how the MCB’s engagement with the 
Labour administration changed in light of the increased terrorist threat and the 
government’s shift from recognising to securitising the Muslim faith.  
 
The government’s response to home-grown terrorism was the establishment of the 
‘Prevent Violent Extremism’ (Prevent) agenda as part of a wider counter-terrorism 
CONTEST strategy. The aim of the Prevent was ‘to stop radicalisation, reduce 
support for terrorism and violent extremism and discourage people from becoming 
terrorists’ (HM Government 2009: 14). Although the counter-strategy was nothing 
new, a key implication of the Prevent agenda was that it increasingly targeted 
Muslim communities and provided a ‘vehicle for a significant growth in state 
surveillance of Muslim communities’ (Thomas 2010: 443). The extent to which 
different government departments were consistent in formulating and delivering 
provisions under Prevent remains debatable.35 However, security concerns increased 
government pressure on the MCB to act not only as an equal partner in facilitating 
relations with Muslim communities, but also as an efficient partner, ready to ‘deliver 
a law-abiding, loyal ethnic minority’(Bunting 2010). 
                                                 
35 See further discussions in O ‘Toole et al. (2012), Meer 2012 and Thomas (2010). 
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A growing perception that Muslim communities and particularly Muslim faith 
institutions were being treated as potential grounds for breeding extremism and 
undermining Britain’s security opened up new wounds in religious cohesion. 
Previous efforts to mainstream faith had provided opportunities for greater 
recognition of the Muslim faith. However, increased levels of terrorist threats and the 
subsequent securitisation of Muslim communities and radical forms of Islam resulted 
in a new shift in religious cleavages. As will be discussed in the next section, the 
British government was cautious not to isolate Muslim communities and welcomed 
those ‘moderate’ Muslims who shared what was considered to be ‘British', home-
grown values (Moosavi 2014). However, within the new climate of suspicion, there 
was a growing feeling that Muslim communities were singled out as a problematic 
category in need of close surveillance and monitoring.36 Following a temporary 
pacification of the cleavage through mainstreaming faith, securitisation of Muslim 
communities deepened the divide, reinforcing sentiments that Muslims once again 
have become an isolated, distinct group whose collective identity rights were 
increasingly ‘under pressure’ (Abbas 2005). 
 
The MCB and the Blair administration shared expectations concerning 
mainstreaming faith. However, their perspectives on how to deal with terrorism 
resulted in disagreements over the extent to which ‘faith’ was at the centre of the 
problem. The interview data indicates that some members of Muslim communities 
felt that the government wanted the MCB to denounce terrorist activities and ‘accept 
that this was a religious problem, an Islamic problem… that these terrorists were 
Muslims’ and that the Muslim communities ‘have not done enough to stop their rise’ 
(Interview 27). Whether this was the government’s exact intention may be debatable. 
However, as the Council pitched itself as a Muslim leading institution, there was a 
feeling that in a rather corporatist style, the MCB was expected to put its own house 
in order and inform on extremists within the Muslim community. As will become 
clear from the following analysis, instead of being co-opted into a counter-extremism 
                                                 
36 On the issues associated with securitisation of Muslim communities in Britain, see Brown 2010. 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The MCB’s relations with the British State  111 
agenda, the MCB expected the government to ‘be more understanding of how 
[Muslim] communities’ dynamics work, of how faith works …of how religions can 
be quite conservative, quite extreme, without being dangerous’ (Ibid).  
  
 
A case for contention  
 
The difference in expectations revealed how a securitised dimension of faith had 
created a considerable obstacle for the MCB’s cooperation with the government. The 
lack of agreement on combating terrorism marked an end to the government’s 
experiment of engaging with a single Muslim umbrella organisation. The MCB 
leaders were still listened to and consulted on a number of issues, including the 
‘Prevent’ agenda. However, there were signs that they were no longer treated as a 
leading authority on Muslim interests. In a short space of time, close cooperation 
between the MCB and the government changed into a relationship increasingly 
underlined by disagreement.  
 
A clear consequence of the government’s disapproval of the MCB was a gradual 
process of distancing itself from the institution by not inviting it to meetings. In July 
2005, senior members of the MCB were still invited to a roundtable meeting chaired 
by the Prime Minister to announce the formation of the 'Preventing Extremism 
Together' Working Groups (Sacranie 2006). However, a year later the MCB was 
already excluded from taking part in consultations led by the Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion. While the MCB welcomed ‘the inclusion of a 
commissioner representing the Hindu Forum of Britain’ it felt ‘puzzled by the 
absence of a representative from the Muslim community’s largest umbrella body’ 
(MCB 2007a).  
 
The findings of the Commission had two major implications for the MCB’s 
engagement with the government. First, it criticised previous patterns of engagement 
with older community leaders who were viewed as ‘self-styled and appointed and 
ultimately not strongly representative’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
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2007: 40).37 Second, it suggested that New Labour’s original focus on faith 
communities might have been too narrow and contributed to social segregation. 
While it praised the interfaith work and recognised that ‘[f]aith groups and 
leaders…play a vital part in promoting harmony and understanding between faiths’, 
it also noted that ‘a majority of the population see religion more as a force for 
division than for understanding’ and that there is a ‘tendency to emphasis religious 
identities to the exclusion of other identities’ (Ibid: 50).  
 
The MCB’s earlier refusal to attend a Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) played an 
important role in Labour ministers distancing themselves from the Council. The 
MCB maintained that its initial refusal to attend the commemoration was motivated 
by conviction that it should have been called ‘Genocide Memorial Day’ which would 
mean making ‘no distinction between genocides undertaken against people of other 
religions and ethnicity’ (Bunglawala 2005). Although the interview data indicates 
that the MCB’s affiliates were split on the issue, the final decision to continue the 
boycott had a damaging effect on its relations with the government. 
 
Whether the government was following its own convictions, or was responding to the 
pressure from the media and right-wing think-tanks, the MCB’s decision to boycott 
the HMD in 2006 was taken as further proof that the Council was no longer fit to 
engage with. As a result, the government embarked on working with other Muslims 
groups, such as the Sufi Council and British Muslim Forum which were deemed to 
be apolitical. The later years of the Labour administration were to show that these 
efforts did not yield the desired results either and the government’s cooperation with 
these two groups ceased too. However, these were the first steps the government took 
to diversify its engagement with Muslim organisations, recognising the need ‘to 
engage with Muslims in plural ways’ (Interview 24). 
The British pluralist context provided further opportunities for the government to 
address the issues of extremism through alternative community arrangements without 
                                                 
37 The historical legacies of the MCB’s roots and style of leadership will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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relying on umbrella bodies such as the MCB. As was mentioned earlier, a key feature 
of the British pluralist context is a well-developed network of civil society 
organisations with a variety of agendas, political and religious and secular 
preoccupations. Following that crucial consultation to which the MCB was not 
invited, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion produced a report which paved 
a way for a broader engagement with women and youth organisations. 
 
The government’s distribution of funds through the ‘Prevent’ agenda was a direct 
result of the decisions formulated in the Report that ‘all future grants to ethnic and 
religious groups are to be assessed against tests of promoting cohesion and 
integration’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007: 51). The MCB was no 
longer believed to pass that test. A diversity of community organisations enabled the 
government to reverse its policies and widen its list of partners to the apparent 
detriment of the MCB. A change in personal relations between the government 
officials and the MCB leaders has led to a further deterioration in their interaction.  
 
Personal relations between government officials and the MCB leaders had a positive 
impact on the MCB’s negotiations with the government in the early period of the 
New Labour’s administration. In the previous section I explored how informal 
structures of close ties and matched expectations created opportunities to resolve 
potential issues on religious matters. This was to change after the 7/7, which 
coincided with Ruth Kelly (2006-2007) and then Hazel Blears (2007-2009) being in 
charge of Communities and Local Government affairs. A series of rather 
confrontational exchanges demonstrate the extent to which personal relations 
deteriorated over the period leading to the government’s disengagement from the 
MCB as its strategic partner. 
 
For example, in her earlier capacity as Police and Counter Terrorism Minister, 
(2003-2006), Hazel Blears defended the disproportionate use of counter-terrorist 
powers against Muslim communities on the grounds of the threat from ‘people 
associated with an extreme form of Islam’ (House of Commons 2005: 46). The MCB 
noted that ‘the characterisation of British Muslims as a 'problem community' in much 
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of …the media and through statements made by government and police officials 
have contributed to an undoubtedly growing anti-Muslim climate in the UK.’ (MCB 
2005). 
 
A brief analysis of Ruth Kelly’s speech made on 11 October 2006 and the MCB’s 
response to it on 14 October 2006 illustrate the extent to which personal relations had 
broken down. The speech entitled ‘Britain: our values, our responsibilities’ was 
aimed at engaging a wide range of Muslim organisations to work together with the 
government to tackle extremism. Although the MCB was also invited, its leaders 
were reportedly unable to attend due to a previously organised meeting with Home 
Secretary John Reid at the Home Office the same day (Bari 2006). In her speech, 
Kelly reconfirmed a change in government policy in tackling extremism. However, 
on closer inspection she also offered an explanation as to why the government 
decided to scale down its engagement with the MCB.  
 
Highlighting successful joint ventures between the government and Muslim 
communities, she first emphasised the government’s contribution to ‘protect people 
from discrimination on the basis of faith at work and in their day to day lives’ (Kelly 
2006). She recalled that it was Labour which had supported Muslim efforts to pass 
the Religious Hatred legislation in 2006 and went on to criticise the MCB’s own 
stance on religious tolerance and its unwillingness to attend the HMD. No specific 
organisations were mentioned in the speech. However, such words like ‘some people 
who don’t feel it right to join in the commemorations of HMD even though it has 
helped raise awareness not just of the Jewish holocaust, but also more contemporary 
atrocities like the Rwanda genocide’ appear to have been mainly directed at the MCB 
(Ibid). The speech called for ‘a fundamental rebalancing of…the relationship with 
Muslim organisations’ (Ibid). This marked a key shift from corporatist-style 
cooperation with one official interlocutor towards increased diversification of 
government engagement with a variety of Muslim organisations: 
 
I am clear that our strategy of funding and engagement must shift 
significantly towards those organisations that are taking a proactive 
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leadership role in tackling extremism and defending our shared 
values (Ibid). 
 
The MCB replied with a detailed letter written by Muhammad Abdul Bari, the 
MCB’s Secretary General from 2006 to 2010, aimed at rebuking some of the 
accusations. It reconfirmed the MCB’s commitment to ‘combat extremism and 
safeguard our society’ by citing instances when it spoke strongly against terrorism 
following 9/11 and 7/7 (Bari 2006). The overall tone of the letter was balanced and 
non-confrontational. However, its frustration was made clear by finding it ‘most 
patronising to be lectured in this way’ (Ibid). The MCB challenged the government 
on the issue of equal and fair treatment of Muslim communities. It merged its own 
concerns of being ‘side-lined’ by the government with the ‘ministerial statements 
stigmatising’ Muslim communities (Ibid). 
 
It sought to indicate that by disengaging from their own organisation, the government 
would damage its relations with Muslim communities as a whole. By positioning 
itself as ‘a responsible representative organisation’, it wished to reassure the 
government that it ‘reflect[ed] the views of its constituents fairly’ and if those views 
were ‘unpalatable to the government of the day, so be it’ (Ibid). While 
acknowledging the government’s right to ‘speak to a wide range of Muslim 
organisations’ the MCB questioned the strategy of rewarding with public funds ‘only 
those [organisations] who support…the government’ (Ibid). The letter also warned of 
the need to ‘distinguish the mainstream, democratically-constituted Muslim bodies 
from the mavericks’ (Ibid) – possibly hinting at the newly-endorsed Sufi Council. 
 
These statements help elucidate some of the issues which contributed to the growing 
tensions between the government and the MCB, including concerns over foreign 
policy, counter-terrorism and distribution of funds for Muslim community projects. 
However, there was also a sense of betrayed expectations which illustrated the extent 
to which informal connections broke down. Relations between the government and 
the MCB deteriorated further in 2009 when the MCB’s Deputy Secretary General 
Daud Abdullah signed the ‘Istanbul Declaration’ which justified violence against 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The MCB’s relations with the British State  116 
Israel and British troops. One of the interviewees provided a sober assessment on this 
development by commenting that ‘first the MCB fell into a trap of being too close to 




Mobilising rhetoric and opportunities for new alliances  
 
The deteriorating relations with the government inadvertently encouraged the MCB 
to reclaim its original status of a social movement organisation, campaigning on 
behalf of Muslim communities and acting as a challenger rather than a simple 
endorser of government policies.  Through its previous engagement with the 
government it had gained access to institutional channels of lobbying officials, 
organising public events, responding to consultations on the issues of Islamophobia 
and integration, cohesion and extremism. The MCB’s discourse during the growing 
escalation with the government remained within the institutional bounds of peaceful 
contention. However, its tone became increasingly critical and adversarial. On one 
hand, it was aware of the need to ‘maintain a very strong, good relationship with the 
government’ to communicate Muslim interests (Interview 31). On the other hand, it 
was aware of its responsibilities to its grassroots supporters, as articulated in its 
Constitution (MCB Constitution 2002). 
 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the MCB sought to mobilise its affiliates 
and supporters on most salient issues to legitimise its actions in the eyes of Muslim 
communities. However, the same issues created most friction with the government, 
particularly concerning the couther-terrorist agenda. The MCB appeared to be no 
longer willing to endorse government policies but was keen to shape them by 
offering its critique. For example, in reference to Prevent, Iqbal Sacranie (2006: 6) 
noted that:  
 
Instead of dealing with the underlying factors, isolating the 
pathogen and treating it with the strongest medicine, it is the 
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Muslim community itself, all of the 1.6 million or more, which 
seems to have become the subject of mass medication. 
 
As discursive framing theories suggest, the MCB used a classic triple frame of 
collective action by focusing on the salient and resonant issue, apportioning the 
blame and finally suggesting what needed to be done to get the issue resolved. The 
MCB Memorandum on the ‘Prevent’ agenda provides a good illustration of how it 
framed its discourse to challenge the government’s actions and mobilise support for a 
better treatment of British Muslims. First, the Muslim community was presented as 
suffering from unfair treatment through the excesses of what the MCB called 
‘securitisation of integration’ as if mirroring some of the securitisation discourse 
adapted by the government (MCB Memorandum 2009: 2). It then apportioned blame 
on the government by criticising the ‘Prevent’ agenda on the grounds that it ‘has not 
minimised extremism but has instead proved to be counter-productive’ (Ibid: 2). 
Finally, it urged the government to take its contribution to the consultation seriously 
and ‘actively seek to rectify the damage done that has inevitably distanced the 
Muslim Community further from engagement on tackling extremism’ (Ibid: 5).  
 
A similar approach was later used by Bari, who criticised the ‘Prevent’ programme 
for being ‘divisive in its engagement with Muslims, rather than fostering and 
promoting the diversity of British Muslims’ (MCB Annual Report 2009-2010: 6). He 
accused the government of ‘forcing’ the MCB to become increasingly sectarian by 
dictating to Muslim communities which forms of Islam to adapt (Ibid). Moreover, he 
highlighted the influence of the ‘right-wing pundits’ on the government, as if 
challenging it to stop listening to the negative representation of the MCB provided by 
the media. 
 
The idea of the government ‘determining which forms of Islam are better’ was 
reminiscent of the previous strong statements made by Iqbal Sacranie. In an effort to 
resist the government’s attempt to impose a ‘problematic category’ on the Muslim 
community by delineating the ideological component of radical Islam from its 
moderate forms and criticising its policy of dividing Muslims into moderate and 
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radical,  the MCB pointed out the inappropriateness of the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
(Sacranie 2005b). Moreover, Sacranie criticised the media and political leaders for 
juxtaposing the labels such as ‘moderate’, ‘Islamist’, or ‘extremist’ as a way to 
impose a ‘reformation’ in Islam like that experienced by Christianity’ (Sacranie 
2005a). He also criticised ‘some think tanks’ of attaching ‘misplaced categories’ and 
preaching to Muslim communities ‘what is right or wrong with Islam’ (Ibid). While 
this could be seen as a purely defensive action against the increasingly damaging 
reports on the MCB provided by neo-conservative think tanks (e.g. Policy 
Exchange), it was also an attempt to turn the tables on the government discourse on 
moderate and radical Islam and criticise the securitisation of the Muslim faith.  
 
Mirroring the government’s move to diversify its partners, the MCB took steps to 
reconnect with civil society organisations. Although this reveals the extent to which 
the MCB may have felt isolated, it provided an opportunity to improve its standing 
by building alliances with other partners and thus remain independent of the 
government. The British pluralist context with a large number of different civil 
society organisations, Muslim and non-Muslim, religious and non-religious, offered 
the MCB alternative platforms to articulate Muslim interests and demands for equal 
treatment. For example, the MCB continued to increase its engagement with other 
faiths, as was demonstrated by high-level public events such as the Interfaith 
Harmony Week at the House of Lords.  
 
The MCB was also one of the founding members of the Mosques and Imams 
National Advisory Board (MINAB) endorsed by the government in 2005. Although 
the work of the MINAB has been criticised, it allowed the MCB to engage with the 
government on the issues of mosques, terrorism and extremism together with 
different and often competing Muslim organisations, within the institutional setting. 
In spite of its ‘narrow remit and not enough trust between actors involved’ (Interview 
28), the MINAB offered the MCB an important safety-net to ensure that the 
government could not side-line it. 
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The MCB has become increasingly aware of the need to institutionalise more within 
mainstream society and not be accused of being too narrow and sectarian. Following 
the break-up with the government, it worked hard to build new links with London 
local authorities and the Mayor’s office, as well as National Union of Students and 
the National Youth Agency (Bari 2007).  Another alliance was struck with the TUC 
when an understanding was reached to ‘resolutely fight Islamophobia and all forms 
of discrimination’ (Ibid: 2). The MCB particularly welcomed the TUC support 
shown in response to the Conservative Party report which offered stern criticism of 
the MCB. During this period, the MCB made little effort to engage with the 
Conservative Party due to its left-wing preferences. While explaining its efforts to 
build new alliances Bari (2007) noted with a degree of cynicism that: 
 
to a large extent ignoring the politically motivated discourse from 
Whitehall and Westminster village we have decided to invest our 
time and efforts in cultivating more friends within civil society and 
strengthening our existing links with the community at large. 
 
Personal connections would become important once again towards the end of the 
Labour administration as there was a gradual improvement in the MCB’s relations 
with the government. By 2010 Farooq Murad was elected as the MCB’s new 
Secretary General and John Denham became Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government. There were signs that the MCB was still considered as an 
important Muslim voice. While the MCB showed its support for British forces 
abroad and its determination to build better relations with the Jewish community 
through interfaith dialogue (as well as officially ending its boycott of the HMD), 
Labour ministers demonstrated willingness to re-engage with the MCB by speaking 
at some of its events.  
 
While the MCB was successful in strengthening its alliance with the TUC and 
improving its relations with left-wing politicians, the Council’s openly poor relations 
with the Conservative Party may have proved rather costly, following the formation 
of the Coalition government and the Conservatives taking charge of the Department 
for Community and Local Government. The extent to which the MCB succeeded in 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The MCB’s relations with the British State  120 
continuing to mobilise public opinion for treating Muslim communities equally and 
fairly within an increasingly diversified and pluralist context under the Coalition 
government will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
The MCB and the Coalition: pluralising faith  
 
When the Coalition government took office in 2010, its engagement with Muslim 
communities was in some ways reminiscent of the Labour administration in its final 
years, particularly on the issues of security and anti-Muslim crime. The MCB’s 
cooperation with key politicians under the Coalition was also subject to a similar 
combination of opportunities and constraints, namely the presence of a shared 
agenda and the existence or lack of good personal relations. However, it was also 
complicated by the Coalition’s pluralist approach to state-religion relation which 
manifested itself in increased diversification of interfaith partnerships and its firm 
policy of non-engagement with Muslim organisations which it considered to be 
‘Islamist’ under the New Prevent Agenda (HM Government 2011).  
 
The issue of faith remained central to the government’s engagement with Muslim 
communities. However, the way it was conceptualised under the Coalition differed 
from that of the Labour administration. This marked another important shift towards 
bridging religious differences by empowering local-based community project with 
the help of the Church of England on one hand, while diversifying state engagement 
with different religious and non-religious groups on the other. Therefore, the nature 
of divergence was two-fold. The first aspect involved the Coalition’s greater reliance 
on the Church of England and the Near Neighbours Fund as ‘a conducive channel for 
interfaith’ and distribution of funding (Interview 28).38 The second shift was a re-
introduction of local-level initiatives and efforts. Some respondents saw these 
developments as ‘a return to the status quo ante of the early 1990s’ (Ibid). Before 
                                                 
38 Near Neighbours is a programme launched in 2011 and funded by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government. It provides small community grants for joint projects between different 
religious and ethnic groups and local organisations. 
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discussing the ways in which the MCB tried to navigate the changed political 
landscape, it is important to briefly outline the nature of state-religion relations under 
the Coalition.  
 
The government’s relations with faith-based organisations were delegated to the 
Faith Engagement team under the leadership of Baroness Sayeeda Warsi in the 
Department for Communities and Local Government. The Department was entrusted 
with providing ‘expertise for colleagues across Whitehall, facilitating productive 
contacts between faith representatives and civil servants on policy areas’ (Hawkins 
2013). It primarily engaged in ‘defending the value of religious belief’ and ‘working 
with communities and colleagues in other Departments to tackle religious hate crime 
and support its victims’(Ibid).  There was also an increased focus on interfaith 
dialogue and cooperation between different faith communities and their 
organisations, particularly on the local level.  
 
In their research on Muslim representation, O’Toole et al. (2013) emphasised a link 
between the Coalition’s approach to faith and its principal project, the ‘Big Society’s 
renewed interest in interfaith work. While the ‘Near Neighbours’ programme was 
administered in close cooperation with the Church of England, a key change was a 
shift from delivering individual faith-based projects to building interfaith 
partnerships. While not all Muslim representatives were happy with the arrangement, 
many organisations welcomed it on the grounds that the established Church provided 
a degree of protection against advancing secularism. For example, the MCB’s 
leading figure on Mosques and Community Affairs, Ibrahim Mogra, spoke 
favourably of the programme (Ibid: 50-51). My research also suggested that while 
cooperation between different faiths was not new, a stronger engagement between 
different faith organisations supported by increased funding was seen as an important 
step to break the barriers between different communities.  
 
An important aspect of the Coalition’s engagement with faith was its ideological 
departure from Labour’s corporatist patterns and a renewed preference for a local, 
decentralised approach. Centrally-controlled practices inspired by New Labour 
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ideology gave way to the Big Society’s support of localities and civil society 
initiatives. A clear illustration of the Coalition’s strategy of empowering local 
authorities was introduced in the paper outlining the government’s integration 
strategy: 
 
Integration is achieved when neighbourhoods, families and 
individuals come together on issues which matter to them, and so 
we are committed to rebalancing activity from centrally-led to 
locally-led action and from the public to the voluntary and private 
sectors (Communities and Local Government 2012: 2). 
 
The distinction was also acknowledged by Muslim representatives. In the words of 
one respondent, the Coalition government did not believe in ‘engaging with people 
through representative organisations…so it ignore[d] any kind of institutionalised 
attempt to engage with the Muslim community’ (Interview 33). Muslims were 
increasingly seen as citizens, who have the same access to members of parliament 
and do not require any particular representative organisation to voice their interests 
(Ibid). A similar view was expressed by a member of the House of Lords, who noted 
that unlike France or Germany, in Britain ‘we don’t understand representation in 
terms of corporate structures’ (Interview 32). Labour’s desire to set up a formal 
consultative machinery for meeting regularly with Muslim organisations may have 
been beneficial for the MCB’s earlier efforts to position itself as a leading 
community voice, engaged in collective Muslim representation. However, the 
Coalition’s preference for a more individualistic approach based on a variety of 
partners resulted in the re-pluralisation of state-Muslim relations. The MCB found 
itself increasingly in the situation where it has had to diversify its own engagement 
and widen its network of civil society partners.  
 
 
The MCB’s efforts to re-engage with civil society  
 
The MCB took a number of steps to lobby the government and articulate Muslim 
claims by using shared channels and platforms of civic engagement. Although this 
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may have revealed the extent to which the MCB was no longer in direct contact with 
the government, it has provided an opportunity to improve its standing by building 
alliances with other political networks. In his address to the MCB’s General 
Assembly in 2012, the MCB’s Secretary General, Farooq Murad, emphasised the 
need to ‘build meaningful bridges’ to overcome ‘ignorance and mistrust and 
exploitation by certain groups and individuals for their self-interest’ (Murad 2012). 
He also urged the MCB’s affiliates to refocus their lobbying activities, to ‘strategise 
and choose where to place our voice’ (Ibid). The research suggests the MCB has 
become increasingly sensitive to the changing landscape of state-Muslim relations 
and sought to adapt its own discourse to new rules of pluralist representation.  
 
Close cooperation with the Church of England helped unlock some government 
funding through the ‘Near Neighbours’ programme. Additionally, the MCB 
continued to build bridges with other faiths, particularly through its leaders’ personal 
contacts in the House of Lords, as was exemplified by annual public events such as 
Interfaith Harmony Week at the House of Lords, mentioned earlier. Speaking at the 
UN World Interfaith Harmony Week, Farooq Murad emphasised the MCB’s 
commitment to ‘working together with all faith communities’ and building trust ‘on 
the common values of peace and harmony’ (MCB 2012a).  
 
Increased engagement with Muslim peers as well as extending its network of allies 
created an opportunity to promote a positive image of British Muslims and attract 
attention to the challenges of Islamophobia. Moreover, active participation in these 
high-level events showed that the MCB was still invited to the Parliament and was 
not side-lined by the British political establishment. In his article on the British 
government’s engagement with Muslim organisations, Bari highlighted the rather 
controversial nature of the government’s alleged disengagement from such 
organisations as the MCB by noting that ‘while senior Muslim leaders continue to 
attend and speak at events in Parliament, the official position is that there is no 
‘formal’ dealing with the bodies that organise them’ (Bari 2012).  
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The MCB’s own press department was keen to underline that they were actively 
engaged in British politics. For example, in November 2012, the MCB hosted the Eid 
Reception in Whitehall to celebrate not only the Muslim festival, but also engage in 
interfaith dialogue. It was important for the MCB that the event was attended by 
politicians, interfaith leaders and business representatives. A more recent example 
was the closing reception at the World Islamic Forum in London, held at the House 
of Lords in November 2013. Similarly, the MCB’s press release drew attention to 
high-level guests and the MCB’s contribution to the event. Focusing on the 
importance of ‘addressing poverty in the third world countries… and building a just, 
peaceful and cohesive society’ Farooq Murad reiterated that the same concerns were 
‘at the heart of the vision of the Muslim Council of Britain’ (MCB 2013b). 
 
The MCB tried to bridge the gap between its affiliates and the Conservative Party by 
emphasising its organisational diversity, maturity and openness to different political 
perspectives. Calling for inclusive politics, Bari (2012) argued that although many 
Muslims were ‘traditionally Labour supporters’ they were ‘fast-learning the nuances 
and reality of British politics’ which was for example illustrated by the creation of 
Conservative Muslim Forum. He went on to add that: 
 
[a]lthough Muslims are still under-represented in the Westminster 
village, we now have this presence in the Conservative Party and 
among the Liberal Democrats, too, as well as Labour. This is a 
natural progression: we – as a ‘community of communities’ – are 
maturing (Ibid). 
 
The MCB’s own engagement with the Coalition government and its Conservative 
ministers was also more nuanced. While there was no official interaction between the 
governments’ leading figures and the MCB leaders, engagement took the form of 
informal relations between the MCB and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government. As before, personal connections and friendly relations played a key role 
in normalising the MCB’s engagement with government officials. The following 
brief analysis of the MCB’s engagement with Baroness Warsi (Minister of State for 
Faith and Communities 2012 to date) and Eric Pickles (Secretary of State for 
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Communities and Local Government 2010 to date) suggests that any prospect of 





The desire to combat Islamophobia provided a particular meeting point for the MCB 
and the Coalition. Allen’s research suggests that in its approach to dealing with hate 
crime, the Coalition government engaged more with the issue of Islamophobia than 
the previous Labour administrations (Allen 2013). He maintains that by moving 
away from the idea of equality as conceptualised by New Labour, the problem of 
Islamophobia was aligned with manifestations of general hatred against any religion 
(Ibid: 7). The establishment of such cross-sectional platforms as the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, the Cross-Government Working Group on 
Anti-Muslim Hatred and TELL MAMA (a public service for measuring anti-Muslim 
attacks) was in line with the Coalition’s pluralist approach to enhancing integration 
and social cohesion. However, it has also provided an opportunity to address the 
problem of anti-Muslim crime within the broader agenda. 
 
Baroness Warsi’s approach to faith reflected the Coalition’s Conservative approach 
of ‘doing religion’ not on the basis of guaranteeing equality of individual faiths as 
bounded categories (New Labour’s approach), but rather as a way of defending 
individual citizens against any acts of hatred, regardless of their religion. Reportedly, 
in her capacity as Shadow Minister for Community Cohesion (2007-2010), she had 
already criticised Labour’s initiative to set up a Young Muslims Advisory Group, on 
the grounds that this had been ‘another example of the Government engaging with 
the British Muslim communities on the basis purely of their faith’ rather than 
considering other issues facing young people such as ‘drugs, unemployment and 
housing’ (Warsi 2008). Arguably, in her new mediatory capacity, she provided the 
missing link between the Coalition and the MCB, particularly by praising the efforts 
of both parties on the issue of Islamophobia. In 2011, she made her famous speech in 
which she claimed that ‘Islamophobia ha[d] now passed the dinner-table-test’ to 
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become socially acceptable in Britain (Warsi 2011). The MCB praised the renewed 
interest in condemning Islamophobia and welcomed Baroness Warsi’s criticisms of 
the media in ‘normalising Islamophobia’ (Murad 2011a). 
 
The tragic events of the Lee Rigby murder and the Woolwich crisis in 2013 provided 
an opportunity to reconcile some of the differences between the MCB and the British 
government.39 While criticising Labour for their ‘hyperbolic statements about the war 
on terror and questioning the usefulness of a ‘them and us’ mentality’, Baroness 
Warsi praised David Cameron for being ‘statesmanlike and sensible, careful to use 
non-emotional language [and] very protective of Britain’s Muslim community’ (cited 
in O’Done 2013). Similarly, she spoke highly of the MCB’s response to the 
Woolwich attack and gave the Council some positive publicity in the media. In her 
interviews to the press, she highlighted the speed and the manner in which the MCB 
condemned the attack, indicating that ‘Muslim spokesmen are not tacitly supporting 
jihadists in our midst’ and ‘the Council has learned from its past mistakes’ (Ibid). 
  
The MCB continued to cite and welcome Baroness Warsi’s positive statements on its 
contribution to society as a ‘Muslim organisation with British values’ and applauded 
her ‘firm response to some Islamophobic assertions in the House of Lords made by 
the former leader of the UK Independence Party’ (MCB 2013c).  These verbal and 
written exchanges may not have signalled full-scale cooperation between the 
Coalition government and the MCB. However, they indicated that shared positions, 
backed up by personal relations provided good opportunities for dialogue.  
 
A joint condemnation of Islamophobia has led to a degree of cooperation between 
the MCB’s leaders and senior politicians. However, the nature and the scope of 
efforts required to deal with a security-sensitive wave of anti-Muslim violence was a 
different matter. A brief illustration of the MCB’s correspondence with Eric Pickles 
                                                 
39 Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers was attacked and killed by Michael Adebolajo and 
Michael Adebowale in Woolwich, southeast London on 22 May 2013. On anti-Muslim attacks, see 
Independent (2013).  
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reveals some of these differences on combating terrorism in its different forms. 
Following the murder of Lee Rigby and the ensuing wave of anti-Muslim crimes in 
the West Midlands, the MCB wrote a series of letters, including one to Eric Pickles 
and the other to Home Secretary Theresa May.  
 
In his capacity as MCB Secretary General, Farooq Murad raised a series of concerns 
collected from its affiliates on the lack of national response to these hate crimes 
(Murad 2013a). The importance of these letters for the MCB’s communication with 
the government was two-fold. First, it revealed that the MCB saw the issue of anti-
Muslim hatred as a matter of national, rather than local security. Second, it showed 
that in light of the seriousness of the incidents, the MCB wished to re-establish a 
more direct engagement with the government. Acknowledging that any ‘formal 
response from the government to the MCB has been muted in the last three years’ the 
MCB leader emphasised that the organisation was ready to ‘extend…hand of 
cooperation and work…together in this regard’ (Ibid).  
 
A copy of the same letter was sent to the Home Office, suggesting the need to 
‘meet…as soon as possible to discuss and agree a strategy to ensure peace and 
harmony are maintained within our communities’ (Murad 2013b).  The same day, the 
MCB’s leader issued a press statement, calling for a ‘coordinated, national response 
to ensure that these sorts of attacks never happen again’ (MCB 2013a). He went on 
to question the government’s response to the escalation in anti-Muslim violence by 
adding that ‘[i]t cannot be right that a minority community is allowed to be targeted 
in this manner’ (Ibid). In response to Farooq Murad’s letter, Eric Pickles (2013b) 
reassured the MCB that the government strongly condemned the attacks and their 
words ‘received coverage in national press and was published online by several 
mosques.’  He mentioned the role of Baroness Warsi in officially condemning the 
attacks and collecting views on what more can be done by the government. He added 
that his Department has funded the ‘Tell MAMA’ project as a way of tackling anti-
Muslim hatred’ and supported multi-faith iftars (evening meals) during Ramadan 
(Ibid). 
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Moreover, as a way of demonstrating that the MCB’s previous claims had not gone 
unanswered, Eric Pickles recalled that the government had ‘funded the first ever 
Srebrenica Memorial Day event to commemorate the genocide…to warn of the 
consequences of when religious hate crime and intolerance goes unchallenged’ 
(Ibid). This was one of the key issues the MCB had campaigned on in the past. And 
yet, the fairly dry tone of the letter suggested that the Department preferred to remain 
neutral in its engagement with the MCB. There was little indication in the letter that 
the MCB’s invitation to work together had been accepted. Instead, the MCB was 
treated as one of many important Muslim voices representing a segment of Muslim 
population. This was reinforced by the final words of the letter:  
 
I hope this reassures you of our commitment to preventing and 
addressing hatred and extremism and hope you will communicate 
these assurances to your affiliates (Ibid). 
 
Moreover, there was no indication that there would be a coordinated national 
response to protect Muslim communities as proposed by the MCB. There was a 
shared understanding that such types of incidents should not be allowed to happen. 
There was, however, little agreement on whether this was a matter of national or 
local importance. As was suggested earlier, the Coalition’s approach to engaging 
with faith communities was rooted in finding local solutions. In his earlier speech on 
integration, Eric Pickles (2013a) made it clear that the Coalition’s position on faith 
was that it ‘provide[d] a moral compass’ and helped ‘galvanise our communities.’ 
However, unlike its predecessors, there was a strong belief that ‘integration occurs 





In this chapter, I examined the extent to which the MCB’s engagement with the 
British state has conformed to the pluralist expectations of state-religion relations. 
The data indicated that the Council’s relations with the government underwent a 
series of changes, from close cooperation to increased co-optation and 
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disengagement, followed by partial re-engagement but on rather different terms. The 
pluralist nature of state-Muslim relations should have made it difficult for the MCB 
to monopolise the status of the sole representative of Muslim interests vis-à-vis the 
government. However, the nature of relations was altered by changes that took place 
in state involvement in religious matters and attempts to pacify religious cleavages 
by mainstreaming faith in public policies. The growing importance of a new Muslim 
religious category was partly the result of guaranteeing equality of religious 
representation, partly a convergence in Muslim expectations and New Labour’s 
ideology concerning mainstreaming faith. The second shift entailed securitisation of 
the Muslim faith, tighter controls on Muslim communities and co-optation of its 
leaders. Whereas the first shift facilitated the MCB’s engagement with the 
government, the second caused friction and resulted in disengagement.  
 
In line with theoretical expectations, the data supports the idea that formal and 
informal constraints have created a series of new rules which shaped the breakdown 
in the relationship. Some of the more formal constraints involved a gradual return to 
pluralist forms of engagement with a wide number of organisations, a process in 
which the MCB found itself increasingly side-lined by the government. However, the 
data also suggests that it was the availability of strong allies (on both sides) and a 
failure of personal relations which provided more volatile constraints and ultimately 
deepened a sense of crisis. The MCB leaders responded to the changed environment 
by openly challenging the government and using the securitisation of Muslim faith as 
a powerful mobilising strategy aimed at partially recovering its authority within the 
Muslim communities (as will be discussed in the next chapter). The process of 
politicisation and later securitisation of the Muslim faith provided the MCB with 
salient issues on which to lobby the government. The MCB’s rhetoric was also 
transformed from integrationist to adversarial as it became increasingly frustrated 
with the government’s counter-terrorist policies.  
  
A change in informal structures had positive as well as negative repercussions on the 
process of engagement. During the rather short period of corporatist approaches to 
mainstreaming faith in public policy, the MCB’s personal connections with the 
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government were shaped by similar expectations. However, following considerable 
disagreements over the ‘Prevent’ agenda, a breakdown in personal communications 
proved damaging and reinforced the already weakened cooperation. Finally, a 
change in alliance structures provided the MCB with a more graceful exit strategy 
from the relationship with the government which was no longer fruitful. By working 
with other Muslim, interfaith and mainstream networks the MCB managed to remedy 
some of the damaging effects of the broken relationship with the government.  
 
Over the last fifteen years, the MCB’s engagement with the government appears to 
have come full circle. A final shift in the MCB’s engagement with the government 
came under the Coalition. Under the new Coalition government, the Conservative 
approach implies treating Muslims as individual citizens with the same access to 
mainstream channel of representation as anybody else, rather than engaging with 
them as a distinct group. It does not believe in block-representation and does not 
favour any institutionalised attempt to engage with Muslim community or to repeat 
the experiments of the Labour Party. This has placed considerable constraints on the 
MCB, making its traditional mediatory function between the state and Muslim 
communities somewhat redundant.  
 
The MCB may have fallen out of favour with the government. However, in spite of 
clear differences of opinion between the MCB and the Coalition on the importance of 
local and national approaches, by 2013 the Council proved to be resilient in adapting 
to the changing environment by entering into new partnerships, particularly within 
the interfaith initiatives and civil society organisations. The extent to which the MCB 
showed similar flexibility in building support from Muslim civil organisations and 
legitimising itself in the eyes of British Muslims will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4 




The previous chapter examined the MCB’s relations with the British state in light of 
the changing political opportunities and constraints of pluralist patterns of state-
religion relations and processes of mainstreaming and securitising Muslim faith. The 
MCB’s rather complex relationship with the Labour administration threatened to 
alienate some of its supporters among British Muslims, while the proliferation of 
alternative platforms for community engagement, particularly under the Coalition 
government, challenged the MCB’s status as a key partner in state-Muslim relations.  
 
Over the last two decades the nature of Muslim minorities in Britain has become 
increasingly diverse in terms of Muslim perspectives and internal composition. In 
this chapter I will examine the MCB’s engagement with Muslim communities and 
the ways in which it sought to improve its legitimacy in light of past and present 
patterns of Muslim representation in Britain. I will explore the extent to which the 
MCB has come to resemble an institutionalised interest group characterised by ‘the 
moderation of its goals, the conventionalisation of its action repertoire, and its 
integration into established systems of interest intermediation’ (Kriesi 1996: 156). In 
order to understand how and under which conditions the MCB has tried to integrate 
itself with its constituents I will examine a series of political, social and historic 
factors which have shaped the MCB’s engagement with an increasingly discerning 
and diverse British ummah (Islamic community).  
 
I will apply insights from organisational and social movement theories to examine 
the ways in which the MCB tried to improve its legitimacy with Muslim 
communities by dedicating its resources to the matters of organisational maintenance 
and bringing its internal institutional practices in line with the pluralist expectations 
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of the external environment. These assumptions will be explored in light of the 
empirical data on the changing nature of the Muslim communities and the MCB’s 
activities mainly between 1997 and 2012. In particular, I will focus on the Council’s 
discursive strategies and practical initiatives aimed at representing the growing 
diversity of Muslim interests and improving its own credibility as an inclusive and 
democratic institution. 
 
The chapter argues that the MCB sought to reconcile its relations with the 
government with community expectations for more inclusive representation of 
Muslim diverse interests. Thus, its internal mobilisation strategies were influenced 
by the pluralist approach to minority representation and democratic principles of 
organisational accountability. However, they were also constrained by internal 
institutional resistance from the previously-institutionalised patterns of power-
sharing among Muslim community elders. In the final part of the chapter, I will bring 
some insights from historical institutionalism to discuss the gradual nature of reforms 
and possible reasons why some suggestions for constitutional reforms were debated 
but not necessarily implemented between 2010 and 2012. 
 
 
The pluralisation of Muslim interests in Britain 
 
The changing nature of Muslim communities over the last two decades created a 
particular set of challenges for collective representation of Muslim interests in 
Britain. As was already suggested, internal community divisions and the lack of 
professional interlocutors capable of articulating Muslim claims and engaging the 
government and the media in meaningful discussions encouraged Muslim 
representation through a national umbrella body. The MCB’s leaders came together 
to formulate a collective agenda to defend Muslim rights and speak out on behalf of 
Muslim communities. However, the same spokesmen would soon come under 
increasing scrutiny from Muslim communities themselves. A brief outline of the 
internal pluralisation of Muslim identity and the growing heterogeneity of Muslim 
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views, affiliations and demands provides an insight into the MCB’s fluctuating levels 
of support within Muslim communities. 
 
Numerous studies have discussed the nature of Muslim communities in Britain in 
their diversity (Abbas 2006, Ansari 2002, Gilliat-Ray 2010). Similarly, the majority 
of people I interviewed emphasised the complexity of Muslim pluralist communities 
first and only then went to discuss the nature of Muslim representation in general and 
through the MCB in particular. Some also reflected that despite the MCB’s attempts 
to position itself as a non-sectarian, non-partisan institution, it could not fully reflect 
the diversity of ethnic, religious and generational aspects.  
 
Muslims living in Britain belong to different ethnic, religious and generational 
groups, with diverse interests, views and expectations. Internal diversity has been 
predominantly shaped by the changing fortunes and aspirations of migrant groups 
who have settled in Britain and largely integrated into British society over an 
extended period of time. Britain’s colonial legacy created an ethnically diverse 
Muslim community, with different cultural traditions and religious practices. As was 
aptly summarised by one of the interviewees: 
 
We are a community of communities – who have come at different 




Greater diversity: changes in ethnic, generational and religious demands  
 
The question of Muslim identity and what it means to be a British Muslim has 
undergone a series of reformulations, not only within the policy sector, but also in 
public debates on minority representation and discussions in Muslim groups. 
Previous emphasis on the racial and ethnic dimensions of the Muslim identity was 
gradually replaced by the need to develop a greater understanding of one’s political 
and religious rights. This shift provided a new openness to embracing the idea of 
Muslim mobilisation and defending Muslim religious rights. A change occurred in 
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what Peach (2005: 17) called a ‘British discourse on racialised minorities…from 
‘colour’, in the 1950s and 1960s…to race in the 1960s-1980s…[to] ethnicity in the 
1990s and religion in the present period.’ Although racial and ethnic identity markers 
were still important, it was a greater urgency to protect the religious element that 
facilitated a collective effort to represent British Muslims as a bounded faith 
community. These were the conditions in which the MCB was created as a national 
umbrella body designed to collectively represent Muslim interests. 
 
Once Muslim communities secured some protection not only against racial 
prejudices through a series of race relations acts but also got stronger assurances 
against religious discrimination, the question of the narrowly-defined identity politics 
and its representative bodies perhaps lost some of its salience. Arguably, a stronger 
sense of integration of the second and third generation Muslims, coupled with 
negative representation of Islam in the media and increased policing of Muslim 
communities, contributed to a sense of fatigue among some British Muslims with 
being singled out as a particular ethnic or religious group. Moreover, there was a 
feeling among some young Muslims that particular ethnic or sectarian perspectives 
went against their sense of belonging to the global ummah and the true meaning of 
Islam (Mandaville 2007).  
 
Multiple interpretations of what it meant to be a British Muslim resulted in complex 
hyphenated identities co-habiting the same public space. The diversity and plurality 
of Muslim identities differentiated by ethnic origin, religious school of thought, 
generational belonging, political views, global outlook or social aspirations produced 
calls for a more inclusive and diversified representation. Inevitably, this created 
considerable obstacles for collective and unified representation as originally 
envisaged by the MCB.  
 
My interview data supports the claim that intra-communal cleavages along ethnic, 
religious and generational lines have become increasingly nuanced. Muslims from 
the older generations tend to prioritise the ethnic aspect of identity by emphasising 
different waves in which migrant communities arrived and conceptualised their 
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identity. For example, one interviewee commented on one of the more recently 
arrived ethnic groups, the Somali community. Somalis were ‘traumatised as a result 
of war, lived in Denmark in Scandinavia for 10-15 years and then came here’ 
(Interview 29). By describing them as ‘twice migrants’, he drew attention to their 
complex European-British identity and Somali ethnic roots (Ibid).  
 
Some of the interviewees have also pointed to ethnic tensions in relation to the 
numerical advantage of the Pakistani community living in Britain. Some felt there 
was a considerable over-representation of Pakistani groups within the MCB which 
dominated the Council’s agenda and its ability to be an all-inclusive organisation. 
One respondent suggested that the MCB provides representation by size, rather than 
legitimacy, alluding to its favourable representation of one ethnic interest because it 
makes up the largest group (Interview 28). Moreover, while many Muslims 
acknowledge the need to unite on the theological level, ‘in practice social interaction 
has been much along the lines of traditional nationally-based communities because of 
the social [and] language differences’ (Interview 33). 
 
The extent to which a particular religious interest is represented by the MCB is 
contingent on which ‘group they belong to, whether it is their local mosque…or a 
larger group’ and therefore ‘it depends on their own group’s relationship with the 
MCB’ (Ibid). Some highlighted intra-religious differences and criticised the MCB for 
being too sympathetic to the Deobandi school of Islam, which is in conflict with a 
Barelvi tradition that has many followers among British Muslims (Interview 23).40 
Similarly some Shi’a groups felt the MCB did not reflect their interests, particularly 
when the MCB took a categorical stance defending Zakir Naik, even though his anti-
Shi’a and anti-Sufi views were well-known.41  
                                                 
40 Deobandis emerged in India in the late 1860s, partly as a form of protest against the British colonial 
rule. Sometimes knows as Muslim revivalism, Deobandis do not recognise Sufi practices and rituals 
of worshiping the Saints which are widespread among the Barelvi movement. They believe in 
bringing Muslims back to the earliest practices of Islam, particularly within the context of educational 
seminaries. 
41 Zakir Nair is the founder of the Islamic Research Foundation and a prominent Islamic speaker. In 
June 2010, he was banned from entering Britain by Home Secretary Theresa May in light of his 
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While some respondents acknowledged intra-religious differences, others noted that 
‘secular voices have become more vocal’ (Interview 24). In practice this meant 
making difficult choices in reconciling their religiously-defined Muslim identity with 
their increasingly secular British identity. For instance, some previously Islamist 
organisations such as the Islamic Society of Britain (a key MCB affiliate) began to 
develop a post-Islamist discourse. One interviewee noted that while it remained 
‘passionate about Muslim identity’ it encouraged people to ‘think about their faith in 
a very rooted, British context’ (Interview 27). Policy Exchange (2007: 31) found that 
‘there [was] no consensus on what a British Islam should be like.’ It maintained that 
‘while some organisations reject the ‘Western’ mode of democracy and political 
participation, others push for greater involvement and even celebration of ‘Western’ 
ideas’ (Ibid).  
 
Finally, generational cleavages provide one of the main obstacles to the MCB’s style 
of community representation, as young Muslims criticise not only the concept of 
community representation, but also the personal credentials of traditional community 
leaders. A series of studies of British young Muslims highlight the obvious gap 
between their views and those of the first generations (Hellyer 2007, Khan 2004). 
Unlike their parents’ generation, which had been primarily concerned with finding 
ways to build Muslim institutions and be accepted in British society, the younger 
generation became more politically-minded, with a more global outlook on politics 
and religion. A Report commissioned by Communities and Local Government (2009: 
8) provides a succinct summary of how ethnic and faith identities are mediated 
through the generational cleavages: 
 
The significance of ethnicity and faith in relation to identity…is 
complex. For older generations in particular, affiliations relating to 
nation, clan, tribe, location of origin can all play as significant a 
part as faith identity and links with countries of origin remain 
strong. For younger respondents there are indications of a growing 
                                                                                                                                          
controversial statements and extremist views. He was due to address the Al-Khair Peace Conference 
at Wembley Arena. The ban fuelled the debate on extremism and freedom of speech in Britain. On the 
MCB’s position on the matter, see MCB Annual Report 2011: 13.   
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religiosity and a more pan-Muslim sense of identity that rejects 
other ethnic boundaries and practices seen as specific to a cultural 
group rather than to Islam. 
 
Similar findings on global perspectives and strong religiosity among British Muslim 
young people were also identified by Lewis (2007), while a collection of articles on 
young Muslims in Britain argued for a need to recognise further diversity among this 
group (Hamid 2011). My interview data confirms the growing salience of 
generational differences and more critical perspectives offered by young Muslims. 
For example, one respondent commented that younger generations are critical of 
such institutions as the MCB because they ‘do not attach competence to [community-
based] institutions’, and see community leaders as ‘uncles…out of touch…[with] a 
colonial style of politics which is out of date’ (Interview 27). Moreover, what is 
particularly problematic for the MCB is that some young Muslims tend to reject ‘the 
earlier style of activism’ and prefer to ‘work through the mainstream’, rather than 
community-based organisations (Ibid). 
 
The growing diversity of Muslim interests undermines the MCB’s efforts to mobilise 
sufficient support for its community-based approach to collective representation. A 
multitude of internal differences, some more salient than others, challenge the 
MCB’s ability to provide equal representation to various groups. Moreover, they 
undermine its ability to formulate a unified set of Muslim minority claims. For 
example, while a Somali community, Shi’a Muslims or young Muslims claim that 
their interests and concerns are not equally reflected in the MCB’s demands and 
internal processes of making decisions, others argue that the presence of these 
divisions tend to undermine the MCB’s unified position on Muslim issues. One of 
the interviewees summarised this dilemma as follows:  
 
The bigger the representational body becomes, the smaller the 
common denominator and the more secular it has to become, 
because it cannot touch on sectarian or religious issues, because 
they would be divisive. On the other hand, the narrower it is, the 
more contentious, the more political it can be (Interview 28).  
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Whereas the MCB positions itself as a non-sectarian, non-partisan organisation, 
some question the extent to which it can ‘breach those ethnic, sectarian or regional 
cleavages in the Muslim community’ (Ibid). Moreover, opinion polls indicate that 
while the MCB campaigns for greater Muslim unity, the level of support remains 
low. According to the Populus poll, ‘few Muslims think that the ‘self-appointed 
groups that claim to speak on behalf of British Muslims actually represent them’ 
(cited in UK Polling Report 2006).42 Similarly, only 7% of Muslims felt that their 
viewpoint was represented by the MCB (Populus 2006). Although this percentage is 
very low, the MCB scored the highest out of the suggested Muslim organisations, 
which included the Islamic Society of Britain, the Muslim Association of Britain, the 
British Muslim Forum, and the Progressive British Muslims. 52% said none of the 
suggested community-based organisations represented their views (Ibid). 
 
This disillusionment in community leaders corresponds to a more general sense of 
rejection of essentialised forms of community representation. In the rather 
pessimistic words of one of the respondents, ‘most Muslims do not think there is 
anybody else who is most representative, but many of them do not think very 
strongly of the MCB as representing them’ (Interview 33). The changing nature of 
Muslim communities and pluralisation of interests created a series of complex and 
demanding expectations towards those claiming to speak on their behalf. Before 
discussing the ways in which the MCB attempted to (re)-connect with Muslim 
communities, it is important to review the organisational landscape of Muslim 
representation in the British pluralist context and a particular set of challenges it has 
created for the Council. 
 
Collective identity representation: questioning the MCB’s legitimacy 
 
Until the late 1980s, the nature of Muslim representation was ‘fragmented, localised 
and concerned with minor issues regarding accommodation for the practice of 
                                                 
42 The Poll was conducted between June 2006 and January 2007 and was based on the quantitative 
survey of 1,003 Muslims in the UK. 
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religion’ (Policy Exchange 2007: 29). Although a number of organisations already 
campaigned on behalf of British Muslims, including the Union of Muslim 
Organisations (1970) or more regional bodies like the Bradford Council for Mosques 
(1981) or the Federation of Muslim Organisations (1984) in Leicester, their 
representation remained largely local. Moreover, little effort was made to consolidate 
community leadership due to internal local rivalries (Geaves 2005: 69). This was 
characteristic not only of the pluralist nature of Muslim communities but also of the 
British approach to local politics and horizontal preferences for community activism. 
 
The aftermath of the Rushdie Affair tested ‘the strengths and weaknesses of a 
Muslim community leadership grounded in grassroots networks and associations’ 
(McLoughlin 2005: 59). One respondent in the study conducted by Ahmad and 
Evergeti (2010: 1704) linked the impact of the Rushdie events to the creation of the 
Muslim community identity by suggesting that ‘when you are feeling oppressed… 
you stand together and you create an identity, a new identity’. Tanuka Loha (Catalyst 
2006) suggested that in spite of considerable disparities in life and experiences of 
different communities, there was a need for ‘vocal, accountable representatives’ who 
were able to ‘passionately and effectively advocate on behalf of those communities 
at a time when Muslims [were] being subjected to a particular kind of repression.’ 
The idea of ‘community under attack’ worked in a similar way in the aftermath of 
9/11 and 7/7, leading to a greater sense of solidarity in light of growing 
Islamophobia. However, this time the need for unity was also be accompanied by the 
‘call for representation to be reformed and broadened’ (Ibid). 
 
A plethora of different, uncoordinated organisations may have originally provided an 
opportunity for a more unified collective representation. However, it was a gradual 
development and professionalisation of Muslim organisations through active 
participation in a variety of identity-based and mainstream civil society initiatives 
that questioned the legitimacy of representation through a single Muslim body. The 
research indicates that a wish for more unified community representation based on 
accommodation of Muslim religious identity was gradually replaced by a more 
nuanced understanding of what such community leadership should look like. In line 
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with a series of studies on Muslim attitudes on community institutions and their 
leaders (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Klausen 2005, O’Toole et al 2013) my findings 
suggest that this shift in community perceptions was largely due to the pluralisation 
of Muslim interests. One respondent noted, that ‘there has been some expansion and 
differentiation of institutions and … they have become less all things to all 
men/women and more differentiated and hopefully more professional’ (Interview 
28). Similarly, another interviewee remarked that:  
  
we have half a dozen of organisations which have emerged…and it 
will be fair to say that each organisation represents ‘a’ view and not 
a ‘total’ view…hence you have multiple organisations, they all 
have a purpose…their view should be taken into account…but also 
others (Interview 29). 
 
The presence of stronger competition and choice within the pluralist environment 
contributed to a more discerning and critical Muslim community. The Labour 
government may have experimented for a while with a corporatist approach to 
mainstreaming faith, but the presence of multiple channels of interest representation 
contributed to the MCB’s predicament of feeling ‘under pressure’ not only from 
above, but also from below. While some doubted the need to represent Muslims as a 
separate minority group, others voiced regret that the MCB was not 
‘professionalising fast enough, that it was a small, voluntary and under-funded centre 
that really struggled to keep up with the demands for an incredible national umbrella 
body’ (Interview 28). 
 
More serious comments were directed at the MCB’s lack of democratic processes of 
representation, such as organisational accountability and transparent elections of 
community representatives to MCB’s General Assembly and the Central Working 
Committee. For example, Ahmad and Evergeti (2010) emphasised the highly 
‘contested nature of Muslim representation’ as many of their respondents expressed 
concern about representation through national Muslim organisations. While some 
gave credence to the MCB as ‘an honest, broadly democratic, though over-ambitious 
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experiment’, others questioned the strength and legitimacy of such national forms of 
representation, particularly in light of 7/7: 
 
Our leadership is terribly weak, who’s come forward here, the same 
usual suspects, parochial, biraderi43 driven, self-appointed leaders 
in many senses (Ibid: 1707). 
   
The fact that such criticisms originated from different Muslim groups, religious and 
secular, liberal and conservative, is also indicative of the changes that took place in 
the Muslim organisational context. While the establishment of such organisations as 
the Sufi Council and the British Muslim Forum was supported by the government in 
the wake of the London bombings in 2005, they did not get the same amount of 
credibility as the MCB because of their narrow support base. However, their style of 
interest representation was similar to the community-style leadership of the MCB. 
 
The strongest criticisms of the MCB came from the new, secular-oriented 
organisations which promoted themselves by capitalising on general disillusionment 
with the MCB, particularly after the government’s u-turn on its engagement with the 
Council. For example, by distancing themselves from the collective style of Muslim 
religious representation and highlighting their secular values, Mariyam Namazie, 
(2007) the founder of the Council of Ex-Muslims in Britain told BBC News that: 
 
The new group will be an alternative voice to bodies like the 
Muslim Council of Britain…We do not think that people should be 
pigeonholed as Muslims or deemed to be represented by regressive 
organisations like the MCB.  
 
Similarly, the chairman of the Muslim Educational Centre of Oxford (MECO) 
criticised what he called the ‘unwarranted credibility’ of such bodies like the MCB 
by claiming that: 
 
                                                 
43 Biraderi refers to traditional family, clan-based politics, based on place of origin or family 
connections, particularly associated with the Pakistani community. 
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[w]ithout any coherent programme to tackle the real problems 
facing British Muslims, the MCB…tended to enhance a-socio-
religious-dynamic where disaffected youth gravitate to violent 
reactions that are authenticated by rabidly anti-Western clerics 
spuriously interpreting the Holy Qur’an’ (MECO 2006).  
 
Conversely, radical Muslim groups questioned the MCB’s links with mainstream 
society and refused to see it as a credible institution on the grounds of being too 
moderate. They made their voices heard by storming the MCB election meeting in 
2005 (Reuters 2005).  
 
Although these reactions may have been rather extreme, they reveal a wide spectrum 
of critical attitudes towards the MCB. Arguably, the most damaging perception of 
the MCB’s style of leadership is a commonly-voiced concern that it lacks democratic 
legitimacy. Kenan Malik noted that any ‘community or group representation is 
inevitably anti-democratic’ as the ‘so-called community leaders are generally 
unelected, self-appointed and unaccountable’ (Catalyst 2006). Pluralist patterns of 
interest mediation encourage strong rivalries among organisations. Muslim groups 
which have to compete for legitimacy and support within Muslim communities in 
Britain are no exception.  
 
 
Organisational strategies to improve inclusiveness and accountability 
 
The previous section focused on a series of changes within Muslim communities and 
the subsequent discussions on the nature of Muslim identity within the British 
context. In light of strong criticisms from different segments of the Muslim 
population and growing pressure from other Muslim organisations to provide 
independent, differentiated and accountable representation of Muslim interests, the 
MCB tried to develop a series of practical and discursive strategies to improve its 
legitimacy. The MCB’s most visible initiatives designed to strengthen support within 
Muslim communities can be divided into two interconnected approaches. The first 
strategy included incorporating civic and Islamic values of community solidarity, 
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consultation and empowerment into its daily processes and discourses to present 
itself as an authoritative organisation that works in the interests of British Muslims. 
The second approach involved individual measures aimed at widening its own 
engagement with previously under-represented groups and building connections with 
leading Muslim members of the business community and civil society.  
 
A key tension in representing Muslim interests is how to reconcile collective 
representation with the growing demand to represent diversity. The Council’s leaders 
see their role as being community spokesmen who work in close consultation with 
Muslim communities, while developing particular provisions to empower British 
Muslims to represent themselves in British society: 
 
Though diverse – a community of communities – we are united by 
bonds of faith, and together under the banner of the MCB, 
committed to seek the common good (Murad 2012). 
 
The MCB’s rhetoric used to (re)connect with its grassroots supporters and 
demonstrate to its critics that its work resonates with Muslim community interests 
rests on three discursive frames: unity in diversity, consultation and empowerment. 
The three rhetorical strategies are part of Islamic discourse as well as the rhetoric of 
civic engagement. Both discourses promote the exchange of different views as well 
as help building consensus and taking action on the issues relevant to the needs of 
Muslim communities. They are used to mobilise support and improve the MCB’s 
reputation. The following analysis explores how the MCB justifies and frames its 
legitimacy as a representative organisation. 
  
As was noted earlier, the Council’s discursive strategies developed within the 
changing pluralist context of interest mediation and were shaped not only by Islamic 
values, but also by government policies towards faith and the overall competitive 
environment of civic and religious organisations. Naturally, the MCB’s rhetoric 
concerning community engagement was influenced by the need to adapt to the 
changing circumstances and the pressing issues of the day. Moreover, the exogenous 
shocks of the Rushdie Affair and 9/11 created an opportunity for the MCB to provide 
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leadership for those segments of Muslim communities who believed that they were 
threatened by Islamophobic attacks in the media and feared that their religious 
identity was not sufficiently protected by the British political system.  
 
Arguably, this sense of ‘community under threat’ may have temporarily relegated 
ethnic or generational differences and created a need for a strong interlocutor which 
would provide collective representation of Muslim political and religious interests.  
A study by Pedziwiatr (2007: 12) supports the claim that the MCB tried to ‘translate 
the diverse socio-cultural reality of numerous Muslim communities in the 
country….into the category of singular Muslim community.’ Similarly, Masood 
(2005) maintains that the MCB sought to ‘transcend the different religious groups 
and present, as far as possible, a single Muslim voice, at least at a political level.’  
 
This was particularly characteristic of the MCB’s actions during the earlier period of 
its closer engagement with the government (1997-2005). However, in the later 
period, following the aftermath of the London bombings and increased securitisation 
of the Muslim faith, a previously attractive concept of separate identity politics began 
to lose some of its popularity within Muslim communities. On one hand, this was 
partly a result of the government’s accommodation and ongoing recognition of 
Muslim religious rights through legislation. On the other hand, the gradual cooling of 
relations with the MCB first by the Labour administration and later by the Coalition, 
accompanied by increasingly critical accounts of its alleged Islamist roots created 
doubts over the MCB’s abilities to provide anything but a rather narrow 
representation of sectarian interests.  
 
 
Muslim unity in diversity 
 
In response to these circumstances and the mounting criticisms, the MCB continued 
to use two inter-related discourses to justify its role in representing Muslim interests. 
While it sought to emphasise Muslim unity and build consensus it was also 
increasingly concerned with communicating its awareness of the growing Muslim 
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diversity. The MCB’s statements over the last twenty years reveal a gradual shift in 
its rhetoric from a singular to pluralist interpretation of Muslim identity. Whereas 
there is a conviction that the collective identity of British Muslims needs to be 
recognised and protected in the public sphere and religious governance, there is a 
greater openness to representing Muslim multiple identities and internal diversity.  
 
The MCB tended to emphasise the unity of different views and perspectives over 
their diversity. For example, in one of his interviews, Iqbal Sacranie pointed out that 
the ‘most important achievement of the MCB to date [was] to bring together the 
diverse sections of the community on one platform’ (Muslim Weekly 2004). The 
MCB still uses the idea of British Muslims belonging to a distinct and bounded faith 
community as a way of drawing attention to the lack of public resources towards 
some disadvantaged Muslim areas. For example, while commenting on the results of 
the 2011 Census, Farooq Murad, the MCB’s Secretary General, justified the MCB’s 
efforts for collective representation of Muslim religious interests by linking a 
category-based representation to overall efforts to improve living conditions in 
deprived areas with a large Muslim population (MCB 2012c).  
 
Therefore, in the context of religious equality, the MCB has continued to represent 
the needs of the Muslim community as a singular category on the grounds of parity 
with other faith groups. In his address in 2011, Farooq Murad reminded his 
grassroots supporters and affiliated institutions that the Muslim community is ‘a faith 
community’ and that the ‘MCB is the result of extensive consultation on the need for 
a platform to …work on common issues’ (Murad 2011b: 10). However, while 
justifying its capacity for acting as a platform for equal representation of different 
Muslim views, the MCB’s recent statements also reveal an attempt to embrace 
diversity and represent different Muslim groups.  
 
The MCB leaders want to promote a collectively acceptable religious and civic 
representation of Muslim interests. There is an indication that the Council seeks to 
qualify and re-evaluate its official position through the idea of unity in diversity. On 
one hand, Muslim unity and solidarity are enshrined in Islamic teaching:  
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And hold fast, all of you together, to the rope of Allah, and be not 
divided among yourselves (Qur'an 3: 103).  
 
On the other hand, this is a rather difficult task to achieve within the highly 
heterogeneous British Muslim environment. The issue of community representation 
is the notion that allows the MCB to merge its religious principles with democratic 
aspirations. In the words of one respondent, ‘for democracy to work and to cater for 
everybody effectively, you need to have that intermediary or representative voice for 
any group of people who have a common agenda or interest’ (Interview 31). 
 
The MCB’s response to the Conservative Party’s Group Report on National 
Cohesion (2007) reveals the extent to which this has become a sensitive issue for the 
MCB. Whereas the intended audience was largely external, including some policy 
research groups which had criticised the MCB in the past, the document provided a 
clear summary of the Council’s robust defence of its values and its contribution to 
Muslim collective action. The document gave a detailed overview of the MCB’s 
activities and achievements to build a strong defence against the charges of being a 
reactionary, anti-democratic institution which is unrepresentative of community 
views (MCB 2007b: 17-20). Although it was careful not to call itself the most 
representative organisation (as it had done on some occasions referring to 
geographical spread of its affiliates) it claimed to be ‘a larger and more vibrant 
coalition of grassroots organisations’ and ‘the first democratic British Muslim 
organisations’ with transparent and regular elections and procedures (Ibid: 17). 
 
Moreover, the Council underlined its organisational inclusiveness by defending its 
reputation as a religiously-oriented, but non-sectarian institution. It rejected being 
negatively labelled as a narrow Islamist organisation on the grounds that the term 
was used pejoratively and did not acknowledge ‘the difference in political thought 
and action of all Muslims that derive their inspiration and values from the religion 
itself’ (Ibid: 10). It was keen to emphasise diversity of religious positions it brings 
together on one platform by highlighting a range of its affiliates and claiming to 
‘create a space for all schools of thought to be represented, Sufi and Salafi, Shi’a and 
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Sunni’ (Ibid: 9). Finally, it contrasted its work with that of other community 
organisations by claiming that it supports ‘both inter-community and intra-
community understanding’, including ‘speaking out against killing of Shi’a Muslims 
in Pakistan, or violence against Christians in Muslim lands’ (Ibid: 17).  
 
The idea of Muslim solidarity is a recurring leitmotif used by the Council to socialise 
its active role in representing Muslim interests. For example, the MCB’s Secretary 
General promised that the MCB would work ‘to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood 
and mutual understanding between the different communities of Muslims in Britain’ 
and ‘represent Muslims in an authentic, independent, competent and well informed 
manner…’ (MCB 2011c). In his later address the same year, he spoke of the Muslim 
community being a ‘vastly multicultural community’, the one with different 
‘ethnicities, languages, shades and differences of opinions about faith and politics, 
varieties of food and dress etc.’ (Murad 2011b: 6). He used this to demonstrate that 
the Muslim community ‘can be united despite major differences’ (Ibid). 
 
There is a growing desire to focus on intra-communal diversity rather than just 
emphasise the multicultural nature of wider British society and the role Muslim 
communities play in it. Previously, a stronger emphasis was placed on diversity 
within British society itself.  Bari, the MCB’s Secretary General at the time, 
emphasised that one of the MCB’s key priorities was ‘mainstreaming the diverse 
Muslim community’ (Bari 2008). By comparing individuals to ‘multi-coloured 
flowers that make this earth attractive’, he presented his view on the ‘essence of 
unity in diversity’ (Ibid). However, the diversity here was implied within the 
mainstream society rather than within Muslim communities themselves. He went on 
to stress that ‘by diversity we certainly do not mean isolation, segregation or 
insularity’ (Ibid). 
 
A series of subtle discursive shifts illustrate the MCB’s attempt to keep up with the 
changing dynamics of Muslim communities and a pluralised definition of Muslim 
identity. On one hand, while talking about the issues of Islamophobia or any attempts 
to marginalise Muslim communities, the MCB evokes common threats facing the 
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community as a singular entity. On the other hand, a considerable effort is made to 
win internal support by acknowledging Muslim internal diversity and the need to 
cooperate with other Muslim organisations. The MCB has tried to show its 
awareness of other representative voices: the ones which are affiliated to its 






The MCB’s political authority is contingent on its ability to placate its critics. A 
process of consultation enables the MCB to legitimise itself as a community-based 
actor which listens to different voices within its affiliated institutions and engages 
with other Muslim interest groups as a ‘mandated organisation’ (Interview 31). The 
MCB itself was created as a result of a lengthy process of community consultation. 
Between 1994 and 1995, the ‘National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity’44 
collected detailed information on community expectations on creating a coordinating 
body which would represent their interests, including media relations, lobbying 
strategies, leadership and community-based programmes (British Muslims Monthly 
Survey 1994b: 9).  
 
The key objective of this committee was to consult with a wide range of national, 
regional and local Muslim organisations on how to build a ‘functional unity around 
the common issues facing the British Muslim community’ and ‘to provide a common 
voice for their expression’ (Ibid). In one of its founding documents, the MCB stated 
that ‘coordination and unity is now seen as a question of the very survival of the 
community’ (MCB Invitation 1997). By working together for the ‘common good’, 
the MCB continues to take part in developing consultation documents and inviting its 
affiliates to discuss these papers and develop a unified position (MCB Website). For 
                                                 
44 The National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity (NICMU) was created on 30 April 1994 under 
the auspices of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) which had been set up earlier 
in 1988 to coordinate Muslim protests against Rushdie’s book. 
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example, the MCB undertook a series of consultations on different issues, including 
the ‘Prevent’ agenda, interfaith dialogue and social action, and multiculturalism. 
 
For an Islamic organisation the concept of shura (consultation) is central to building 
internal consensus in a democratic and transparent way just as it is for a civic-based 
organisation. The principle of shura is incorporated into the MCB’s approach to 
representation from the very first pages of the ‘Invitation’ document encouraging 
new organisations to join its ranks. It presents the MCB as ‘an independent body 
working for the pleasure of Allah to promote consultation, cooperation and 
coordination on Muslim affairs in the UK’ (MCB Invitation 1997: 4). 
 
In the words of one of the MCB’s affiliates, the concept of shura is very similar to 
how a Western-type democracy is based on ‘elected representatives making 
collective decisions on people’s behalf’ (Interview 30).  Consultation with its 
grassroots affiliates allows the MCB to exercise a degree of democracy by providing 
it with a space to listen to different voices and resolve internal tensions. For example, 
on several occasions, neither the Federation of Muslim Organisations nor the Islamic 
Foundation supported the MCB’s decision to boycott the Holocaust Memorial Day 
(HMD) which lasted from 2001-2007. However, representatives from both 
organisations felt that the MCB’s organisational structure was loose enough for them 
to speak their minds and take a different course of action. The data suggests that 
there is an informal understanding within the MCB that for a democratic organisation 
to function properly there must be a freedom to disagree and voice contrary opinions, 
without being forced to leave the organisation. 
 
An additional element of consultation strategy is its informal dimension. In an 
attempt to build consensus the MCB leadership engages in a series of personal 
consultations with the key members of its affiliates. For example, a leader of one 
affiliate can also head a larger affiliated organisation and be consulted by the MCB’s 
leaders in both capacities. On the day-to-day basis this provides a useful mechanism 
for negotiating and discussing the issues. Informal ties may also prove useful in 
sharing experiences and introducing best practices from one organisation to another. 
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Some highlight that ‘there is a lot of interaction and support’ between the MCB and 
some of its affiliates (Interview 29). However, others argue that occasionally such 
informal consultations may also contribute to a particular group of interests 
dominating the MCB’s agenda. This creates an impression that some decisions are 
taken behind closed doors and are made to suit a particular ethnic group or religious 
interest within the MCB rather than to benefit the community as a whole. One 
respondent noted that: 
 
You have to be aware of the importance of informal connections, 
rather than formal affiliations. The important thing is personal 
connections… they are strong (Interview 28). 
 
In line with an Islamic principle of Muslim solidarity, the MCB is ready to work 
together with other Muslim organisations. For example, the MCB reiterates that it 
‘will seek a relationship of good-will and mutual respect with all Muslim 
organisations… [t]he door will remain open for them to join’ (MCB Invitation 1997). 
The MCB also engages with other leading organisations though its involvement in 
the work of the MINAB. While there are internal rivalries among the founding 
members of the Board, the data suggests that cooperation through the MINAB is 
beneficial for the MCB’s efforts to improve its reputation. MINAB is believed to 
provide ‘a space where there is genuine dialogue within [the] major factures within 
the Muslim communities, ethnic and sectarian’ (Interview 23). The MCB’s 
participation in the MINAB as a particular arrangement for collective representation 
of very diverse Muslim interests allows it to overcome its own shortcomings of being 
viewed as a closed sectarian group. 
 
 
Muslim empowerment: self-governance and participation  
 
The MCB sees itself as a service provider organisation (Interview 31). Its key 
contribution to mobilising Muslim claims is to empower Muslim communities to 
build their own capacities to represent themselves and secure provisions for religious 
and community practices. The rhetoric of empowerment helps the MCB to position 
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itself as a proper grassroots organisation which provides bottom-up representation of 
Muslim interests in the pluralist framework of decentralised civil society and 
multiple interest groups. This is echoed by general approaches to Islamic activism 
aiming at changing a negative perception of Muslims and empower Muslim 
communities living within British society. For example, Tariq Ramadan (2011) has 
described empowerment as ‘spiritual independence, intellectual independence, socio-
economic independence and courage.’  
 
In his speech at the MCB’s annual event, Ramadan also praised the MCB’s active 
commitment to changing the discriminatory perceptions of Muslim communities 
externally, as well as highlighting the Council’s work to break away from the ‘victim 
mentality’ internally (Ramadan 2010). The MCB’s rhetoric reveals similar overtones 
in its approach to building community capacity and enabling Muslim communities 
not only to represent themselves by practising self-governance, but also to contribute 
to British society by fulfilling their duties as British citizens: 
 
Our motivations are underscored by the ethos of enthusing active 
and civic-minded British Muslims who will contribute to the 
common good of British society (MCB 2007b: 6). 
 
The MCB’s programme dedicated to capacity building of mosques and other Islamic 
organisations is a clear example of how the Council uses the idea of empowerment to 
make mosques community-friendly. Key recommendations from its own survey of 
over 1,000 mosques emphasised the need for the mosques to be more inclusive, 
while other focused on improving communications between the MCB’s affiliates 
through such programmes as the MCB Community Engagement Week (MCB 
2006a). The MCB presented its programme as a strategy to ‘empower the community 
through enhancing support of fund raising activities and investing in infrastructure 
development of the organisations…to put them firmly on the road to achieve their 
tasks better in everything they do’ (Al-Azami 2007).  
 
In an MCB-endorsed study on the project, Wilkinson (2007) noted that the project’s 
participants praised the organisational efforts to create a ‘synthesis of western 
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managerial expertise and Islamic context.’ By merging together practices and 
discourses of self-governance and Islamic empowerment, the MCB provided a clear 
illustration of how its work aimed to serve the everyday needs of Muslim 
communities. In his invitation for all UK mosques to join the programme, Salman 
Al-Azami (2007) emphasised that in serving the community, the MCB was 
determined to make mosques more inclusive through the ‘active participation of 
youths and women.’ 
 
The MCB’s approach to representation through community empowerment suggests 
that the MCB combined its discursive strategies with practical measures. Further 
evidence of the MCB’s proactive steps to be inclusive of different group interests can 
be found in its engagement with Muslim women, young people and the business 
community. While mosques and mosque-based organisations form the backbone of 
its membership, MCB leaders are also aware of the need to reconnect with a wider 
range of Muslim interest groups. Because these measures often go underreported in 
the media, there is a commonly-held belief that the MCB can only provide narrow-
based representation.  
 
A brief outline of these measures provides an illustration of the MCB’s attempts to 
build a wider coalition of support. By drawing attention to a degree of continuity in 
its efforts to ‘connect and engage with …grassroots and communities’ the MCB’s 
leadership emphasised the need to ‘increase participation of women and young 
people… to strengthen… alliance with civil society…’ (Murad 2011b: 5). In other 
words, it created not only discursive but also actionable opportunities to widen its 
ranks and improve internal legitimacy.  
 
The MCB was criticised for not having enough women working within its own 
institutional structures. As will be mentioned in the later chapters, the question of 
Muslim women being part of the SMR was not as problematic in the Russian 
context, particularly in light of historic precedents of women taking part in Muslim 
congresses dating back to 1917. However, different Islamic practices in Britain 
resulted in women being more under-represented in Muslim organisations with 
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strong Islamist roots. While some of the traditionalist attitudes of its individual 
affiliates may have complicated the process of women’s inclusion, over the last two 
years the MCB has tried to invite more women to work not only within the affiliated 
organisations, but also within its own committees. For example, in November 2010, 
the MCB held a meeting for a group of women ‘to encourage their involvement in 
MCB’s many projects and committees’ (MCB 2010c: 11). Nonetheless, while the 
MCB is becoming more open towards women participation, some of the individual 
measures are still seen as a particular achievement, rather than a normal everyday 
practice. While praising the fact that the half of the members of the Business 
Executive Committee consisted of women, it was also noted that it was a ‘historic 
first for the committee’ and it was a ‘strong message’ that the committee welcomed 
‘people of all talents, including women.’ (Ibid: 9) 
 
More significant results can be noted in the MCB’s efforts to attract young Muslims 
to work within or alongside the institution. In 2005, the MCB organised a youth 
group convention at Manchester City Hall. To ensure that the views of young 
Muslims were taken into account, some audio recordings from the convention were 
played back at the meetings of the MCB’s Central Working Committee. Arguably, 
the creation of the Youth Affairs Committee was a more significant development in 
this direction. The Committee holds annual ‘Young Muslim Beacon Awards’ which 
celebrate achievements and showcase best practices of Muslim youth organisations 
(MCB Youth Affairs Committee Website). The MCB also runs a special youth blog, 
The Platform, which claims to bring together ‘talented young and mature writers to 
voice views on current events and topical issues’ (Ibid). It is ‘led solely by young 
people’ while a majority of articles is written by ‘leading academics, specialists, 
journalists, and politicians, along with insightful contributions from young up-and-
coming writers, generating an exchange of vibrant ideas’ (The Platform Website). 
One of its key aims is to improve dialogue between different generations.  
 
The MCB’s engagement with members of the Muslim business community has 
provided a further opportunity to get support from Muslim communities by 
encouraging self-representation. While outlining his vision for the MCB, Iqbal 
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Sacranie suggested that the MCB should work as ‘a vehicle through which we can 
develop wise community leadership – men and women who are able to rise up above 
their parochial allegiances and think strategically for the benefit of the community a 
whole’ (Sacranie 2006: 16). While this matches the MCB’s agenda of empowering 
Muslim communities to improve their visibility within British society, it is also an 
indication that the MCB’s leadership has become aware of the growing 
professionalisation of British Muslims. A key example of these initiatives are the 
annual ‘Leadership Dinners’ organised to highlight major achievements of Muslim 
communities. The MCB has framed this initiative as an invaluable platform to ‘meet 
leaders from all walks of British Muslim life’ (MCB Leadership Dinner). It was also 
keen to remind the participants of its own involvement as ‘Britain’s leading Muslim 
umbrella body’ (Ibid).  
 
 
Internal restructuring: The Constitutional Review (2010-2012) 
 
In the previous section I examined the ways in which the MCB’s behaviour has 
conformed to the expectations of social movements theories in relation to using 
mobilising rhetoric and implementing measures thought to resonate with its 
constituents. By fusing together Islamic and civic activism discourses, the MCB tried 
to re-establish itself as a grassroots organisation serving interests of Muslim 
communities and campaigning for Muslim solidarity and empowerment.  
 
In this context, the Council’s preoccupation with its own organisational maintenance 
deserves particular attention. The Council embarked on organisational reforms in 
response to growing criticism. In its efforts to streamline its processes and self-
legitimise in the eyes of British Muslims, it incorporated institutional practices from 
its external environment. In line with institutional expectations of the pluralist 
context of interest mediation, internal restructuring was aimed at improving the 
MCB’s democratic credentials by making its structures more accountable, 
transparent and inclusive. 
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The Constitutional Review (hereafter the Review) envisaged a series of changes to 
develop the existing provisions for membership, election processes and 
representation, as defined in the MCB’s Constitution (MCB 2002a) and the Code of 
Conduct and Governance Protocol (MCB 2010a). In his annual address to the MCB’s 
General Assembly, Farooq Murad (2011b) emphasised the need to take a critical 
look at the organisational framework to ‘ensure the MCB’s structure and processes 
are in line with its purpose, enabling it to be democratic, inclusive, representative and 
responsive.’ The proposed programme of reforms focused on three areas: improving 
mechanisms for internal consultation; making electoral procedures and membership 
arrangements more accountable; and making the work of individual committees 
more transparent. 
 
The Review began with an open invitation to its affiliates to voice their ‘views and 
opinions on what the MCB needs to do to ensure its organisational structure is 
responsive to present-day and future challenges’ (MCB 2010c: 3). The MCB’s press 
office advertised the running of focus groups in Birmingham and Manchester. It also 
invited non-affiliated Muslim groups and organisations to ‘make a difference and 
engage with the [Constitution] Committee to improve the structure of the MCB and 
enable it to better reflect and represent the Muslim communities in the UK’ (MCB 
2010b).  
 
By opening up the consultation process the Council’s leaders sought to get Muslim 
communities involved in debates over its organisational capacity to represent their 
diverse interests. This offered a useful strategy to mobilise support by showing that 
the proposed measures were not imposed from above, but rather the result of 
community empowerment and open debate. Advertising the campaign among 
Muslim communities provided a further opportunity to build broader alliances. This 
was particularly important in relation to existing criticisms that the MCB provided a 
very narrow representation of Muslim interests since many decisions had still been 
taken internally without broader consultation.  
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The process of consultation revealed that some were unhappy with the way in which 
top officials, such as the Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General and Treasurer 
were elected by the Central Working Committee and not the General Assembly 
(MCB 2011b). Under the section of ‘Representation’ the Review grouped together 
questions aimed at improving participation of the under-represented groups and 
suggested introducing ‘positive action/positive discrimination measures to improve 
representation’ of women and some ethnic/national groups, such as ‘quotas for 
under-represented groups’ (Ibid). 
 
 
Electoral procedures, membership arrangements and individual committees 
 
My research suggests that the MCB’s leaders have been aware of the need to make 
the organisations ‘more representative…engaged, connected…and more effective in 
decision-making (Interview 31). They have also been open to criticism that the 
existing structures had not been flexible enough to accommodate the needs of new 
communities and that ‘the elections’ process’ [has not been] encouraging enough of 
good people to come forth’ (Ibid). There was a further awareness that the current 
governance structure created an impression that ‘all [was] done too much at the high 
level’ whereas ‘offices should be open for elections by the delegates and not just by 
the elected representatives’ (Ibid).  
 
There were a series of criticisms raised concerning the openness of the voting 
practices (referred to as block voting), particularly in relation to inbuilt biases of 
favouring small, nationally-spread organisations, rather than the large regional 
mosque associations. This is generally believed to favour if not the Islamist elements 
within the MCB, then at least some of its better represented, founding members. For 
example, at the MCB’s Annual General Meeting that took place on 20 June 2010 
there were concerns from the floor that the ‘MCB was too heavily dominated by one 
narrow faction’ (Amin 2011). The data suggests that some respondents see it as a 
significant constraint on the extent to which the MCB can succeed in reforming its 
organisational structures, even if there is a desire to ‘see it work in a better way than 
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it does now and see it more open and more accountable and more dynamic than it is 
now’ (Interview 28). Some of the concerns included calls for greater transparency in 
the electoral process for key posts, which could be achieved by giving enough time 
to read the candidates’ biographies in advance and limiting the apparent circulation 
of ‘pre-printed lists of candidates…supplied…by their organisations’ (Amin 2011).45 
 
The Review made a direct appeal to community solidarity by suggesting that the 
question of membership and the level of internal engagement of affiliated institutions 
needed to be addressed as the records showed that there was a feeling of apathy 
among the affiliates (MCB 2011b). Considering that only half of the delegates took 
part in the elections in 2010, this apathy was seen as a contributing factor to the 
democratic deficit. The lack of interest and disengagement was found to have an 
‘adverse impact on the profile and standing of the MCB’ (Ibid). The existing Code of 
Conduct and Governance Protocols (MCB 2010a) were adopted to regulate the 
processes of decision-making and establish a notion of ‘collective responsibility’ 
which implied that decisions could only be taken ‘after due process of consultation’ 
(Ibid: 5). However, once a measure was agreed, it was ‘the responsibility of all 
including those who had disagreed with the decision to own it and take responsibility 
for its consequences’ (Ibid).  
 
Some of the proposed changes also included ideas to introduce individual (rather 
than affiliate-based) membership. While the suggested reforms included the 
introduction of women’s quotas, the extent to which this would be translated into real 
numbers remained debatable. While there was a general desire to improve female 
participation there was also a realisation that limited representation of women at the 
MCB level was ‘just a reflection of [female] participation at [the] grassroots’ 
(Interview 33). As will be discussed in the final part of the chapter, the MCB’s key 
                                                 
45 The scope of this thesis only covers the period from 1997 to 2012, with occasional references to 
some developments in 2013. By 2014, however, there were some indications that more of these ideas 
have been taken into consideration. 
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affiliates are the mosques and the number of women holding offices in the local 
mosques are rather low.  
 
Another area in which there was a reduced level of transparency was the inbuilt 
process of selection of individuals for the key committees within the Council. The 
MCB’s committees are where the real work is being done. Arguably, while some 
Non-Specialist Committees (e.g.  Business and Economics, Mosque and Community 
Affairs, Women and Family Affairs) are more democratic and can invite individuals 
from Muslim communities and mainstream society, the membership of the core ones, 
such as the Finance and General Purpose Committee have strict regulatory controls.46 
Their membership is ‘restricted to the Office Bearers and Advisors duly appointed by 
the Central Working Committee’ and any person who might be invited to its 
meetings does not have the right to vote on proposals (MCB 2010a: 14).  
 
Such a differentiated approach suggests an attempt to be inclusive and open to 
external opinions in some areas while remaining relatively closed and exclusive in 
others. On one hand, Non-Specialist Committees are free to invite different experts. 
This provides an opportunity to listen to a wider set of views and perspectives. On 
the other hand, the chair of each of the Specialist Committees ‘must be a member of 
the Central Working Committee’ and ‘selected by the Secretary General in 
consultation with his/her colleagues’ (Ibid: 12). To ensure accountability of the 
Specialist Committees, these nominations must be made ‘bearing in mind the balance 
in schools of thought, gender, age and ethnicity’ (Ibid). This illustrates that the 
institution has a set of checks and balances to retain internal control, but also that it is 
mindful of the need to transcend the existing gender, generational, religious and 
ethnic cleavages. 
  
                                                 
46 Constitutionally-mandated, Specialist Committees include: Finance and General Purpose, Media, 
Research and Documentation, Legal Affairs and Membership. Their Chair-people are appointed by 
the Central Working Committee which is itself partly nominated, partly appointed and partly elected 
by the General Assembly. 
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The publicised results 
 
The results of the Review were announced at the Annual General Meeting in 2012 
which saw the re-election of the existing leaders of the MCB. The two essential 
changes that were publicised included women’s representation and more direct 
elections. The delegates agreed to ‘impose a minimum 20% quota for the women on 
the MCB’s key decision-making body, its Central Working Committee’ (MCB 
2012b). The second important change involved direct elections of the future 
Secretary General not by the committee members, but by all MCB delegates from 
2014 (Ibid). Further promises were made to ‘listen far more intently to Muslim 
youth’ starting with a ‘specially-convened session at the AGM where radical ideas 
for youth participation were offered by young civil society activists’ (Ibid). The 
newly re-elected Secretary General emphasised that more work must be done ‘to 
bring women forward into Islamic institutions’ (Ibid). 
 
The Review gave the MCB a chance to respond to its critics and rebrand its 
credentials as a representative organisation. It provided a transparent and accountable 
exercise to take a critical look at its internal processes and to make the institution not 
only more representative but also more resilient in undertaking its representative 
functions in the future. However, it is also interesting to note which proposals did not 
make the cut and seem to remain on hold.  These included the introduction of 
individual membership, direct elections of the chairs within the committees and 
removing the practices of block voting which were seen to favour some ethnic 
groups at the expense of others.  
 
The way in which the Review was conducted, including particular areas it sought to 
reform, conforms to the previously formulated theoretical expectations. As an 
increasingly institutionalised interest group, the MCB became engaged in its own 
internal maintenance. Moreover, its search for internal legitimacy encouraged it to 
realign its own institutional practices with those of the external environment. British 
pluralist patterns of state engagement with interest groups have increased 
competition between the groups and challengers, making it difficult to maintain the 
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support of British Muslims without somehow adhering to the existing values of 
democratic elections, accountability and transparency. The reforms provided the 
MCB with an opportunity to improve its own processes and procedures which were 
seen as rather outdated. By consulting with different groups, getting them involved in 
the process and appealing to their sense of solidarity, the MCB sought to protect its 
conduct from being questioned. 
 
Organisational theories shed light on how and why the MCB tried to improve its 
legitimacy through organisational maintenance. While a brief analysis of the MCB’s 
discursive strategies helps understand a degree of decoupling between what was 
proposed and what was implemented, it does not provide a sufficient explanation of 
the nature of institutional resistance to these measures. Neither does it offer a 
sufficient explanation of why the MCB’s actions have remained limited even when 
there was a shared understanding that organisational changes were required. The data 
suggests that there is an institutional barrier of entrenched interests within the MCB 
itself, as well as within some of its affiliates, which provides a considerable 
constraint on its ability to implement change. The next section will apply insights 
from historical institutionalism to trace the importance of these historically 
contingent interests to better understand which measures got sufficient tracking, 
which did not, and why. 
 
 
Internal resistance to change and historically entrenched interests 
 
The MCB’s integration in the British pluralist context combined with Islamic 
approaches to consultation endowed the Review with a series of democratic 
mechanisms to improve the Council’s legitimacy. Historical institutionalism 
emphasises the importance of particular sequences of events which contribute to 
some groups or types of interests consolidating their authority within the institution 
over a period of time. In this part of the chapter, I will examine how and why 
traditionalist interests became entrenched within the MCB and how power relations 
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in mosques may have influenced the Council’s organisational development and 
resistance to change. 
 
The political legacy of Islamist movement groups partly explains the MCB’s 
cautious approach to giving equal representation to a variety of voices within its own 
organisation. However, the research also suggests that institutional practices of 
power-sharing arrangements migrated from the individual level of mosque 
governance to the national level of interest representation through the MCB. In light 
of these historical legacies, a concept of ‘gradual change,’ developed by historical 
institutionalists (Thelen and Mahoney 2010), provides a useful way to analyse the 
MCB’s reforms. I will explore whether entrenched interests and historically 




Constraining legacies of Islamist preferences and conservative thinking  
 
The Rushdie events provided a critical juncture for particular ideological interests to 
come together and defend religious rights of Muslims in Britain. The violent nature 
of the events was not only the result of the struggle between Rushdie’s supporters 
and opponents, but also was generated by the competition between various Muslim 
groups in Britain (Kepel 1997: 127). The two sets of competing interests were 
allegedly the Iranians, represented by the Muslim Parliament of Britain and the 
UKACIA, which consisted of ‘middle-class Islamic activists, intellectuals and 
businessmen broadly inspired by the South Asian Islamic reform movements, the 
Jama’at-i-Islami and…the Deobandis (Birt 2005: 99).47  
 
One interviewee suggested that the Deobandis were more successful in attracting 
enough community support because ‘they are better organised than other Muslim 
                                                 
47 On tensions between the Muslim Parliament of Britain and the UK Action Committee on Islamic 
Affairs (UKACIA), see further discussions in Kepel 1997: 126-146 and Malik 2009: 120-141. 
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groups (e.g. Barelvis) and have more English-speaking imams’ (Interview 23). Since 
the early days of the invitation for Muslim organisations to come together under one 
umbrella body, the MCB has considerably diversified its membership as is evidenced 
by its ever-expanding list of mosque-based and non-mosque affiliates. However, 
there are claims that it continues to be ‘dominated by ideological supporters of 
Islamic movements’ which may have ‘discouraged other groups from getting 
involved’ (Interview 33). 48 
 
In his analysis of the MCB’s list of affiliates in 2010, Amin (2011) suggested that 
there was an in-built Islamist bias within the institutional make-up. He grouped 
together different local affiliates by their links and belonging to wider groupings, 
such as the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Society of Britain, the Young Muslim 
Organisation and the Islamic Forum and concluded that ‘certain organisations 
[could] increase their voting power by affiliating their individual branches’ (Ibid). He 
also suggested that this gives these groups a political advantage to ‘nominate a 
member of the Central Working Committee and determine the elected members of 
the Central Working Committee’ (Ibid). While discussing the MCB’s electoral 
processes, Bunting (2010) summarised quite similar concerns that there exists ‘an 
informal alliance known as the Islamic Movement’ which ‘will nominate a 
candidate…on whom they agreed a several months ago.’ One respondent voiced a 
rather common interpretation of this in-built bias by commenting that ‘part of the 
problem with the MCB is that everything is an Islamic issue, they are not just being a 
Muslim civil rights organisation’ (Interview 24). 
  
The original founders of the MCB may have followed a traditionalist interpretation 
of the Islamist ideology inspired by such figures as Abdul A’la Mawdudi in the 
Indian context or Muslim Brotherhood if they were Arabs. At the same time, some 
young leaders from the affiliates have also questioned some of the traditionalist 
                                                 
48 This is a reference to Barelvi Muslims who are Sufis and do not accept some the MCB’s Islamist 
colouration. While some argue their proportion within the British Muslim population is significantly 
higher than that of the Deobandis, their interests are represented by the British Muslim Forum which 
is not a political organisation and is a relatively weak representative institution. 
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assumptions and preferred to identify themselves with being post-ideological 
(Hussain 2012). Some of these organisations, such as the Islamic Society of Britain 
which had been originally founded on Mawdudi ideas, started to adapt their ideology 
to the secular demands of the British context. Interestingly, in his recent study on 
young Muslims, Hamid (2011: 253) classified the MCB as a post-Islamist 
organisation. However, personal connections between similarly-inspired groups and 
internal alliances inside the MCB’s politics still resulted in a tendency to vote 
together and support particular leaders. This created a difficulty for bringing change 
to electoral procedures. 
 
While the Islamist label in its ideological sense may not be entirely applicable to the 
MCB’s affiliates, some studies have described the nature of the ‘vested interests’ 
inside the MCB as conservative and heavily influenced by traditional principles of 
mosque governance (Klausen 2005). Over the last couple of years, the MCB has 
shown commitment to representing, modernising and empowering mosques, which 
make up a large number of its affiliates. However, in spite of the MCB’s 
preoccupation with improving mosque capacities, many of its affiliated mosques 
remain not only traditionalist in their outlook but also undemocratic in their approach 
to representation.  
 
In particular, the majority of mosques established in the 1960s and 1970s were 
traditionally built to cater for Muslim religious needs. As they grew larger they 
expanded their functions to provide community-based services and Islamic education 
opportunities for young Muslims. Although many mosques continue to adapt to the 
changing needs of Muslim communities, their day-to-day operation tends to be 
governed by a committee which provides political and financial leadership to the 
mosque community. While the committee may diversify its activities to become 
more community-friendly, its membership continues to suffer from an inbuilt 
democratic deficit. In her study, Gilliat-Ray (2010: 195) has voiced a common 
concern that ‘becoming a mosque committee member, or Chair, is not necessarily a 
democratic process, since it is often likely to rest upon kinship and other social ties.’ 
Historically contingent ethnic and sectarian rivalries between mosques have also 
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contributed to mosque elders wishing to protect particular interests of their mosques 
by concentrating power in the hands of the few, appointed, but not elected committee 
members. MCB’s own research on British mosques noted that: 
 
Most mosques are established by the elders of local communities 
and are therefore also maintained by them. Young people are not 
often seen as mature, responsible and trustworthy enough to 
become trustees or management committee members. There are 
also cultural norms that prioritise elders over youth when it comes 
to management. (MCB 2006a: 19) 
 
The lack of democratic elections and somewhat cliquish attitudes inside mosque 
committees may have been an unintended consequence not only of cultural values, 
but also of historic legacies of the earlier forms of Muslim representation in Britain. 
However, this has a major implication for the MCB’s own capacity to be seen as a 
democratic institution. The aforementioned evidence suggests that particular 
selection processes and unaccountable power-sharing arrangements in mosques got 
locked in within the MCB’s own electoral procedures. The MCB believes it has a 
series of checks and balances to ensure its processes are accountable and to a large 
extent this is true. However, this does not prevent unelected mosque chairmen from 
working as community delegates within the MCB General Assembly and speaking 
on behalf of Muslim communities which may not have elected them in the first place.  
 
There is a rather problematic assumption here that the ‘management of organisations 
speak for their members’ (Amin 2011). Whereas this is true for some affiliates with 
direct election procedures, this is less likely to be true for the mosques as they do not 
have a formal membership. In fact, ‘mosques are run by a self-perpetuating group 
drawn from the original founders’ and then ‘by selected younger people as these 
founders age’ (Ibid). More importantly, ‘few mosques have a formal membership 
taken up by all worshippers and democratic election of their management’ (Ibid). My 
research confirms that there is a tension between a nominated community elder, put 
in charge of catering for everyday needs of the mosque and a community 
representative who is democratically selected and entrusted by the community to 
represent its common interests. For example, one of the concerns was that sometimes 
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a mosque chairman acts as a middle man who attends the meetings, but then does not 
communicate down to his congregation (Interview 28).  
 
Another issue, recognised by the MCB, is the question of female participation. As 
was noted earlier, the MCB has tried to mainstream women representation by 
introducing a quota system. However, the lack of female participation also reflects a 
degree of conservatism and resistance to change in mosques. Although this may be 
different for women representatives from charities or educational affiliates, the 
problem of female under-representation is carried upwards within the institutional 
chain: from a mosque to a mosque council and then to a larger umbrella body such as 
the MCB. While commenting on the MCB’s elections prior to the Constitutional 
Review, Bunting noted that ‘entrenched conservatism stubbornly persists in the local 
mosques and dominates the MCB membership, while a younger contingent continues 
to fall prey to radicalisation’ (Bunting 2010).  
 
A study by Klausen (2005: 96) found that most of the religious community leaders 
she interviewed supported more traditional, conservative views which may not be 
necessarily shared within Muslim communities. She found that this neo-orthodox, 
traditionalist thinking, which was particularly widespread among the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi religious leaders in Britain, was not of an Islamist nature and did not 
imply demands to create a Caliphate, but rather it was focused on ‘the right to exist 
as a religious minority and to live, by choice, according to religious law’ (Ibid: 99). 
While mosque community leaders reject an attempt to introduce ‘western practices in 
Islam, they equally regard the Islamist fringe groups as parasitic and abusers of 
Islam’ (Ibid).  
 
Her classification of Muslim approaches to life in Europe, identified the neo-
orthodox group as ‘men and women based in mosque organisations, engaged in local 
politics, or affiliated with the new national Muslim associations’ (Ibid). My data 
seems to confirm that it is this conservative thinking which gets reinforced within the 
larger national bodies through rather undemocratic processes, reluctance to share 
power, or a simple inability to do so due to insufficient human and financial 
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resources. Extensive measures to reform the MCB would threaten not only the 
political or religious interests of these leaders, but also a preferred way of doing 
things in line with the existing traditions and received norms. However, it should be 
also noted that not all organisations within the MCB share this thinking which is 
probably why there is still a healthy discussion about which representational changes 
are feasible, considering the nature of these constraints. 
 
 
Gradual changes and implemented measures 
 
A closer look at which measures were implemented by 2013 and which were not 
provides a useful way to explore the idea of gradual change within the MCB’s 
organisational structure. The MCB’s approach to reforms should be considered in the 
larger historical context of mosque governance in Britain. Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010) classify patterns of gradual change in relation to the presence of strong/weak 
veto players and high/low enforcement or interpretation of rules. In the previous part 
of the chapter, I mentioned that different ideas had been offered in the course of the 
Review aimed at improving the MCB’s representational capacities. By briefly 
matching the list of the so far rejected measures with the typology offered by 
Mahoney and Thelen, it is possible to suggest that the MCB’s strategy of gradual 
reform corresponded to the layering dynamic of change, rather than the one of 
displacement, conversion or drift. 
 
For example, the discussed introduction of individual membership would have meant 
a displacement strategy as it would have offset the vested interests of the affiliates as 
collective actors. Had the MCB opted for not changing anything within its 
institutional governance and just waited for gradual changes to filter through less 
reactionary affiliates, this would have corresponded to the drift dynamic. If the 
MCB’s delegates were to reformulate the functions of the Central Working 
Committee and extend the number of external advisors by granting them wider 
voting powers, this would have signalled a conversion, or a reinterpretation of the 
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existing rules. However, none of these measures appear to have been implemented 
yet. In line with the concept of decoupling, they were discussed but not acted on.  
 
Based on the proposed classification, the MCB’s reforms and practices conform to 
the layering dynamic, which is characterised by the presence of strong veto players 
(i.e. entrenched interests) and a rather low discretion for rule enforcement (i.e. the 
existence of prescribed rules and regulations which the affiliates need to adhere to). 
The introduction of female quotas was an additional and a rather gradual 
arrangement which did not offset the vested players as much as individual 
membership or new arrangements would have affected the nature of the Central 
Working Committee. Similarly, the right to elect key posts was extended to the 
General Assembly in 2012. This was a significant achievement as it created an 
additional mechanism to improve the MCB’s democratic legitimacy. This was done 
alongside the existing procedures that remained unchanged. In other words, it 
produced an extra provision without substantially changing the existing rules, 
particularly since the changes were expected to take place in two years’ time. These 
measures may have suited the entrenched interests inside the MCB who were 
interested in preserving the status quo as far as it was possible. However, in line with 
Mahoney and Thelen’s ideas (2010: 17), every new step ‘may be a small change in 
itself, yet these small changes can accumulate, leading to a big change in the long 
run.’ 
 
Therefore, the data supports the premise that the nature of organisational changes is 
not only contingent on the sociological assumption that all organisations are 
inherently resistant to change or the rational choice preferences of the groups seeking 
to preserve their power. The MCB’s efforts to change its organisational structures 
and make them democratically accountable have also been constrained by 
historically entrenched interests and previous practices of governing mosques. The 
MCB’s decision to undertake reforms was shaped by the changing needs of Muslim 
communities and strong criticism which encouraged it to re-evaluate its way of 
engaging with Muslim communities. Nonetheless, its own institutional limitations, 
rooted within the deeper historical structures of power-sharing arrangements have 
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constrained the extent to which it has been ready to let go of its organisationally-





The chapter discussed the MCB’s engagement with Muslim communities in light of 
changing expectations and demands on collective representation and Muslim 
diversity. In line with theoretical expectations about social movement organisations, 
the data supported the claim that the MCB’s ability to position itself as a legitimate 
representative of Muslim interests has depended on its abilities to mobilise support 
and adapt to its institutional environment. 
 
Once a more active phase of collective action passes, a previously popular and 
engaging challenger may lose its supporters through a general disillusionment with 
its too radical or overly moderate approach to mobilisation (McAdam and Zald 
1996). While this approach recognises the importance of building consensus among 
supporters and developing engaging strategies, it does not necessarily explain why a 
potential legitimacy gap can still occur once the organisation’s own processes do not 
keep up with the changing needs of those in whose name they act. A closer look at 
the growing diversification of Muslim interests and different approaches to Muslim 
identity presented the MCB with a real challenge of how to be inclusive of this 
diversity. This was exacerbated by what the MCB saw as its duty to present a united 
front against Islamophobia and articulate common concerns for greater protection of 
Muslims in Britain. 
 
My research suggested that the MCB’s approach to engaging with Muslim 
communities has been based on the need to justify its status as a representative 
institution. In other words, the MCB leaders have struggled to provide an 
authoritative voice on Muslim issues to the government, while its own organisational 
structures were criticised for being insufficiently democratic, accountable or 
inclusive. A better understanding of the MCB’s rhetoric of engagement, combined 
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with limited initiatives to widen its ranks, helped clarify how the Council had sought 
to counteract some of these criticisms. The analysis of its official statements and 
communication documents reveals that the MCB framed and institutionalised its 
actions by combing a discourse of civic engagement and democracy with similar 
notions grounded in Islamic values. 
 
The final section explored why the MCB’s effort to reform its processes through the 
Constitutional review was rather limited, in spite of a widely-held belief that this was 
the right strategy to represent Muslim interests in fairness and diversity. A closer 
analysis of historically entrenched interests helped understand the impact of the 
earlier stages and patterns of power relations on the Council’s present approach to 
representation and change. Arguably, the MCB’s own processes, rooted within the 
deeper traditional structures of power relations within the earlier forms of Muslim 
representation through mosques committees, continue to hamper the extent to which 
it can fully reform itself. Therefore, in practice, its real or perceived ability to 
represent all the different groups, including younger Muslims and Muslim women, 
other ethnic and sectarian groups and secular Muslims, is constrained. 
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Chapter 5 




In Chapter 3, an approach based on political opportunity structures was applied to 
analyse the MCB’s engagement with the British government. In this chapter, I will 
use a similar process to define the institutional and organisational arena of state-
Muslim relations in Russia and explore the relations between the Council of Muftis 
and the Russian state. Before examining the changing nature of the SMR’s 
engagement with the Russian authorities, I will explain how the Russian context has 
been shaped by a specific set of opportunities and constraints. I will outline the same 
four dimensions which were used to describe the British case, namely the nature of 
religious divisions, institutional patterns of interest mediation, informal ways of 
resolving conflicts in state-religion relations and opportunities for making alliances 
with other religious and non-religious groups.  
 
Over the last two decades, the SMR’s engagement with the Russian state underwent 
a series of changes. I will examine the extent to which the Council’s engagement 
with the government conforms to Russia’s predominantly corporatist context, 
exemplified by a strong paternalistic state, weak civil society and a limited number 
of centralised organisations. In light of these institutional conditions, I expect the 
SMR’s engagement with the government to be strong, whereas its cooperation with 
other organisations should remain weak. Moreover, the SMR is unlikely to risk 
disengaging from the state because without the support of the government, there are 
few alternative platforms from which Muslim claims can be made.  
 
These assumptions will be analysed in relation to the data gathered in 2011 and 
complemented by the earlier research conducted in 2008. The analysis will centre 
mainly on the SMR’s relations with state officials under the Putin-Medvedev 
administrations. However, some references will also be made to the earlier years of 
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the Yeltsin presidency to better illustrate the intensity of the corporatist norms of 
state-religion relations which were to follow. First, I will outline some of the POS 
specificities of the Russian context. I will then discuss the SMR’s increasing 
cooperation with the government within the Russian framework of ‘traditional 
religions’. Finally, I will focus on a brief but atypical period of tensions in state-
council relations that took place in 2010-2011 and examine how informal structures 
and paternalistic norms of the Russian political system may have helped to resolve 
them.  
 
The SMR’s relations with the Russian state were marked by periods of strong 
cooperation as well as temporary animosity. In this chapter, I will argue that the 
SMR’s engagement with top figures in the government, as well as with civil servants 
engaged in religious affairs was influenced by the two shifts that took place in 
institutional patterns of religious governance and official interpretations of the 
existing religious divisions, particularly between the Russian Orthodox Church and 
Islam. The first shift involved the re-institutionalisation of corporatist approaches to 
state-religion mediation and state efforts to pacify religious divisions by officially 
recognising the Muslim faith as one of Russia’s traditional religions. The second 
change resulted from increasingly negative perceptions of Islam and Muslim 
migrants in Russian society and a partial attempt by the state to diversify its 
engagement with official Muslim organisations. These shifts in corporatist 
arrangements and religious cleavages were also accompanied by more volatile 
changes in informal relations between religious and political figures and the potential 
(or the lack thereof) to form alliances with other institutions, confessions and Muslim 
groups. The scope of these changes will become apparent in a more detailed 
discussion of the SMR’s relations with the government in light of the empirical data. 
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Russia’s corporatist context: past legacies and recent shifts  
 
State-Muslim relations in Russia have been an integral part of Russia’s long-term 
engagement with different religious and ethnic traditions. In this section, I will apply 
the POS-based approach to explain a series of institutional and organisational 
features of state-religion relations which, in the Russian context, can be characterised 
as corporatist. A better understanding of the existing religious divisions, state co-
optation of spiritual leaders, informal rules of state patronage, coupled with the rather 
mixed nature of cooperation and competition between Russia’s major confessions 
provides insights into the institutional context of state engagement with official 
Muslim organisations.  
 
With over ten per cent of Russians being Muslim, Islam has been endorsed as 
Russia’s second official religion. Together with the Russian Orthodox Church 
(ROC), Judaism and Buddhism, it is one of four traditionally-recognised faith 
groups. However, with the growing tensions over Islamic radicalisation and 
increased flow of Muslim migrants from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, 
the Russian state has become preoccupied with bridging the gap between different 
ethnic, religious and cultural groups, as has been exemplified in numerous speeches 
of state officials. For example, in his address to Muslim leaders, President Putin 
(2007) spoke of ‘an absolutely new form of cultural cooperation between different 
peoples and religions [which] constitutes Russia's inner strength as a great and 
important world power’. The long history of Muslim communities living side by side 
with other religious and non-religious groups has resulted in complex patterns of 
interaction, particularly between Islam and the ROC. However, beneath the unifying 
rhetoric of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians, there has been a 
degree of rivalry, not only at the official level, but also in the everyday interaction 
between different communities (Karpov and Lisovskaya 2007, Shlapentokh 2008, 
Shutov 2007, Warhola and Lehning 2007).  
 
Ethnic divisions, and in particular the importance of ethnicity as a strong identity 
marker, have long roots in the Soviet period. Ethnic and cultural dimensions of 
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different peoples and their traditions were promoted, while all religions were 
suppressed in equal measure. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a 
newly acquired freedom of worship, coupled with the lack of financial resources to 
rebuild religious infrastructure resulted in increased competition between different 
established confessions, not only for membership of the faithful, but also for state 
support. Without neglecting the importance of ethnic cleavages I will mainly focus 
on the tensions between the Muslim and Christian faith groups, particularly in 
relation to the corporatist nature of the Russian state. The structure of religious 
cleavages will be conceptualised as a series of opportunities and constraints shaping 
the existing divisions between Muslim minorities and the Christian (at least in 
culture, if not always in faith) majority of the Russian population.  
 
Article 14 of the Russian Constitution states that the ‘Russian Federation is a secular 
state’ and ‘religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal 
before the law.’49 However, in practice, the ROC has often enjoyed a more privileged 
position of not only representing a majority religion, but also being a close partner of 
the Russian state.  While state-Islam relations have been modelled on state relations 
with the ROC, at times the interests of Muslim minorities came second to those of 
the Orthodox Christians (Krasikov 2004, Laruelle 2008). Senior leaders of the 
recognised religious groups take part in inter-religious affairs and meetings with state 
officials designed to promote religious harmony, articulate different religious 
perspectives and demonstrate readiness to provide the government with the spiritual 
backing of their respective congregations. However, in practice, the privileged 
position of the ROC has also created obstacles for the Muslim leaders in securing 
equal treatment for Muslim institutions and communities. Some of these tensions 
will be explored in relation to the mosque shortages in Moscow. 
 
Moreover, the specificities of Russia’s past and present approaches to constructing 
and consolidating the Russian identity have led to a partial blurring of the ways in 
                                                 
49 The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Available at: http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-
02.htm, accessed 20 March 2014. 
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which ethnic and religious divisions were discussed in relation to the changing 
composition of the Muslim communities in non-Muslim areas. It is not, therefore, 
surprising that on the societal level religious and ethnic tensions have contributed to 
anti-Muslim feelings which resulted in the growing salience of religious cleavages.  
 
State-religion relations in Russia have historically developed within a predominantly 
corporatist system of interest mediation. Russia’s mixed legacies of authoritarian and 
more tolerant ways of managing religious diversity from the top have shaped the 
current practices of selective co-optation of senior religious figures (Hunter 2004). 
Although there were different levels of state control over the matters of religion and 
religious expression over the course of Russia’s Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods, state-religion relations were influenced by the establishment of the religious 
or spiritual bureaucracy. While these religious civil servants would have access to the 
government, they would also be responsible to the government.  
 
It goes without saying that state-religion relations were complicated by the 
egalitarian atheism of the Soviet Union and its repressive policies aimed at 
suppressing religion and replacing it with purely cultural and folkloric traditions of 
different ethnic groups.50 However, while the spiritual dimension of religious 
representation was systemically rooted out together with its leaders, the 
organisational structures of the Christian, Jewish and Muslim institutions survived 
and were revived after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The early 1990s were 
marked by the emergence of new religious organisations which were free from state 
control and interference. This newly discovered degree of pluralism was exception to 
the systematic application of corporatism and state intervention into matters of 
religion. While this period witnessed a proliferation of different religious and civil 
society organisations which acted outside of state control, it was short-lived. As will 
be discussed later in the chapter, by 1997 there was already a desire to control 
religious diversity and to regulate the nature of state-religion relations. 
                                                 
50 For a more detailed exploration of state-religion relations in the Soviet Union, please see Anderson 
1994. On the role of Islam in the Soviet state, see Ro’i 2000, Benningsen and Wimbush 1979. 
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Russia’s institutional environment of state-religion relations may not fully conform 
to Schmitter’s definition of the ideal type of corporatism because of the complexities 
of these state-religion relations under different political regimes. However, it 
contains many of its features, particularly considering the ways in which different 
interests of civil society are linked with the state. From the days of Muslim 
communities being officially recognised by Catherine the Great, the Muslim clergy 
(which is something rather oxymoronic considering the lack of hierarchical 
structures in Islam) were incorporated as religious officials into the vertical structures 
of the Russian state and entrusted with representing the interests of Russia’s Muslim 
regions along the Volga River.51 Official engagement between the Russian state and 
Muslim communities was conducted through the institution of the system of Muslim 
Spiritual Boards (DUMs) in its different organisational and regional forms. As will 
be explained later in the thesis, this means that a limited number of state-endorsed 
Muslim organisations is expected to show loyalty to the state in return for particular 
privileges. These formal structures facilitate the work of officially recognised groups, 
but also create competition for state patronage and affect opportunities for 
establishing alliances with other religious groups or political interests.  
 
Russia’s corporatist system is characterised by a high level of state intervention and 
weak civil society institutions. State patronage, vertical approach to resolving 
conflicts and strong reliance on personal connections represent some of the informal 
structures of Russia’s state-religion relations. Centralised structures of government 
support for religious and social institutions, combined with control and close 
monitoring of their activities has become institutionalised under President Putin’s 
administration. While unofficial organisations continue to remain relatively weak, 
paternalistic relations between top government officials and senior representatives of 
different confessions provide a key opportunity to resolve religious issues and 
                                                 
51 The idea of organised institution of clergy is generally rather alien to Islam. Religious authority 
resides with Islamic scholars while the role of imams is not to organise the life of Muslim community 
but rather lead and facilitate prayers. Therefore, there are no ordained clergy with authority over 
Muslim rituals. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the ways in which the functions of imams in the 
Tatar tradition have become associated with responsibilities and hierarchical structures of religious 
governance, more fitting a Christian than an Islamic tradition. 
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overcome some of the prejudices on the local level. As was noted by one 
interviewee, ‘once muftis complained to the President…about how local officials had 
stopped the building process of the mosque and minaret…I saw how following these 
meetings works would resume (Interview 7). 
 
The data highlights a wide-spread perception that centralised forms of governance 
help consolidate the flow of financial resources required to improve the Muslim 
infrastructure which was almost destroyed under the Soviet regime. Although 
attempts to unify centralised Muslim organisations and to build the ‘Islamic vertical’ 
had failed, the state continued to ‘engage[] with the system of centralised Muslim 
organisations… as if it were part of its governance structures… not integrated with 
state political structures by closely following advice from authorities and responding 
to their directives and requirements’ (Interview 14). Some unofficial Muslim 
organisations, which tend to accuse their official counterparts of corruption and 
dependence on the state, are forced to interact with the state to get approval and 
financial backing for their own activities (Interview 3). According to another 
interviewee, ‘a specific feature of the Russian state is that everything is permeated by 
the state’ (Interview 1). 
 
The Russian corporatist environment facilitates access to the government for 
officially endorsed organisations and disadvantages the ones deprived of state 
patronage. This dependence on state patronage implies the growing importance of 
personal connections and good relations between senior Muslim clergy and state 
officials. Clearly, personal connections are crucial to strengthening relations within 
any type of political system. However, within the corporatist context, their presence 
or absence is highly noticeable.  
 
The complex nature of the transitional period of the late 1990s meant that while civil 
society organisations had increased opportunities to develop and advertise their 
activities, efforts to form alliances within the political system itself remained 
restricted. Fish (2001: 22-23) emphasised the limited incentives for civil society 
groups to engage in traditional forms of lobbying political parties or parliamentarians 
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and instead stressed the preferred style of establishing personal connections with 
particular insiders. During Putin’s administration, the work of civil society 
institutions was increasingly constrained by selective backing of organisations based 
on their loyalty to the state – ultimately undermining their autonomy. McIntosh 
Sundstrom and Henry (2006: 316) noted that Russia’s long tradition of ‘monopoly on 
organisational resources ha[d] led to control over many of the institutions and 
funds…commonly associated with civil society development.’  
 
The corporatist nature of the Russian system and weak civil society imply the lack of 
alternative social and political platforms to mobilise support for Muslim 
communities and a gap between official and unofficial Muslim organisations. For 
example, centralised Muslim Spiritual Boards have few opportunities to build 
alliances with civil society institutions. In light of internal divisions and rivalries 
within the Muslim field itself, the over-reliance on the state is, therefore, not 
surprising. Although there are many religious funds and Muslim charities, their work 
is monitored by the state. The lasting legacy of the Soviet authoritarian practices of 
suppressing bottom-up initiatives, coupled with Putin’s desire to consolidate his 
political regime, contributed to a shared belief among civil servants that unofficial 
organisations are simply irrelevant in the Russian political system. As was noted by 
one interviewee: 
 
Nobody is really interested in unofficial organisations…they could 
exist, in great numbers, but nobody would engage with them…it is 
like the parties, which are not registered and do not take part in 
elections – you know, they can be many, but for the Electoral 
Committee they just do not exist – the same here… interests of 
Muslims can only be represented through official organisations 
(Interview 17). 
 
Although there is a degree of cooperation on developing spiritual and moral values 
and formulating the national idea on the state level, the lack of unified structures in 
Islam makes it ‘vulnerable in its engagement with the state and the ROC, which 
prefers to deal with equally hierarchical systems’ (Malashenko 2007: 125). With 
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both religions dependent on state support, interfaith cooperation between Islam and 
the ROC is constrained by competition over religious spaces.  
 
The POS theory suggests that shifts in formal and informal political structures 
influence actors’ behavioural strategies. To analyse the extent to which the SMR’s 
relations with the government conform to these theoretical expectations, I will 
examine the process of engagement within the changing nature of institutional 
opportunities and constraints. While state-religion relations in Russia have largely 
remained corporatist in nature, there were small shifts which occurred in the period 
from 1997 to 2013.  
 
As will be explained in the next section, the first shift marked a move away from a 
more diversified style of state-religion engagement of the 1990s to an increasingly 
corporatist approach which has become fully re-institutionalised under Putin’s 
presidency. After that, there were two smaller fluctuations within the corporatist 
regime, namely a relative pluralisation of state engagement with Muslim 
organisations under the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev (2008-2012) and the gradual 
return to the corporatist norm under the third administration of Putin.  
 
Some important changes have also occurred in the nature of religious cleavages and 
the ways in which they have been perceived and interpreted by senior Muslim 
representatives. The first change was characterised by increasing attempts by the 
state to pacify religious divisions by institutionalising state engagement with 
officially-recognised religions on the turn of the 21st century. The second shift 
involved a reopening of religious cleavages between Muslim communities and the 
rest of the Russian population as a result of the growing securitisation of Islam in 
light of real or perceived threats of Muslim migrants in large cities. As will be 
explained in the chapter, the aforementioned shifts and fluctuations would prove 
significant in influencing the behaviour of the SMR and the nature of its engagement 
with the state. This is particularly important in relation to the ways in which the SMR 
articulated Muslim claims for equal treatment and framed its decisions to cooperate 
with the government or openly criticise its policies.  
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In the next two sections of the chapter, I will elaborate on the shifts in light of the 
empirical findings and consider their influence on the SMR’s engagement with the 
government. Russia’s corporatist framework of state-Muslim relations would suggest 
a strong cooperation between the Council and the government and limited 
engagement between the SMR and civil society organisations. However, the data 
indicates that the nature of the SMR’s relations with the government was more 
nuanced. The following discussion analyses how and under which conditions the 
SMR decided to engage with the Russian state in the period in question. I will 
demonstrate that although the SMR fully cooperated with the government throughout 
the period, there were significant changes in its choice of rhetoric. This is indicative 
of its ambition to challenge the state and lobby the government for greater protection 
of Muslim religious rights, while remaining an institutionalised partner. 
 
 
The SMR’s engagement with the government: ‘traditional religions’  
 
The formation of the SMR in 1996 took place on the cusp of a short-lived period 
characterised by a rather atypical pluralist engagement between the Russian state and 
civil society and a subsequent re-introduction of an increasingly corporatist 
approach.  The change involved a move from relatively non-interventionist policies 
on religious diversity during a liberal phase of the 1990s to the state’s stronger 
cooperation with selected representatives and greater controls over religion in the 
2000s. State efforts to promote religion in the public sphere provided an opportunity 
for strong cooperation between the SMR and the government as the latter aimed to 
pacify some of the previously exposed religious tensions of the early 1990s.   
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Re-institutionalisation of corporatist practices 
 
The short period of political liberalisation under Yeltsin (1991-1999) helped create a 
pluralist framework in which freedom of religion was constitutionally protected from 
the encroachment of the state. In its desire to distance itself from the repressive 
atheism of the Soviet era, the Yeltsin administration had initially adopted a largely 
liberal approach to minority religions and ethnic groups (Marsh 2005, Rousselet 
2000). While the passive nature of state relations with Islam in the 1990s was later 
criticised for being too laissez-faire, a temporary lifting of state control stimulated 
religious revival and proliferation of Muslim organisations, which was beneficial for 
rebuilding the previously destroyed Muslim infrastructure.  
 
However, this was also accompanied by the proliferation of Muslim groups and the 
growing external influence of Islamic organisations from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey, which were ready to provide financial and educational assistance to Russia’s 
Muslims. The government’s concern over the growing flow of foreign funding 
outside its control disadvantaged Muslim parties and prevented them from receiving 
funds from groups engaged in religious activities. By 1997 Muslim political and 
social activism was already significantly limited when the government tried to 
regulate Muslim activities by consolidating them into smaller entities (Hunter 2004: 
47).  
 
Ironically, the Soviet legacy offered a ready-made corporatist template for 
restructuring state relations with Muslim minorities. All that was needed was to 
replace the cultural and ethnic markers of national identity with religious ones and 
identify Russian Muslims as a religious category. In spite of its democratically 
misleading title, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations 
established state control over religious life in 1997. A key consequence of this 
legislation was the institutionalisation of the concept of traditional religions, which 
gave a particular legal advantage to Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism over 
any other religious beliefs. However, the idea of traditional religions and interfaith 
initiatives was a ‘Soviet-inspired religious policy paradigm’ (Fagan 2012: 121). In its 
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institutional dimension, the corporatist nature of state policies towards religion was 
somewhat reminiscent of the Soviet-style secular management of religion which was 
stripped of its repressive excesses. 
 
Mainstreaming faith within the framework of traditional religions constituted a 
gradual transition from a more pluralist style of state-religion engagement to a more 
corporatist engagement with selected religious groups. The concept of traditional 
religions served as an ideological prop. In his critical assessment of the apparent 
discrepancy between the selective concept of traditional religions and the freedom of 
religion guaranteed by Article 14 of the Russian Constitution, Buriyanov (2012) 
commented on the state’s authoritarian tendency to regulate religion and civil 
society. Although the extent to which the proposed model was truly authoritarian is 
debatable, it provided a way to re-institutionalise state-religion relations. 
 
Gvosdev’s concept of ‘managed pluralism’ (2002) helps understand the process of 
transition from selectively applied pluralism to an increasingly corporatist model of 
religious incorporation. While explaining the way in which state-religion relations 
were defined in the Preamble to the Law of 1997 and amended in 2002, his research  
suggested that managed pluralism allowed for  ‘competing and diverse ideologies to 
be filtered and vetted for compatibility with the ethos of society’ (Gvosdev 2002: 
77). However, it was the government that managed the process by providing ‘a menu 
of acceptable “choices” from which the population [was] free to choose’ (Ibid).  
 
‘Managed pluralism’ appears to be largely applicable to the last couple of years of 
the Yeltsin administration and the beginning of Putin’s first presidency (2000-2004). 
After the initial recognition of religious diversity, state engagement with religions 
gradually solidified into a corporatist system of interest representation marked by 
selective co-optation of categorised religions, endorsement of preferred spokesmen 
from each tradition and allocation of state patronage in exchange for loyalty. As a 
result, the institutional approach to engaging with Muslim organisations became 
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more managed and controlled by state officials and civil servants.52 However, official 
recognition of Islam as Russia’s traditional religion with an equal status (at least on 
paper) to other religions, and namely the ROC, has also meant that religious 
divisions (at least on the official level) were somewhat levelled out.  
 
As Muslim religious figures were institutionalised in state-religion relations, they 
gained further opportunities to cooperate with the state, provided both had a shared 
agenda. First, they could use their endorsed status to lobby government officials. 
Improved opportunities of access ensured that while defending Muslim minority 
rights, Muslim representatives could use more conciliatory rhetoric. Although 
Muslim mobilisation ‘never encroached on the political system or its ideological 
base’, Muslim communities could now defend ‘their own corporate interests’ 
(Filatov 2007: 43).  
 
Second, when in favour with the government, the SMR could reposition itself as a 
leading organisation and engage with the government directly. In line with 
terminology used to describe corporatist patterns of interest mediation, the SMR 
aimed to become a ‘peak’ organisation, in other words, the most influential voice of 
Muslim interests before the state. Filatov suggests that ‘a status of traditional religion 
facilitate[d] the establishment of contacts with the government’ (Ibid: 42). Over the 
last ten years, further evidence of incorporation of senior religious figures into the 
system of governance has manifested itself by the tendency of senior Muslim clergy, 
together with other faiths representatives, to sit on various government bodies, 
including the President’s Committee on Religious Affairs, State Duma of the Federal 
Assembly for Public Associations and Religious Organisations and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The SMR tried to make full use of its close relations with senior 
                                                 
52 A further discussion on Russia’s ‘managed pluralism’ can be found in Balzer 2003. In his study, he 
applies the term to Putin’s first administration, emphasising the ‘managed’ element over the ‘pluralist’ 
one, thus highlighting the limits of pluralism in the Russian context. The term ‘corporatism’ is more 
generally applied to the Soviet period, while the developments in the post-Soviet Russia tend to be 
examined from the pluralist (or ‘managed’ pluralist) perspective. However, the nature of relations 
between Putin’s second and third administrations and officially endorsed and co-opted representatives 
not only from the political and business sectors, but also from civil society and religious groups, has 
increasingly resembled more corporatist arrangements, see also Markus 2011, Ryzhkov 2014. 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The SMR’s relations with the Russian state 183 
government figures and contacts in municipal authorities. However, the cost of co-
optation meant that officials could keep Muslim leaders in check.  
 
A case for cooperation  
 
The SMR’s engagement with the Russian government has been based on the idea of 
an informal contract by which the Council demonstrates loyalty to the state and the 
state protects Muslim minority rights. What has traditionally distinguished the 
SMR’s style of engagement with the government from other official Muslim 
organisations, such as the TsDUM or the KTsNSK, is its relatively independent 
political position, with its activities being akin to a social movement organisation 
working within the system rather than being simply a state-endorsed interest group, 
uncritically supporting every policy. Disagreements with the ROC over religious 
spaces and its campaign to ensure that Islam is not treated as a secondary religion 
illustrate its endeavour to secure greater recognition for Muslim communities.  
 
The SMR seeks to protect Islam from the politically-motivated decisions of local 
officials who are often reluctant to offend the interests of the non-Muslim majority in 
matters of Muslim facilities or public display of religious symbols. Within the 
Russian corporatist context, the spheres of influence for traditional confessions rarely 
intersect and there is little battle for Russian hearts and minds. However, the ROC 
often exerts an informal influence on local officials in charge of granting permissions 
for Muslim spaces of worship. The data suggests that there is a general feeling that 
‘the lack of understanding of Islam among some civil servants at the local level, or 
those civil servants who are strongly influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church 
results in problems for Muslim communities’ (Interview 7). 
 
The idea of rights and responsibilities is most clearly developed in the SMR’s Social 
Programme for Russia’s Muslims written in May 2001 (Kanevsky 2003). The 
programme was drawn up to bring together two discourses on civil liberties and 
Islamic principles. It was also a response to the ‘Fundamental Principles of Social 
Concepts of the Orthodox Church’ and its engagement with the state. The Orthodox 
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Church Programme presented church-state relations based on the Byzantine principle 
of symphony – cooperation without interference. This idea would later develop into 
‘separate’, yet ‘harmonised sharing of interests and responsibilities’ between the 
church and the state (NEWSru 2009).  
 
The Muslim Social Programme rests on the Islamic understanding of a contractual 
agreement between the state and its citizens. The state is expected to prevent any 
forms of religious discrimination by protecting ‘freedom of religion, equality of all 
religions before the law and state institutions’ as well granting freedom to ‘engage in 
religious practices and activities, including religious rituals, publication of literature, 
educational and charity work’ (SMR 2001). In return, Muslim organisations are 
expected to fulfil their obligations by recognising ‘the legitimacy of the laws of the 
Russian Federation… demonstrate loyalty to the legally elected state 
authorities…strengthen patriotic feeling…[and] promote religious tolerance’ (Ibid). 
The Programme provided an opportunity for the SMR to work with the state as an 
equal of the ROC. Its acknowledgement of the secular nature of the state and its own 
recognition of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of all religions helped create an 
image of a moderate state partner, in favour of multi-confessional harmony and 
against any extremist interpretations of Islam.  
 
The Soviet legacy of under-developed religious infrastructure combined with the 
competitive nature of predominantly Tatar-based Muslim organisations working 
under rival jurisdictions within the European part of Russia provides very limited 
opportunities for making alliances. Commenting on internal divisions, one 
respondent noted that in the 1990s many organisations were fragmented, leading to 
‘a wave of atomisation and people declaring themselves muftis’ (Interview 2). 
Moreover, many respondents expressed a commonly-held view that the SMR’s 
closeness to official structures made it an unlikely partner to poorly-developed 
unofficial networks of civil society organisations. Unsurprisingly, the SMR’s 
leadership focused on building stronger alliances with similarly official, corporatist 
structures such as the mayor’s office and municipal authorities in Moscow and 
government committees.  
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The SMR’s chairman, Ravil Gainutdin, engaged in cultivating good contacts with the 
Russian government and used every opportunity to lobby the President directly. For 
example, when the Vologda mosque was under threat of demolition in 2000, 
Gainutdin complained directly to Putin, comparing the campaign against the mosque 
to ‘an echo of the militant atheistic campaign of the 1960s’ (Rotar 2001). First, he 
received a reply from the deputy governor Pozdnyakov who remarked that it was 
‘inappropriate to interpret the authorities’ demands for the law to be observed as a 
political imperative and an expression of Islamophobia’ (Ibid). However, by 2002 the 
situation was resolved after a personal meeting between Mufti Gainutdin and 
President Putin. This highlighted the benefits of personal connections and direct 
involvement of high-ranking politicians (Hunter 2004: 70).  
 
This meeting was generally regarded as the starting point of close relations between 
the SMR and Putin’s administration. The same year Putin attended the Moscow 
Cathedral Mosque and the official residence of the SMR next door, indicating that 
the SMR was treated as a favoured Muslim organisation. In 2002-2003, Gainutdin 
was regularly invited to the Kremlin and praised for his work on developing Muslim 
infrastructure and educating young Muslims in patriotism (Makarkin 2005). 
Moreover, the SMR’s efforts to develop a trusting relation with the government were 
unexpectedly facilitated by Talgat Tadjuddin’s emotional response to the US 
invasion of Iraq which temporarily discredited the TsDUM in the eyes of the 
government (Konstantinov, 2003).53 
 
The SMR’s advantage over other official and unofficial Muslim organisations lies in 
its ability to defend Muslim religious rights while remaining an officially acceptable 
partner for the state.  In his book on Islam in Russia, Gainutdin (2004) echoed the 
                                                 
53 In April 2003, Talgat Tadjuddin, made a controversial statement, declaring jihad on the United 
States in response to the American actions in Iraq. Sergei Nikulin, a senior Justice Ministry official 
has acknowledged the moral desire of the leader of the TsDUM to support believers in Iraq, but noted 
that any actions aimed at military assistance to Iraqi insurgency will be considered illegal by the 
Russian state. For more details see Konstantinov’s article in the Novaya Gazeta, 4 April 2003). 
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point expressed earlier by Victor Zorkaltsev (2003) that there should be a social 
partnership between the state and traditional religions because religious organisations 
are ‘one of the most important institutions of civil society.’54 He shared these words 
by reiterating that traditional religions can support the state by representing ‘pivotal, 
supporting structures of civil society’ (Gainutdin 2004:56). While acknowledging 
that Muslims ‘have received a number of opportunities they have never had before’ 
he acknowledged that if used properly, they could become important factors to 
enhance the role of Islam in society (Ibid: 56-57). 
 
The SMR’s cooperation with the Kremlin focused on the mutually-beneficial efforts 
to promote Russia’s spiritual values and develop a legal framework of state 
assistance to Muslim communities, particularly in the areas of youth engagement and 
Islamic education. The rhetorical underpinning of the SMR’s partnership with the 
government was framed through patriotic statements on Russia’s moral and spiritual 
strength derived from its multinational heritage. For example, public speeches by 
government officials were saturated with references to Russia’s spiritual revival and 
the need to consolidate and protect peaceful coexistence of different peoples and 
confessions by engaging with religious leaders (United Russia 2007). The SMR’s 
spokesmen placed an equally high value on their cooperation with the state. In one of 
his interviews, the chairman of the SMR expressed his desire for the Russian state to 
develop relations with Muslim communities on the level of partnership, taking into 
account the interests of religious organisations (Gainutdin 2003).  
 
Mutual efforts to raise awareness among young people of patriotism and spiritual 
values, together with a shared determination to fight social ills, such as drugs and 
alcoholism, provided a strong focus for a wider cooperation with other traditional 
confessions. The practice became institutionalised during Dmitri Medvedev’s 
chairing of the presidential administration’s Council for Co-operation with Religious 
Associations in February 2004 (Fagan 2012: 47). Relations between the ROC and the 
                                                 
54 Victor Zorkaltsev was chairman of the Committee of State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation for Public Associations and Religious Organisations from 1994-2003. 
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SMR may have suffered a series of setbacks on the everyday level of securing 
permits for building new mosques or introducing religious education in schools. 
However, the politicised idea of harnessing the value of religion to achieve Russia’s 
greatness provided a mutually acceptable platform for senior religious leaders to 
engage not only with the state but also with each other. 
 
Even when state-council relations reached a low point (see next section), Ravil 
Gainutdin called on Muslim communities to work together with the government ‘to 
prevent the spiritual decline’ and to encourage young people ‘to believe in 
themselves and in the ability of the state’ (SMR 2011a). He urged young people not 
to forget ‘about Russian patriotism, which seeks to preserve ethnic harmony and 
unity in our multi-religious society’ (Ibid). More importantly, in his address to the 
All-Russian Muslim Forum in March 2011, Gainutdin called for building a ‘close 
and trusting relationship between the Russian confessions’ and to ‘remove grounds 
for mutual resentment and mistrust between the leaders and people of different 
faiths’ in order ‘to save society from the abyss of spiritual impoverishment and 
degradation’ (Gainutdin 2011b). 
 
Another important element of the SMR’s positive engagement with the government 
was strong cooperation between Gainutdin and the Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov 
(1992-2010). Within the centralised system of governance, friendly ties with 
Moscow authorities ensured that many issues were resolved without making special 
appeals to the President. While still in office, Luzhkov supported the SMR in its 
opposition to religious education in schools. According to one respondent, ‘the 
Russian Orthodox Church announced its programme of the Foundations of Orthodox 
Culture, but the government has not yet decided to introduce it in 2009 and Luzhkov 
is against it, too’(Interview 3).  
 
There were agreements reached on plots of land allocated for construction of 
mosques in Moscow. The SMR was successful in converting its close relationship 
with Moscow authorities into tangible improvements of the Moscow Cathedral 
Mosque. The Council continued to invite the Mayor to celebrate Muslim festivals 
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and see for himself the growing need to expand the mosque. Continuous efforts to 
get the Mayor involved in the process of reconstruction paid off when ‘the Moscow 
government … offered the Council an extra 0. 89 hectares of land to build a new 
extension’ (Gizatullin 2009). Considering the land prices at the centre of the city, the 
Council took this gesture ‘as a sign of care and respect for Moscow’s Muslims’ 
(Ibid).  
 
Their informal alliance helped shield the SMR from some of the attacks by other 
Muslim organisations or indeed the ROC. For example, some commentators claimed 
that church officials favoured a more loyal partner such as the TsDUM who would 
accept its leading role and would not engage in missionary work among the Russian 
population’ (Makarkin 2005). While Luzhkov remained in power till 2010, there was 
no need for the SMR’s leadership to take a particularly critical stance on Muslim 
rights in relation to the Church or civil servants if this might have threatened its 
cooperation with the government.  
 
 
Islamic education as the shared agenda 
 
The SMR’s campaign to develop and promote Islamic education illustrates how 
positive changes in state policies on religion, including state support for Islam and 
the increasingly corporatist nature of state-religion relations provided an opportunity 
for the Council’s closer cooperation with the government. In light of constitutional 
restrictions on the state’s direct involvement in religious affairs, it is not surprising 
that the government’s support of Muslim projects was based on their cultural rather 
than religious dimension. The proposals focused on providing support for 
educational, charitable and cultural activities. In line with the law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations, the state could ‘assist and support the 
charitable activities of religious organisations as well as the realisation of socially 
important cultural and educational programs and events’ (Federal Law No, 125-FZ, 
2004, art 18). 
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State support for Muslim efforts to rebuild the previously dismantled system of 
Islamic education (including Muslim schools, universities, and imam training 
centres) did not technically infringe the legal restrictions. Moreover, this fitted within 
the common agenda on fighting extremism. There was a mutual agreement between 
Muslim organisations and state officials that projects aimed at developing training 
programmes for Muslim clergy, establishing Islamic universities and engaging in 
publishing and charity work should be supported with state grants. Malashenko 
(2010a: 82) suggests that the Muslim clergy and the Russian state were united in 
their rejection of non-traditional Islam, which [was] identified with radicalism and 
extremism.’  
 
Within the Russian context such paternalistic forms of state support had two 
implications for state-Islam relations. First, by integrating top Muslim officials 
within the system of grants, it reinforced the corporatist nature of religious 
representation. Second, it demonstrated that the government took an active interest in 
the lives of Muslim communities and consolidated the top-down style of state 
patronage. While the SMR and other Muslim partners have been encouraged to use 
the money to help the state in its fight against Islamic extremism, the government 
could prove its care for Muslim minorities. In his comments on state support for 
Islamic education and state-Muslim relations, a senior Muslim official praised the 
way in which the ‘state machine turned itself towards Muslims and Islamic education 
and concerned itself with helping Muslims to prepare their own elite’ (Interview 7). 
 
The joint efforts of government officials, the SMR, other centralised Muslim 
organisations and Russian scholars of Islam resulted in the establishment of the 
Foundation for support of Islamic culture, scholarship and education (hereafter the 
Foundation) in 2007.55 Young Muslim leaders from the DUM in the Nizhny 
                                                 
55 Earlier in the chapter, I briefly mentioned that during the Yeltsin period, in the climate of increased 
freedom in Russia and its policy of open borders, there were many Islamic organisations, namely from 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia who were keen not only to re-establish connections with Muslims in Russia, 
but also to bring their own interpretations of Islam. A lot of foreign funding was channelled into 
reviving Islamic education and publishing in Russia. In this context, the establishment of Russia’s 
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Novgorod Region (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Nizhegorodskoi Oblasti, 
DUMNO) played a key role in developing Islamic education and acted as a useful 
ally for the SMR.56 The group’s active participation in developing curricula for 
Islamic institutions and its publishing sector found a positive response from the 
authorities interested in monitoring Russian Islam and limiting foreign assistance. 
Damir Mukhetdinov, the head of the DUMNO, praised the creation of the 
Foundation as a step ‘in the right direction in relations between the government… 
communities, and the Spiritual Board of Muslims…in tackling problems in the name 
of Russia’s prosperity and inter-national peace’ (Mukhetdinov 2007). Within the 
Russian corporatist context, where individual efforts of small Muslim organisations 
struggle to secure sufficient funding, such type of collaboration with the SMR proved 
beneficial (Interview 1). 
 
The Foundation’s primary objective was to provide an ‘open, honest forum for 
cooperation between the state and Islamic religious organisations in Russia’, 
guaranteed by ‘active engagement with the President’s Administration, the 
Government and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (Foundation Website).  The 
SMR, together with the TsDUM and the KTsMSK were all registered among its 
official founders. The Foundation engaged in channelling resources to Muslim 
communities, while carefully monitoring where the money went. For example, to 
qualify for funding, communities or organisations had to be officially registered and 
prove they have not been involved in any extremist activities (Interview 3).  
 
 
In the past, state officials were reluctant to admit their actual financial support to 
Muslim religious organisations and tended to emphasise their moral rather than 
financial backing (Grishin 2009). However, in his written address to the delegates at 
                                                                                                                                          
own body which would support Muslim communities and provide funding to individual projects 
which it would be able to monitor has become particularly important. 
56 The Muslim Spiritual Board in Nizhny Novgorod is part of the DUMER, which is under the 
jurisdiction of the SMR. Ravil Gainutdin is chairman of both organisations, the DUMER and the 
SMR.  
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the conference on fighting terrorism, President Dmitri Medvedev (2008) praised the 
‘unifying force of religion’ and emphasised the importance of funding the 
‘missionary work’ of traditional Muslim leaders on the grounds that it helps people 
to ‘separate true faith from attempts to manipulate faith by the self-styled preachers.’  
 
The SMR valued the importance of state funding in educating young Muslims and 
protecting them from radical teachings. Mirroring government rhetoric on the need to 
fight extremism, the Council gained an opportunity to secure further funding to 
develop Muslim infrastructure and support Muslim communities in building new 
mosques, publishing Muslim literature and opening educational establishments. In 
2009, Gainutdin praised the work of the Foundation as a ‘wonderful example of 
cooperation between the state and religious organisations, especially for youth…as 
an opportunity for systematic fighting against extremism by humanitarian means’ 
and a great help to ‘many educational activities based on religious beliefs and 
traditions of our fathers and grandfathers’ (Gainutdin 2009). 
 
Large-scale funding programmes and state patronage of Islam within the officially 
secular Russian state were met with some criticism (Ponkin 2008). Following 
allegations of corruption and money laundering in the beginning of 2010, there was 
an increased emphasis on financial transparency.57 The government continued to 
channel financial resources to the Foundation, even though the SMR’s status as the 
main recipient was challenged by other Muslim organisations, as will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
  
                                                 
57 For the charges of alleged corruption see ROSPRES 23 March 2010 and Islam RF 25 March 2010.  
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The SMR’s strategy of disengagement: securitisation of Islam 
 
State support for Muslim official organisations in exchange for loyalty was not 
surprising, particularly in the light of increasingly corporatist relations, official 
institutionalisation of Islam as Russia’s traditional religion and incorporation of 
Muslim leaders in state-religion relations. What is interesting in the Russian case is a 
period of tensions, during which the Council openly challenged the state about 
Muslim religious rights. These tensions were partly a result of the changed 
configurations of alliances and personal animosities between the SMR’s leadership 
and the Kremlin’s advisors which became more pronounced under a more diversified 
approach to state-religion relations under the Medvedev presidency (2008-2012). A 
brief analysis of the SMR’s disagreements with the government in 2010 indicates 
that the Kremlin’s advisors were happy to engage with SMR as long as it restrained 
from openly criticising the government. More importantly, there was a shift in 
religious cleavages, brought about by the increasingly negative public perception of 
Islam in relation to the dominant role of the ROC. In this section I will examine how 
the intensity of religious divisions, and particularly the way they were presented by 
the SMR’s spokesmen, has become more visible in the public sphere as anti-migrant 
feelings turned increasingly Islamophobic. 
 
Theories of securitisation suggest that behind the refusal to accommodate the needs 
of minority communities lies a collective fear of the majority that their identity is 
under threat from foreign traditions (Buzan and Weaver 1998). Local and municipal 
authorities were often reluctant to approve or promote Muslim activities in Moscow 
districts. For example, in 2010 the local authorities in the Moscow area of 
Tekstilschiki caved in to the pressure of nationalist groups and the general public 
protesting against the plans to build a new mosque for 3,000 Muslims living in the 
area. After a series of petitions and demonstrations, they assured the public that no 
mosque would be built in the vicinity (Yegorova, 2010). 
 
In the previous section, I suggested that religion has become an important marker of 
the Russian identity, following the collapse of the Soviet ideology and religious 
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revival of the 1990s.  Official recognition of Islam and its reintegration as one of 
Russia’s four traditional religions facilitated cooperation between Muslim clergy and 
high-level officials, thus partly pacifying religious divisions. However, towards the 
mid-2000s, the salience of religious cleavages on the societal level increased in light 
of rising levels of Islamophobia. This was partly due to increased migration from 
Central Asia, partly from global security concerns and Russia’s own attempts to deal 
with the spill-over effect of terrorist threats from the North Caucasus.58Attempts to 
build new mosques in large cities, coupled with large numbers of migrants from 
Central Asia, coming to celebrate Muslim festivals and cramming inside and outside 
the four official mosques in the capital exposed and fused together strong anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim feelings. These feelings were fuelled by negative 
publicity of Muslim practices in the media, combined with local officials giving in to 
public fears over Islamic symbols in their predominantly non-Muslim areas. 
 
The previously mentioned Soviet preoccupation with ethnicity, combined with the 
subsequent positive promotion of religion, established a degree of fluidity in public 
perceptions of ethnic and religious identity. In their study on Islamophobia, 
Engelgardt and Krymin (2003) suggested that Russian xenophobic feelings were 
often directed at members of other groups because of their different ethnicity rather 
than religion. Pain suggested that negative attitudes towards Islam were often 
ethnically-determined (Pain 2012). However, according to Verkhovsky (2007), it is 
difficult to separate religious intolerance from ethnic intolerance, because ‘Russian 
society tends to confuse religious and ethnic identity.’ 
 
Moreover, in the aftermath of terrorist bombings in Moscow in 2010 and media 
reports about Muslims ‘flooding’ the area around the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, 
some opinion polls indicated a rise in negative attitudes towards Islam. Between 
2003 and 2006, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) noted a small increase in 
positive attitudes towards Islam (FOM 2006). By 2012, they found that 23% 
                                                 
58 This was exemplified by hostage crises in the Moscow ‘Dubrovka’ theatre in 2002, in Beslan in 
2004 and more recent bombings in Moscow underground in 2010. 
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expressed a negative attitude towards Islam and 39% believed that Islam played a 
negative role in Russia in general (FOM 2012).  
 
A brief analysis of my data gathered in 2008 and 2011 suggests that over a short 
period, anti-Muslim rhetoric has increased. In 2008, some respondents noted that 
anti-Muslim feelings were generally expressed in xenophobic, anti-immigrant terms 
(Interview 1). However, by 2011 more people focused on the rise of Islamophobia, 
not only in Russian society, but also among state officials (Interview 5). Some anti-
Muslim feelings were coloured by pejorative references towards migrants from 
Central Asia, while others revealed a growing fear and dislike of Muslims from the 
North Caucasus, based on real or perceived links to terrorism and crime (Interview 
6).  The selective nature of Islamophobic feelings becomes evident in relation to 
Tatar communities. As one caller noted on Russian radio, these people are ‘our local 
Tatars who we love and respect’, as opposed to people from Central Asia ‘who are 
not welcome here’ (Russian News Service 2010).  
 
Arguably, a rise in general xenophobia contributed to the negative politicisation of 
Islam, and the securitisation of Muslim religious identity. The growing Islamophobia 
highlighted religious divisions and provided Muslim organisations with opportunities 
to mobilise against discrimination on religious grounds. Malashenko (2007: 98) 
highlighted that ‘[r]eligious minorities tend to consolidate on the basis of their 
confession, especially when they feel a real or perceived threat to their rights and 
status.’ In the Russian context, such a threat to Muslim identity was only too 
apparent (Ibid).  
 
In the following section, I will argue that as an institutionalised actor, the SMR 
campaigned to pacify the tensions by articulating the need for more religious spaces 
which could accommodate the growing number of Muslim believers, regardless of 
their ethnic origin. However, exacerbation of these tensions in society and a parallel 
problematisation of the issue by the SMR’s leaders provided the Council with 
rhetorical ammunition to challenge the state and re-position itself as a key defender 
of Muslim minority interests. In line with the POS expectations, the growing 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The SMR’s relations with the Russian state 195 
securitisation of Islam resulted in a change in the SMR’s rhetoric. The Council 
became more critical of the government which, in turn, had a serious impact on its 
relations with state officials. Moreover, it began to use the securitised rhetoric of a 
community under threat to challenge the parallel fears of the majority population. For 
instance, in his address to the All-Russian Muslim Forum in 2011, Gainutdin (2011b) 
argued that a real threat was not the development of Muslim infrastructure: 
 
The first and most significant threat to all citizens of our country, 
including Muslims, is the sharp rise in xenophobia and chauvinism 
in Russian society, particularly a rapid growth of Islamophobia. 
 
 
A case for contention 
 
A series of tensions emerged between the SMR and state officials over the freedom 
of religious worship and equal treatment of Muslim communities. The key issue was 
the extent to which the Russian government and municipal authorities protected 
Muslim minority rights. For the SMR, the authorities’ reluctance to alleviate mosque 
shortages in Moscow provided a clear example of unfair treatment of Muslim 
communities, regardless of whether they were Moscow-born Tatars, ethnic Russians 
from the North Caucasus or migrants from Central Asia. The SMR was not prepared 
to make a distinction between Russia’s ethnic Muslims and new migrants because it 
considers Muslim solidarity above any ethnic and cultural divisions. Within the 
larger space of the former Soviet Union and a long history of ties between former 
Soviet republics and Russia’s previous centralised Muslim organisations, the SMR’s 
present engagement in establishing close relations with Muslim migrants was hardly 
surprising. 
 
Although there are many unofficial places where Muslims can worship, there are 
only four officially-recognised and purpose-built mosques for 2 million Muslims 
living in Moscow. There are similar tensions over mosque shortages in other large 
cities which occur during Muslim festivals, as the Russian media produces some 
inevitably shocking images of many Muslims praying in the streets around the 
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existing mosques. Whereas representatives from the TsDUM took a more 
conciliatory stance and accepted the offer of alternative, temporary venues for 
Muslim celebrations, the SMR used the salience of religious cleavages to place 
pressure on the government and mobilise support for more mosques to be built. The 
SMR raised its expectations of the government, while it became more critical of 
officials advising on state engagement with Muslim organisations. 
 
A turning point in the SMR’s engagement with the government came in 2010, after 
the failed attempts to unify the three main centralised Muslim organisations in 
2009.59 Gainutdin was expected to be the preferred chairman of such an organisation, 
which would have reinforced the SMR’s influence within the Russian ummah. Such 
a development would have considerably changed the existing power configurations 
and alliance structure within the Muslim field. While many commentators attributed 
the failure to unite to internal rivalries and personal animosities between the SMR 
and TsDUM, some of the SMR supporters noted the involvement of particular state 
officials working behind the scenes and interfering in the process. Both reasons were 
summed up by one interview who noted: 
 
there were different conceptions of how unification can be done, 
but there were also those in authorities who did not want this 
greater unity…because there are some forces…which are afraid of 
strong, unified Islam in Russia… if there are many Islamic centres, 
it is easier to manipulate them (Interview 5). 
 
In the corporatist setting, state endorsement of a particular institution depends on the 
latter’s loyalty. Unsurprisingly, Muslim leaders were expected to limit their critical 
comments on the government’s lack of action. Some noted a certain cooling in the 
government’s engagement with the SMR as a result of uncovered or alleged 
corruption among the Council’s top officials (Interview 17). However, others 
suggested that the Kremlin’s advisors did not welcome the SMR’s more proactive 
position on the lack of prayer provisions and accusations of Islamophobia. As a 
                                                 
59 The three centralised Muslim organisations at the time were the SMR, TsDUM and KSNSK. In 
2009, the DUM of Tatarstan was still part of the SMR and RAIS had not been yet created. 
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result, the SMR’s members were temporarily excluded from some of the committees, 
while in the Public Chamber its chairman was replaced by a new Moscow 
representative from the TsDUM, Albir Krganov. This created an impression that the 
SMR had lost its favourable position with the government. As one supporter of the 
SMR remarked: 
 
Because of critical statements of the government, some Muslims 
were taken off the posts…and now many people write badly of the 
Council – but let them write, it is nothing but provocation 
(Interview 6). 
 
The SMR suffered a series of blows as a result of the altered alliance configurations 
in state-Muslim relations in Moscow. The first change involved the dismissal of the 
Mayor Luzhkov in September 2010 and the breakdown of the long-established 
informal relations with municipal authorities. The second change was a shift in the 
Kremlin’s close cooperation with the SMR and a search for different partners. On 
one hand, this might have been a result of internal fighting among officials 
responsible for regulating religious matters under the Medvedev administration. On 
the other hand, a more differentiated approach to religious governance might also 
suggest a small fluctuation in the corporatist nature of state-religion relations at the 
time.  
 
The SMR was unhappy about the ongoing smear campaign against its leaders and 
their efforts to reconstruct the Moscow Cathedral Mosque. Its leadership expressed 
suspicion that the smear campaign had been orchestrated by particular officials 
within the advisory circles to the Kremlin. By 2010 there were bitter exchanges 
between the SMR spokesmen and figures such as Aleksei Grishin who was a key 
advisor on state relations with Muslim organisations and also in charge of funding 
initiatives for Muslim communities. Another key player was Roman Silant’ev who, 
among his other titles and responsibilities, including his work at the ROC, was keen 
to promote the interests of the TsDUM, the SMR’s key competitor and increase its 
influence in Moscow. Moreover, from the SMR’s perspective, he was ready to 
support any other Muslim player willing to undermine the work of the Council. 
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The dismissal of Luzhkov in September 2010 significantly weakened the SMR’s 
position in securing land for religious purposes, rendering some of the previously 
favourable, informal agreements between the Moscow authorities and the SMR 
ineffective. A new administration under the Mayor Sergei Sobyanin had a more 
cautious approach and reversed some of the previous decisions, particularly 
following the conflict over the mosque in Tekstilschiki. Some interviewees 
acknowledged the difficulties of working with the new team of officials engaged in 
policies of mosque construction and expressed hope that with time, a greater 
understanding might be reached (Interview 5; Interview 7).  The appointment of 
Sobyanin constrained the SMR’s abilities to promote Muslim rights and encouraged 
it to be more assertive in voicing its demands. This is in line with Tarrow’s (1998) 
argument that too much coercion by the state may lead to increased contention on the 
part of the social movement organisation. 
 
A second blow to the SMR’s engagement with the government was the creation of 
the Russian Association of Islamic Accord (RAIS) in December 2010. The new 
Muslim organisation united the DUMs of Perm, Stavropol and Mordovia and had 
close links with security services (Interview 16). The same month saw the opening of 
the TsDUM branch in Moscow. The SMR viewed both developments as attempts to 
undermine its authority in Moscow. These moves were interpreted by some of the 
SMR’s leaders as attempts by state officials working on religious affairs to exert 
pressure on the Council and criticise its increasingly militant rhetoric as unpatriotic. 
Moreover, the RAIS and TsDUM’s branch in Moscow were praised, for example by 
Grishin and Silant’ev, for their loyalty, accommodating position on matters of 
mosque shortages and close relations with the ROC. The RAIS engaged in a lengthy 
campaign to discredit the SMR’s controversial work in rebuilding the Moscow 
Cathedral Mosque and called on the new mayor to grant the building permissions to 
the TsDUM instead. It also capitalised on the failed efforts to open a mosque in 
Tekstilchiki and accused the SMR of using the Islamophobic card against the 
authorities (RAIS 2010a). 
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The period of tensions between the SMR and the government occurred during the 
Medvedev administration which was marked by an attempt to introduce some 
elements of political decentralisation and (at least rhetorical) manifestation of greater 
democratisation of the Russian system, including modernisation of its political, 
social and religious institutions (Fagan 2012, Jonson and White 2012). Arguably, the 
Medvedev administration might have been more reminiscent of the ‘managed 
pluralism’ of the first Putin presidency. However, as some of these discourses 
permeated state-Muslim relations, the policy of state-regulated pluralisation and an 
attempt to engage with more civil society players have only intensified internal 
rivalries between the official Muslim organisations seeking state endorsement. In 
theory, an extended invitation to more Muslim voices to engage with the state would 
have been a more suitable mode of engaging with the non-hierarchical nature of 
Islam. However, I will demonstrate in the next section that in light of personal 
rivalries between Muslim leaders and the high benefits of being favoured by the 
state, the more diversified pattern of state-Muslim relations has led to more 
confrontation between the SMR and government advisors.  
 
Moreover, the SMR’s increasingly militant tone offended the officials in charge of 
distributing funds and state patronage. The failure in personal, informal connections 
manifested itself in the growing support and development of alternative Muslim 
voices. Russian scholars and commentators on Islam tend to agree that alternative 
organisations played a part in altering, if only temporarily, the balance of power 
among Muslim organisations. Malashenko (2010b) highlighted that it was an attempt 
to lower the prestige of the SMR, particularly at the sensitive period following ‘the 
resignation of the mayor of Moscow…with whom Gainutdin developed the closest 
relationships.’ Similarly, Silant’ev (2011), arguably the SMR’s strongest opponent, 
was keen to conclude, perhaps rather hastily, that the ‘creation of the RAIS 
precipitated the demise of the SMR.’ In an interview to Islam Ru, he also remarked 
that although state officials were not directly told not to engage with the SMR, they 
talked to alternative organisations, including the TsDUM and the RAIS (Guliayeva 
2011). 
 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The SMR’s relations with the Russian state 200 
 
The war of words 
 
Following the growing salience of ethnic and religious cleavages in the aftermath of 
nationalist demonstrations in Moscow in December 2010, as well as the creation of 
the RAIS earlier in the month, the SMR’s engagement with state officials became 
still more confrontational. Arguably, this was the combined effect of mobilised anti-
Muslim feelings, confrontations with local authorities over prayer spaces and the 
creation of the RAIS. The Council’s previous statements expressing regret over the 
issue of mosque shortages tended to be more sympathetic towards local officials 
whose choices could have been restricted by the wishes of the Christian majority 
(Gainutdin 2000).  In December 2010, there was a clear change in how the SMR 
framed Muslim discrimination and challenged the authorities to respect Muslim 
minority rights as was documented by a series of public exchanges between the 
SMR’s leaders and state officials. 
 
A change of rhetoric became apparent in the SMR’s letter addressed to the new 
Mayor and distributed upwards along the vertical of power to Putin and Medvedev. 
The SMR used a triple discursive frame of collective action by first identifying the 
salient and resonant issue, then apportioning the blame, and finally suggesting what 
needed to be done to get the issue resolved. It emphasised the constitutional rights of 
Muslim communities to have religious spaces for prayer (SMR 2010).  In reference 
to protests in Tekstilschiki, it was careful not to apportion blame to the government 
but rather to the media and ‘individual informal social organizations who urge[d] 
residents to oppose the building of mosques in the capital’ (Ibid). The letter warned 
that such actions would ‘incite religious and ethnic hostility’ hinder the government 
attempts to ensure ‘social order, inter-religious and inter-ethnic harmony’, and be 
‘damaging to church-state relations’ (Ibid). In its calls to resolve the situation it 
reminded the authorities of the exemplary role Moscow was to play in state-religion 
relations in Russia and made a powerful appeal ‘to the leadership of our state and the 
city of Moscow to provide the required amount of land for the construction of 
mosques in Moscow’ (Ibid). 
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Three days later, the SMR’s frustration with the issue was betrayed by the rather 
harsh opinions expressed by its chairman in an interview to Radio Liberty in the 
Tatar language (Radio Azatliq). The importance of the interview was three-fold. 
First, it was a clear statement against civil servants involved in trying to contain the 
SMR by endorsing the RAIS. By calling them ‘pocket muftis’ and ‘marionettes’, it 
accused the RAIS of ‘working within the state together with such Islamophobes as 
Grishin…to crush Islam in Russia’ (Gainutdin 2010). Second, it now blamed the 
government for the failed efforts to unify different Muslim centralised organisations 
earlier in 2009 and called its policies ‘anti-Islamic’ (Ibid). Third, it voiced one of its 
most direct criticisms of the lack of religious provisions for Muslim communities. 
Gainutdin painted a picture of Muslims forced ‘to make public prayers in the street, 
on the tramways, even in the church yard’ during the major Muslim festivals and 
called it an unchecked ‘humiliation of Muslims and infringement of their civil rights’ 
(Ibid). 
 
In response to these comments, the RAIS called for the SMR’s work to be 
suspended. Although its actions may be interpreted as more evidence of internal 
rivalries between Muslim organisations, there is evidence to suggest that some 
officials used the RAIS as a proxy to level criticisms at the SMR and attack its 
legitimacy. The RAIS muftis called Gainutdin’s words ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘ungrateful’ 
and accused the SMR of ‘inciting religious and ethnic hatred’ and ‘working against 
state security’ (RAIS, 2010b). Similar sentiments were later voiced by the Moscow 
office of TsDUM.  One of its spokesmen commented that over the last 15 years of 
working in Moscow, the SMR had not lived up to the expectations of the authorities 
or ordinary Muslims (Krganov 2011).  
 
Although the SMR lost the patronage of the Mayor’s office and was in open 
confrontation with competing Muslim organisations, it continued to take risks and 
challenge the authorities because it was bolstered by direct support offered by a 
younger generation of muftis from Nizhny Novgorod. These were the same group of 
Muslim leaders who had previously contributed to the development of Islamic 
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education and worked closely with the SMR. First, they offered to the SMR their 
extensive publishing resources and Muslim media to promote a positive image of the 
SMR. For example, Mufti Damir Mukhetdinov wrote an article in Medina al-Islam 
defending the SMR’s militant rhetoric and questioning the motivation of its 
opponents (Mukhetdinov 2011). Second, as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
they joined the SMR’s central apparatus in the process of internal restructuring. 
Although some interviewees linked their support for the SMR with personal career 
aspirations, others emphasised the extent to which the Council benefited from such 
an internal alliance. For example in his interview to Islam RF, Umar Idrisov, a close 
supporter of the SMR and the former Chairman of the DUM in Nizhny Novgorod 
(1993-2008), mentioned that Damir Mukhetdinov joined the organisation ‘in the 
midst of the information war waged against the Mufti Ravil Gainutdin personally by 
Grishin’ (Islam RF, 5 March 2012). 
 
The historic legacies of Muslim representatives working within the system and 
strongly relying on authorities to protect Muslim minorities, coupled with the 
restrictive nature of the Russian corporatist, authoritarian state, ensured that even in 
its most critical statements the SMR was careful not to openly criticise the first 
figures of the government. The SMR continued to express its discontent at the 
existing provisions for Muslim communities, but it focused its attack on state 
advisors and middle level officials directly involved in issuing permits for land or 
distributing funds for Muslim projects. Moreover, the SMR’s spokesmen were keen 
to emphasise that even at the most challenging stages of their engagement with the 
government and during ‘personal attacks on the mufti from competing 
organisations’, Ravil Gainutdin was given a prominent seat at the Congress of  the 
ruling party United Russia, which showed that ‘he [was] still getting the 
government’s support’ (Interview 6). 
 
Therefore, a short period of tensions revealed a breakdown in the SMR’s 
communication with government advisors. As a result, according to one interviewee, 
tolerance towards the SMR’s rhetoric in defending Muslim rights was reduced as 
‘authorities [did] not forgive as much as they used to because they got fed up’ 
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(Interview 17).  The same official suggested that the SMR’s ‘words and stories 
abroad’ that ‘Muslim rights in Russia [were] not protected and discriminated 
against…harmed the authorities’ (Ibid) As a result, ‘the state started to support more 
state-friendly organisations’ (Ibid). Arguably, this is what the SMR found 
particularly offensive as it perceived such actions a direct manipulation of Muslim 
leaders and direct interference into the lives of Muslim communities. 
 
 
The SMR and the Russian state: a case for re-engagement 
 
The paternalistic nature of Russia’s corporatist approach provides an informal 
mechanism for resolving tensions. Within the Russian vertical context of state-
Muslim relations, there is a shared agreement that disputes with officials can be 
successfully resolved by eventually by-passing middle-level officials and addressing 
the Kremlin directly. Initiated by Putin and continued by Medvedev, official 
meetings have become a regular feature of Russia’s corporatist style of state-religion 
relations. They provide a real opportunity for heads of traditional religions to voice 
their concerns and get assurances that issues will get resolved by cascading 
instructions to the right level of the power vertical. One respondent expressed 
concern that ‘you have to complain to Putin, the Tsar, but that’s how things work in 
Russia’ (Interview 7). 
 
The informal mechanism of resolving tensions from the top proved useful for the 
SMR in rebuilding its relations with the Kremlin after bitter exchanges with officials. 
A key opportunity presented itself in 2012, just before the Duma election and 
guaranteed return of Putin as President. The timing was pertinent as Putin wanted 
electoral support from traditional confessions. He was ready to offer a more sensitive 
and accommodating approach to state-religion relations that could pacify some of the 
recent disputes. The official meeting between Russia’s religious leaders and Vladimir 
Putin was initiated by ROC Patriarch Kirill, with the aim of giving support to Putin’s 
presidential campaign in return for assurances that state patronage and support of 
traditional religions would continue. Within the overall corporatist framework of 
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such meetings, it came as no surprise that senior representatives from different 
Christian confessions, Buddhism, Judaism and Islam openly supported Putin’s 
candidature in the coming elections, particularly in light of the public protests in the 
aftermath of the Duma elections in December 2011. 
 
In his address to religious leaders, Putin articulated a need to reformulate the 
definition of the secular nature of the state. By distancing himself from the Soviet 
era, when the separation of the Church from the state meant that ‘the rights of the 
Church and traditional religions were infringed’, he argued for a different 
understanding of Russia’s secularism, suggesting that ‘the nature of relations 
between the state and religious organisations…should be one of partnership, mutual 
help and support’ (Putin 2012). This meant that traditional religions would continue 
to ‘play a large positive role in spiritual revival of the county’ and the state would 
compensate religious organisations for previously confiscated buildings and forward 
the required funds, with 3.5 billion roubles projected for the period 2012-2014 (Ibid). 
 
The idea of financial support to religious organisations has been firmly 
institutionalised in the official discourse of state-religion relations, seen as an 
achievement of Putin’s administration over the turmoil of the 1990s. Following the 
protocol and similar rhetoric from other religious leaders, the chairman of the SMR 
praised Putin’s role in achieving inter-confessional harmony and unity and placed 
special emphasis on his contribution to ‘safeguarding and strengthening the spiritual 
unity of Muslims’ (Gainutdin 2012a). A key point, however, that distinguished 
Gainutdin’s speech from other religious leaders was that he voiced criticism of what 
the SMR saw as artificially created centres of Muslim influence (Ibid). Hinting at the 
failed attempts at unification, he expressed a wish for Muslims ‘to be united, to be 
together with the leadership of the state and…contribute to strengthening the unity 
and integrity of our country’ (Ibid). Finally he made a direct link between mandating 
Putin to contribute to the spiritual unity of the Russian nation, and ‘not to fragment 
Russia along regional, national, religious lines’ (Ibid). 
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In his response, Putin (2012) promised that the government ‘would not interfere in 
the affairs of religious organisations’ either by pushing them to fragment or forcing 
them to consolidate. He, therefore, provided verbal assurances that his administration 
and civil servants in charge of religious policies would steer clear of the previous 
attempts to restructure the existing field of official Muslim organisations. Neither 
would they introduce any new players to keep the existing institutions in check. 
Some respondents suggested this may have signalled the government’s fatigue with 
managing the highly contested Muslim environment (Interview 9).  
 
Whatever the underlying motivation, certain figures within the SMR saw this as a 
positive development and used it as a sign that the existing tensions were resolved.  
Commenting on Putin’s words, Damir Mukhetdinov reiterated the SMR’s readiness 
to endorse Putin and remarked that he was ‘extremely pleased with the position of 
Prime Minister (and presidential candidate) on the secular nature of the state, running 
in full compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation’ (DUMER 
2012a). He also made a strong statement against officials, who ‘in recent years have 
demonstrated a completely different understanding of public policy’ and thought 
they could ‘play with Muslim organisations as if they were toys’ that they thought 
they could ‘divide and crush them the way they liked’ (Ibid).  
 
He developed this idea a year later in less emotional terms by arguing that some 
officials were mistaken in thinking that muftis must be loyal to authorities, and if not 
they could simply give their backing to a new parallel structure (Mukhetdinov 
2012a). However, speaking against political manipulation of the Muslim space, he 
was careful to attribute such actions not to the malicious nature of some officials, but 
rather to the ‘general failure of some approaches in relations with the Muslim 
community’ (Ibid).  
 
Throughout the period of tensions, the Kremlin valued the Council’s contribution to 
fighting extremism and dealing with problems of immigration. The government was 
also aware of the SMR’s authority and high esteem among Muslim communities in 
Central Asia and the CIS, as well as its extensive network of contacts in the Middle 
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East and the Muslim World. By 2012, there was clear evidence that the SMR had 
regained some of its lost prestige with the authorities, which was even noted by its 
most radical opponents (Silant’ev 2013).  
 
A series of measures were taken from both sides to rebuild the partnership. In an 
attempt to clear themselves from some of the alleged charges of corruption and 
mismanagement of funds, the SMR replaced its representatives in the Foundation 
and the Moscow Islamic University.60 Among the Kremlin’s advisors, Aleksei 
Grishin, who had been particularly critical of the SMR, was replaced by Ilya 
Barinov. In his capacity as Head of the Department for Cooperation with Religious 
Organisations, Barinov (2012) stated his readiness to build a constructive partnership 
with Gainutdin and reassured the SMR that there would be sufficient funds to 
support their activities. In particular, he emphasised that the question of funding 
would not be a ‘matter of taste’ but would be allocated according to the particular 
usefulness of the projects (Ibid).  
 
In 2012, the SMR’s representatives were happy to confirm that out of 1,683 grants 
distributed by the Foundation to Muslim organisations, 308 were given to the Russia 
Council of Muftis (DUMER 2012b). From their perspective, this was an indication 
that they had recovered a central position in state-Islam relations. However, the 
question of mosque shortages remained unresolved as Moscow authorities decided 
that the existing number of mosques was sufficient (Maltsev 2013). In spite of this 
deadlock, the SMR believed that it had increased its opportunities to lobby the 
government directly. In response to the Mayor’s reluctance to build new mosques, a 
representative from the SMR commented that they would continue to defend Muslim 
religious and civil rights and, if necessary, would ask President Putin to intervene on 
their behalf (Ibid). 
 
 
                                                 
60 Damir Khairetdinov became a new rector of the Moscow Islamic University and Ildar Nurimanov 
became the SMR’s new representative in the Foundation’s official committees. 
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Conclusion 
 
Within the largely corporatist context of state-religion relations, the SMR’s 
interaction with the Russian government and state officials was generally based on 
close cooperation. Moreover, it was marked by state support for Muslim official 
organisations on one hand and their increasing co-optation and expectations of 
loyalty on the other. Such forms of engagement had a long historical tradition, 
interrupted by a short pluralist interlude during the Yeltsin administration. However, 
by 2002 state co-optation of the SMR and its temporary endorsement as a peak 
organisation appear to support the POS expectations that formal structures play an 
important role in shaping actors’ behaviour.  
 
In light of theoretical expectations, the data indicates that the positive promotion of 
traditional religions has provided the SMR with an easier access to the government 
and religious committees and facilitated its work on promoting Islamic education. 
Endorsed by the state, the SMR had a stronger basis to challenge the privileged 
position of the ROC and the ineffectiveness of particular local officials rather than 
general state policies. Furthermore, strong alliances with Yuri Luzhkov’s office 
provided some temporary assurances that the shortages of religious spaces might be 
resolved. 
 
State policies towards promoting religion may have increased opportunities for 
Muslim organisations to mobilise support for Muslim rights. Nonetheless, some of 
the strategies proved difficult to implement in light of the newly-exposed religious 
cleavages. Within a very short time, relations between the SMR and state officials 
soured, particularly over the issue of religious spaces and Muslim visibility in large 
cities. During a brief phase of increased pluralisation of Muslim organisations under 
the seemingly more democratic interlude of Medvedev’s administration, a series of 
tensions emerged between the SMR and state officials which culminated in open 
animosity by the end of 2010. They were partly due to activities and involvement of 
other Muslim organisations and individual advisors to the Kremlin who did not 
approve of the SMR’s privileged position. However, their institutional nature can be 
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better explained by the securitisation of religious cleavages. Negative attitudes to 
Islam increased in light of Moscow’s terrorist acts, coupled with the increasingly 
Islamophobic nature of xenophobic feelings towards migrants from Central Asia and 
ethnic Muslims from the North Caucasus. The growing salience of religious 
cleavages created friction with the Kremlin, as the Council’s increasingly critical 
rhetoric was perceived as a sign of its ingratitude and lack of patriotism.  
 
Good personal relations and the presence of friendly allies should not be neglected 
either. The Council’s mobilising tone may have been bolstered by its internal alliance 
with the DUM from Nizhny Novgorod. However, the dismissal of Moscow’s Mayor 
also revealed its isolation and the extent to which the presence or absence of allies 
could constrain its activities. Within the highly competitive field of Muslim 
organisations, the SMR’s rivals, namely the TsDUM and the RAIS, tried to benefit 
from the situation. This was indicative not so much of alliances, but rather rivalries 
and divisions which proved to be vital in shaping the balance of power within state-
Muslim relations.  
 
Finally, the subsequent re-engagement with the government and normalisation of 
relations illustrated the benefits of internal mechanisms of paternalism and the inter-
dependence of official Muslim organisations and the Kremlin, not only on the 
matters of common ideology and rhetoric, but also electoral support and influence. 
The highly centralised, ‘manual’ (to use the Russian analogy of the driving mode) 
regime of direct engagement between the President and religious leaders reveals the 
authoritarian nature of state-religion relations in Russia. However, paradoxically, it 
equips the vertically structured corporatist system of interest mediation with a rather 
unexpected degree of flexibility. The SMR’s re-engagement with the state 
demonstrated that middle-level barriers and prejudices of some officials could be 
overcome, provided top religious leaders knew how to work the system. The SMR’s 
ability to challenge the state, while remaining its loyal partner, has provided it with 
key opportunities to defend Muslim rights. However, its failure to secure support of 
municipal and local officials has continuously frustrated its efforts and constrained 
its work. 
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The SMR’s close engagement with the state may have helped secure concessions 
from the state and promote Muslim minority interests in Russia at the official level. 
However, the Council’s inevitably bureaucratic behaviour and the lack of close 
connections with Russian Muslims meant that its engagement with Muslim 
communities was not without its problems. In the next chapter, I will examine the 
ways in which the SMR tried to improve its legitimacy among Muslims in Russia. As 
an intermediary institution, the council’s effectiveness in protecting Muslim minority 
interests depends not only on its ability to gain access to the state, but also on the 
extent to which it can gain respect and support from those whose interests it claims to 
represent. 
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Chapter 6 





In the previous chapter, I discussed the ways in which the SMR structured its 
relations with the Russian state under the two different scenarios of cooperation and 
confrontation. It was argued that in the corporatist context, paternalistic mechanisms 
of interdependence between senior Muslim leaders and the Kremlin led to a 
subsequent normalisation of close relations. In this chapter, I will examine the 
Council’s engagement with Muslim communities and the ways in which it sought to 
improve its legitimacy in light of the changing expectations and competition from 
other Muslim organisations. 
 
Before analysing the ways in which the SMR sought to gain support, I will briefly 
present the changing context of Muslim communities in Russia and discuss the ways 
in which ethnic, religious and generational differences within the Russian ummah 
have created a compound set of challenges for the SMR. I will then focus on the 
Council’s discursive strategies and practical initiatives aimed at healing some of 
these intra-communal tensions and improving its own credibility as a representative 
institution – inclusive of different interests and mindful of creating a collective 
Muslim identity. 
 
Organisational theories suggest that as interest groups age they dedicate more effort 
to improving their organisational maintenance. Moreover, their internal strategies 
unfold in line with the received norms and expectations of their external context. In 
the next section, I will examine how the SMR’s strategies to gain support from 
Russian Muslims were affected by the corporatist setting of interest mediation, 
particularly by its centralised forms of administration and emphasis on technocratic, 
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rather than democratic legitimacy. I will examine this linkage in relation to a series 
of communicated and implemented initiatives and the Council’s strategies to make 
its organisational more efficient and inclusive.  
 
Russia’s enduring legacy of representing Muslim interests though the system of 
DUMs resulted in historically institutionalised patterns of resolving Muslim issues 
within the existing constraints of these administrative structures. In the final part of 
the chapter, I will evaluate the nature and scope of SMR’s reforms by drawing on 
historical institutionalist approaches which highlight the importance of entrenched 
interests and help explain the gradual nature of institutional change.  
 
Over the last two decades the nature of Muslim minorities in Russia, particularly in 
large urban centres, has undergone a series of transformations in relation to its ethnic, 
generational and religious composition. In this chapter I suggest that the SMR’s 
institutional proximity to the state and detachment from Muslim communities have 
made it difficult for the Council to respond to these changes. Similarly to the MCB, 
the Council sought to reform its organisational structure to legitimise itself in the 
eyes of Russian Muslims. However, these efforts were constrained by past patterns 
of Muslim representation and the present corporatist character of state-Islam 
relations in Russia.  
 
 
The polarisation of Muslim interests in Russia 
 
Islam in Russia represents a complex religious, cultural and ethnic mosaic with 
individual regional differences and traditional forms of Muslim administration.61 
Muslim minorities settled in the Russian territory have been affected by different 
historical legacies of state integration. These different collective memories ranged 
from relatively peaceful and now distant assimilation policies towards Tatar and 
                                                 
61 For a regional comparison see Pilkington and Yemelianova 2003. On Tatarstan: Nabiev, Ishakov 
and Khabutdinov 2002. On the North Caucasus: Bobrovnikov 2002, Zelkina 2000. 
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Bashkir groups to more militant campaigns in the North Caucasus, both past and 
present.62 The older generations had also been exposed to the ideological melting pot 
of the Soviet period and its principle of ‘brotherly peoples’, regardless of their ethnic 
origin. The younger generation was raised with a more pronounced sense of ethnic 
and religious identity on one hand, and a more global transnational outlook on Islam 
on the other. 
 
A series of Russian and Western studies provide detailed accounts of Muslim 
diversity in Russia (Dannreuther and March 2010, Hunter 2004, Pilkington and 
Yemelianova 2003). For example, Malashenko (2013) commented that Muslim 
composition in many Russian regions has changed which means that ‘the Muslim 
space in Russia is continuously expanding.’ As was mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, Muslim minorities living in Russia represent a complex mix of different 
ethnic and religious groups. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the process of 
Islamic revival, traditional forms of Muslim representation through the existing 
centralised institution of the DUMs was challenged by the need to develop a more 
differentiated engagement with a variety of Muslim groups. The interview data 
supports the claim that ethnic, religious and generational differences are reflected in 
the complexity of the Russian ummah. Moreover, it suggests that over the last five 
years, some of the internal cleavages have become more pronounced, which has 
resulted in a greater polarisation of Muslim interests.  
 
Internal diversity, accompanied by increased intra-communal tensions, contributed to 
the changing attitudes towards Muslim leaders, particularly toward representatives 
from the DUMs. Some emphasised that such centralised organisations as the SMR 
failed to provide an equal representation to different ethnic and religious groups. 
Others commented that the actual ways in which Muslim official organisations 
operate were outdated and did not reflect the current concerns of Russian Muslims. A 
brief analysis of such comments on ethnic, religious and generational differences 
                                                 
62 On the war in Chechnya, and the conflict in the North Caucasus, see Souleimanov 2005 and 
Sagramoso 2007. 
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reveals the nature of criticisms directed at the SMR and its style of leadership. It 
helps understand why the SMR’s authority has become challenged by other 
organisations, while many ordinary Muslims continued to express a degree of 
indifference towards it. 
 
 
Greater polarisation: changes in ethnic, generational and religious demands  
 
The first and the most problematic factor has been the growing internal polarisation 
of Russian Muslims based on their ethnic identity. The SMR is essentially a Tatar-
based organisation which claims to speak on behalf of all Russian Muslims. Before 
the influx of Muslim migrants from Central Asia and increased internal Muslim 
migration from the North Caucasus, the Council was mainly in charge of providing 
representation and managing the religious demands of ethnic Tatar and Bashkir 
communities. They made up the majority of Muslims living within the SMR’s 
geographical jurisdiction, i.e. mainly the European part of the Russian Federation.63 
However, in light of economic and social pressures, migrants from Central Asia have 
also settled in large cities and required access to religious spaces. The changed 
composition put extra pressure on the SMR, particularly considering high levels of 
religiosity among Muslims from the Central Asia and the North Caucasus. For 
example, one senior Muslim leader commented that: 
 
60-80% migrants are practising Muslims from Central Asia…it is a 
serious problem for Russia …for the next ten years the issue will be 
how to adapt these immigrants’ (Interview 5). 
 
In spite of the overall rhetoric of Muslim solidarity, many respondents highlighted 
the growing tensions between different ethnic groups living in mixed areas, namely 
between the Tatar communities and the new arrivals from the North Caucasus and 
                                                 
63 The SMR also included Muslim communities which were consolidated under the jurisdiction of the 
DUM of Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals. However, over the last couple of years, Tatarstan muftis were 
reluctant to recognise the SMR’s authority in light of personal relations, power struggles and 
accusations of corruption. 
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Central Asia. Some acknowledged successful stories of peaceful coexistence of 
different Muslim communities in the Memorial Mosque, under the leadership of 
Shamil Alyautdinov (an imam of Tatari origin). Others mentioned intra-communal 
tensions between Tatar imams and the changing nature of mosque congregation, 
mainly referring to new Chechen members. One respondent explained: 
 
New Muslim minorities who come and see that they are no longer 
minorities and are equal to Tatars…. start to behave differently, 
have different demands, require new spaces for worship and so we 
have confrontations – we are not against you, but this is a Tatar 
mosque, it has been built by Tatars (Interview 7). 
 
Some interviewees expressed concern that if another ethnic community was to 
become a majority in the mosque, there was a possibility that they may take over the 
mosque and drive Tatar members out. In the words of one interviewee, ‘if there are 
no Tatars, then the Caucasians will come… and if this happens…there is a risk they 
will leave from the jurisdiction of the Council [the SMR]’ (Interview 6). He went on 
to provide an example of such an alleged takeover in a Yaroslavl mosque where a 
Chechen imam left the jurisdiction of the DUM (Ibid). 
 
Moreover, ethnic tensions also happen over religious practices and the language of 
the sermon. Whereas the majority of Tatar imams (particularly of older generation) 
prefer to speak Tatar, Muslims from the North Caucasus are often unable to 
understand their sermons. The same respondent phrased the issue in the following 
way:  
 
Chechens come, they don’t like the ways things are done in 
originally Tatar mosques…so they bring their own traditions and 
customs…before there was an old generation of Tatars who 
maintained order and were more strict, now they cannot do that 
anymore (Interview 6). 
 
While some Muslims from the North Caucasus moved from the south to the more 
central areas, there are still few Muslim organisations representing their interests in 
large cities. Although there are some diasporic groups, the KTsMSK does not have 
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any jurisdiction over the Muslims outside its regional jurisdiction of the North 
Caucasus. One respondent remarked that ‘people from the Caucasus feel that their 
rights are not being respected... [or]…their voices heard’ (Interview 19).  
 
There are also further tensions between some members of the Tatar community and 
migrants from Central Asia in relations to the negative perception of Islam in 
Russian society. With a high percentage of Muslims who attend religious festivals 
being from Central Asia, some Muslims have expressed concern that such high 
numbers near the mosques have tarnished the reputation of the Russian ummah as a 
whole. One interviewee regretted that the image of Islam has suffered from the 
arrival of migrants as there was ‘an impression that Muslims are all terrorists, market 
traders and are all from Central Asia’ (Interview 1) This was different from how the 
Tatar community was perceived by the non-Muslim majority: accepted on the 
grounds of shared culture and historic tradition. 
 
The second factor creating a serious obstacle in representing Muslim interests is the 
widening generational gap between old and young Muslims. The already-mentioned 
gap in understanding between the old generation of imams and some young Muslims 
from other regions is part of a bigger picture of internal generational cleavages and 
different demands on Muslim clergy. The Soviet period of religious persecution and 
disengagement from religion resulted in a missing generation of Muslim leaders who 
would have been now in their 40s or 50s (Interview 7).  Moreover there is a gap 
between the older and younger generations because of a rather official, bureaucratic 
language used by the senior imams and their lack of educational expertise. For many 
young Muslims who had a chance to study abroad, the old ways seem outdated: 
 
Today we see that 90% of Muslims are young people who don’t 
accept the old leaders…their understanding of the world is 
different, especially if the old do not have enough knowledge about 
Islam (Ibid). 
 
The generational conflict is also about the importance of tradition in relation to the 
global nature of Islam. In this respect, there is little difference between the changing 
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nature of the Russian ummah and its British or European counterparts. In the words 
of one interviewee ‘for older generations it is about their popular traditions, but the 
younger generation has a global outlook’ (Interview 1). 
 
While some young Muslims feel their interests are not represented through the 
official organisations, they begin to organise themselves. With the threat of such 
informal groups becoming radicalised as their activities fall below the official radar, 
there is a growing feeling among the Muslim clergy that they need to include these 
groups. Although there are officially organised large-scale forums for young 
Muslims, the fact that they are sponsored and therefore monitored by official 
organisations does not always inspire trust among ordinary Muslims.  
 
The third factor which is closely identified with both ethnic and generational 
cleavages is a growing divergence of religious expectations. Commenting on the 
wider appeal of more radical Islamist movements, Malashenko (2013) remarked in a 
rather gloomy fashion that:  
 
The traditionalists are gradually losing their popularity among 
Muslim youths in Russia. They have few charismatic and 
professionally educated clergymen and have been tarnished by 
collaboration with the secular authorities, to whom they remain 
loyal.    
 
Besides the religious diversity of the different schools of Islam and the state desire to 
support ‘traditional’ and ‘moderate’ forms Islam against the threat of Islamic 
radicalisation, some studies indicated a growing religiosity among Russian Muslims. 
The latest figures based on the ethnic and regional markers of religion showed little 
change in the number of Muslims (Census 2010).64 However, the aforementioned 
study by the ‘Levada-Center’ (2012) suggested that between 2009 and 2012, the 
number of people who indicated their adherence to Islam increased from 4% to 7%. 
Moreover, while commenting on the changed composition of Muslim communities 
                                                 
64 There was, however, a small reduction in the Bashkir population (Census 2010). 
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in large cities, Malashenko (2013) noted that Muslims became more religiously 
observant.  
 
However, increased religious observance does not necessarily imply respect for 
official Muslim organisations, such as the DUMs, because of their bureaucratic 
qualities, close identification with the state and the lack of religious expertise. In the 
final part of the chapter I will return to the question of spiritual authority to explain 
why more progressive Russian Muslims may have viewed the SMR as an outdated 
and co-opted relic of the top-down approach of Muslim integration. 
 
 
Collective identity representation: questioning the SMR’s legitimacy  
 
Internal divisions and diverging expectations have hindered the effort to provide 
collective representation of Muslim interests and put extra pressure on official 
spokesmen to cater for everybody’s needs. While this was an inevitable development 
of the changing Muslim environment, the proliferation of different interests and the 
polarisation of opinions provided a fertile ground for intra-communal rivalries and 
personal attacks on the SMR’s leadership by other centralised organisations. 
Increasingly, the SMR was criticised for its inability to respond to the challenges 
facing Muslim communities, particularly on the issues of mosque shortages or 
radicalisation. Some of these issues were exploited by other organisations within the 
context of state-Muslim relations, as they tried to use every opportunity to challenge 
the SMR’s reputation in the eyes of the government (see previous chapter).  
 
However, some comments were also made in relation to the SMR’s inability to 
provide leadership for Muslim communities and represent their interests. For 
example as was noted by a one interviewee: 
   
Today we have some questions for the SMR, because when they 
say they claim to speak on behalf of all muftis of Russia, they are 
misleading Muslims in Russia and abroad because this is not 
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so…around 40 muftis are not part of SMR and have never given 
them any right to speak in their name (Interview 20). 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the SMR’s authority was being undermined by 
the increasingly critical comments from the two other official organisations, the 
TsDUM and the RAIS. The TsDUM has been the Council’s traditional rival from the 
early days of inter-communal leadership disputes of the 1990s. The RAIS was 
formed in 2010, allegedly with the intention of offsetting the existing balance of 
power among Muslim leaders in Moscow (see Chapter 5).65 Determined to increase 
their influence in the capital, the two organisations challenged the Council’s actions 
in relation to the proposed plan to extend the Moscow Cathedral Mosque and tried to 
rally Tatar Muslims against the SMR’s plans to demolish the old building of the 
mosque.66 Whereas conflicts over mosques and their jurisdiction were nothing new, 
the unfolding campaign illustrated the extent to which intra-communal divisions 
could be galvanised and exploited in an attempt to discredit a particular organisation.  
 
Together with its supporters, the TsDUM’s leadership issued a joint statement of 
condemnation against the SMR’s plans to demolish the old mosque and build a new 
one in its place. The statement opened with the words that ‘over the last few years 
the chairman of the DUMER, has plunged the Russian Muslim ummah into different 
kinds of political and religious turmoil’ (Interfax-Religion 2011).67 Whereas such 
rhetoric was not new, a more serious and divisive implication was that the SMR’s 
leader were ‘headed in the direction of de-tatarisation of Moscow Islam’ (Ibid). 
Referring to the need to reconstruct the mosque to accommodate the growing number 
                                                 
65 RAIS was instrumental in challenging the SMR’s position in Moscow, particularly in 2010-2011. 
However, its role in state-Muslim relations has decreased significantly by 2013, following internal 
struggles and organisational fragmentation within its own institution. 
66 On the arguments against the demolition of the old mosque see a series of articles and publications 
by the TsDUM, for example in Iman (a monthly newspaper published by the Regional Muftiyat of 
Penza (RDUM Penza Region) affiliated to the TsDUM, October 2011, pp. 11-18 and p.25. 
Conversely, for the SMR’s arguments, see articles published in the autumn 2011 in Islam RF, for 
example, Khairetdinov, 7 September 2011. 
67 This was a charge levelled against Ravil Gainutdin who was the chairman of Muslim Spiritual 
Board of the European part of Russia (DUMER) and the SMR. The DUMER remains the most 
influential organisation within the SMR. 
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of Muslims from Central Asia, the statement implied that the SMR spoke on behalf 
of foreign Muslims at the expense of the local Tatar community.  
 
The SMR struggled to project a positive image in light of the growing demands for 
more inclusive and differentiated representation, coupled with internal attacks on its 
reputation. As more young Muslims began to question the old ways of Muslim 
representation riddled with personal rivalries of the ageing generation of leaders, it 
was only a question of time before similar criticisms would be directed at the SMR. 
A product of the same bureaucratic system of representation, the council also faced 
disapproval from more progressive-thinking Muslims in search of bottom-up forms 
of Muslim mobilisation (Interview 1).  
 
However, democratic principles of community engagement were difficult to 
introduce in the Russian corporatist context which was strongly associated with 
vertical forms of interest mediation. As one commentator remarked, ‘any normal 
religious organisation is bureaucratic, because they don’t exist in a vacuum and have 
to follow the same laws… and following of the laws requires bureaucracy’ 
(Interview 18). Although in comparison to other religious figures, Gainutdin was 
ahead in some online opinion polls, the overall perception was that the Council was 





                                                 
68 In 2009, according to an opinion poll published by Islam Info (http://www.info-
islam.ru//publ/statji/rejting_musulmanskikh_liderov_rossii_2009/5-1-0-11270), Ravil Gainutdin’s 
enjoyed 19.2 % of support, while Talgat Tadjuddin of the TsDUM had 8.3 %, Ismail Berdiev, Head of 
the KTsMSK had 2.4%. Similarly, Islam News, 30 December 2011 (http://www.islamnews.ru/voting-
161.html) asked which leader had the most impact on the Russian ummah in 2011 and found that 
Gainutdin had 12.8%, Tadjuddin – 4%, while younger leaders such as the imam of the Memorial 
Mosque, Shamil Alyautdinov enjoyed the support of 12.2% and Damir Mukhetdinov, Deputy 
Chairman of  DUMER – 14.6%. Although the validity of the sample of both surveys is rather limited, 
they give an indication of the SMR leaders enjoying stronger ratings. This is in line with the interview 
data which indicates that while there is little support for any member of the official Muslim clergy, 
Muslim communities are more familiar with the work and authority of the SMR. 
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Organisational strategies to improve effectiveness and inclusiveness  
 
Within the growing polarisation of interests and ethnic tensions on one hand, and a 
tough competition from other centralised organisations on the other, the SMR 
struggled to present itself as an authoritative and credible voice. First, it was accused 
of being an unrepresentative institution, out of touch with the concerns of young 
Muslims. Second, it was criticised for providing a rather asymmetrical representation 
of Tatar interests and not doing enough to help Muslim migrants from Central Asia, 
particularly in light of the growing fusion of anti-migrant and anti-Muslim feelings. 
Conversely, the rival organisations interpreted its measures to improve provisions for 
Muslim migrants as being directed against the rights of Tatar Muslims (who were 
Russian nationals). 
 
In response to the criticisms, the council tried to develop a series of strategies to 
mobilise support for its work and reconcile some of the existing tensions. This is in 
line with theoretical expectations of how social movement organisations integrate 
themselves with their constituents (Kriesi 1996). The Council undertook and 
publicised a series of practical initiatives aimed at increasing its own engagement 
with a range of previously under-represented groups. One of the theoretical 
expectations was that the strategies available to the institutionalised challenger are 
influenced by its external environment. Within the Russian corporatist rules of state-
religion engagement, official Muslim organisations seek to represent Islam as a 
single religious category. Within the struggle between different centres of Muslim 
influence and centralised blocks of Muslim organisations, the SMR’s legitimacy 
depends on its ability to present itself as an authoritative and influential organisation.  
 
Traditionally, the Council has positioned itself as a ‘federal, centralised, religious 
organisation’ that ‘unites the efforts of Muslim religious organisations…to resolve 
important issues… and develop a unified position in relations to different aspects of 
spiritual, moral and political life’ (SMR Website). However, in light of the growing 
tensions and reduced support, it also acknowledged that there was a need for 
‘Muslim organisations to become more open and engage with society on different 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The SMR’s engagement with Muslim communities  221 
levels, formally as well as informally’ (Gainutdin 2012c). Moreover, while reporting 
on its achievements between 2007 and 2012, the SMR’s chairman stated  that while 
the last couple of years proved to be the most difficult, the council showed its 
‘stamina and vitality’ and ‘retained its authority…in spite of those who wished to 
blacken its name and discredit it’ (Ibid).  
 
Whereas the MCB’s work centred on inviting women, young people and influential 
members of the British business community, the SMR’s approach was designed to 
attract young educated Muslims, including some of those believed to adhere to more 
radical ideas. There were already some women working in the SMR and while the 
respondents did not draw any particular attention to the issue of women’s 
participation in Muslim organisations, the members of the SMR were keen to 
introduce me to their female members working not only in the communication 
department but also responsible for promoting Islamic finance. Other measures to 
widen participation involved working with migrant communities in the areas of 
welfare, advice and education. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the 
measures actually resonated with Muslim communities. However, as will be 
discussed in the next section, the SMR’s use of specifically-tailored rhetoric 
indicates that it wished to become more popular with Russian Muslims by portraying 
its organisation as more efficient and inclusive.  
 
Inevitably, some of the Council’s rhetoric was aimed at gaining a tactical advantage 
over its rivals. In the past, the disputes often involved mutual accusations of 
misinterpreting Islam and spreading radical ideas or centred on the issue of mosques 
and affiliation of new communities with the SMR or TsDUM (Silant’ev 2007, 
Tulsky 2003). The divisive statements by Muslim leaders and their spokesmen have 
done little to heal the rifts within the Muslim communities or change the image of 
centralised organisations. A brief analysis of more positive rhetoric and statements 
aimed at promoting Muslim solidarity, consolidating Muslim institutions and 
empowering Muslim communities to deal with the growing Islamophobia illustrates 
how the SMR has tried to build support for its initiatives. 
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Muslim unity and solidarity 
 
Muslim unity is one of the key principles of any Islamic organisation and it is not 
surprising that the Council’s leaders have tried to engage with Muslim communities 
by making extensive references to unite in Islamic faith. Intra-communal tensions 
coupled with the worsening situation for migrants in large cities encouraged the 
SMR to elaborate a more nuanced and inclusive rhetoric based on Muslim communal 
solidarity and religious unity. Ethnic and cultural diversity were still acknowledged 
and celebrated, but official speeches made increasing references to the common 
values between Russian ethnic Muslims and Muslim migrants from Central Asia. For 
example, during a special event dedicated to the legacy of Ismail Gasprinsky,69 the 
Chairman of the SMR stated that the council was ‘committed to achieving the unity 
of the Russian ummah while preserving ethnic and regional identities of our peoples’ 
(Gainutdin 2011a: 6). 
 
In the SMR’s rhetoric, the idea of Muslim solidarity reflected both Islamic and 
community activist principles. By combining both, the council hoped to place itself 
at the centre of Muslim engagement. The overall importance of such a position was 
to show that Muslim rights are universal and that the only way to face up to the 
growing threat of Islamophobia was to stand together. For example, the SMR’s 
deputy chairman, Damir Mukhetdinov, argued that the 70 years of Soviet rule 
created a lack of any widely accepted religious tradition that could unite Russian 
Muslims (Mukhetdinov 2012c). Whereas religious practices were eradiated as a 
useless ‘relic of the past’, it was important to remember that the ‘Russian ummah has 
strong historic ties with its brothers in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as 
throughout the project of the Eurasian Union’ (Ibid). Some of the practical initiatives 
aimed at helping labour migrants from Central Asia to adapt to Russian culture 
involved creating special centres under the auspices of the regional DUMs to provide 
legal advice and Russian language courses. For example, the SMR set up language 
                                                 
69 A prominent Crimean Tatar educator (1851-1914) - who was the first Russian Muslim intellectual 
to speak of the need to modernise Muslim communities through education, culture and reform.  
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courses at the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, while a special team was created within 
the DUMER to help with legal affairs. 
 
While the MCB tried to avoid promoting a particular school of Islam as it did not 
wish to upset any sectarian interests, the SMR’s approach was different. In an 
attempt to overcome the existing internal divisions it sought to create a sense of 
religious solidarity by focusing on religious similarities between religious practices 
of Russian Muslims and Muslim newcomers from Central Asia. In doing so, it 
emphasised that Muslims in Russia and Central Asia belong to the same Hanafi 
school of Sunni Islam. These links had been reinforced by the older generation of 
religious leaders, including senior members of the SMR who had been educated in 
Bukhara (Uzbekistan) in the Soviet era. In its engagement with Muslim migrants, the 
SMR’s leaders have used this as a common platform on which to build a stronger 
sense of Muslim unity. In his presentation at the VIII Muslim Forum held in 
November 2012, the SMR’s chairman used a common rhetoric of Muslims within the 
former Soviet borders being united in their Islamic creed and historic legacy:  
 
Islam is…an international religion. This is why we are happy to 
welcome our brotherly peoples in our mosques and schools, just as 
our forefathers did before us…to pass on to them the heritage of the 
Hanafi maddhab70 and teaching traditions of the Bukhara 
school…studied by many representatives of different nationalities 
and Islamic schools (Gainutdin 2012d). 
 
Such rhetoric was aimed at breaking down the barriers between Russian Muslims 
and migrants. For example, in another speech at a conference dedicated to the 
challenges of migration, Gainutdin (2013a) emphasised religious and linguistic 
similarities between Tatar Muslims and Muslim migrants from Central Asia. He also 
noted that his own books on Hanafi maddhab had been translated into the Kirgiz 
language.   
 
                                                 
70 Maddhab is a religious school of law in Sunni Islam. 
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Alongside Muslim forums which were generally attended by the Tatar clergy, the 
SMR has worked to establish closer relations with Muslim religious leaders in 
Central Asia, particularly by holding regular meetings, conferences and events. For 
example, the VII Muslim Forum organised in November 2011 was dedicated to the 
challenges facing Muslim communities within the CIS. Its agenda included 
discussions on establishing a common position on Islamophobia and developing 
adaptation programmes for migrants in Russia.  
 
The SMR lobbied for regular exchanges of imams and scholars from CIS countries to 
help labour migrants integrate into Russian society (DUMER 2012f). In an interview 
to a Tajik Newspaper (Rossiya dlia vsekh 2012), published in Russia, the head of the 
SMR Press Office, Gulnur Gazieva, commented that for a number of years the 
Moscow Cathedral Mosque has taught the Russian language to migrants and 
provided free legal advice. Furthermore, a special website (www.islamsng.com) was 
created to publish analytical articles on Islam in the CIS which provided a further 
opportunity for the SMR to position itself at the centre of intra-communal relations. 
As was explained by a Moscow imam, ‘solidarity means…mutual help and in this 
process people try to use centralised organisations’ (Interview 21). He also noted that 
the Islamic principle of unity did not mean that ‘people should have a single opinion 
but that they should not be enemies…it is about peaceful co-existence, about being 
able to listen to the opinion of others’ (Ibid). 
 
The issue of Muslim solidarity is enshrined in the Qur’an (3: 103) which makes it 
natural that the SMR would call on Russian Muslims to reconcile their differences 
and unite. For example, while commenting on the intra-Tatar divisions, one 
interviewee remarked in a rather disappointed way that ‘before there was Islamic 
renaissance… now they got ‘reborn’ and just ended up in arguing…any high 
principles or ideas are gone, now it is just a big squabble’ (Interview 9). Juxtaposing 
the developments in the Russian ummah at the end of the 1990s with those around 
2010s, he blamed the lack of support for Muslim clergy on their personal rivalries. 
Interestingly, within the highly divisive environment of Muslim centralised 
organisations in Russia and the arrival of Muslim migrants from outside, the issue of 
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solidarity between Russian Muslims and their brothers from Central Asia created a 
useful mobilising frame for the SMR to show that it understood the changing 
problems of the Russian ummah. It also provided an opportunity to shift the attention 
from internal rivalries to more universal issues. Although it is difficult to gauge the 
success of these initiatives, these steps were designed to overcome some of the 





Another criticism was levelled at the lack of discussion and consultation between 
Muslim leaders and Muslim communities. Similarly to the MCB, the SMR’s 
leadership tried to improve its image as a more democratic institution that listens to 
the opinions of others, or at least engages with a wider range of actors. The SMR’s 
rhetoric and approach to consultation have been two-fold. Closed-door consultations 
with senior representatives of the DUMs were framed to demonstrate the Council’s 
efficiency as a well-structured and effective institution, capable of solving 
community problems. There were also wider public consultation with Muslim 
experts, scholars and public figures during Muslim congresses and forums which 
were often initiated by the SMR as a more inclusive platform for exchange of ideas. 
One respondent described this two-stage process of consultation by noting that ‘the 
SMR comes together sometimes once a year or once in a couple of 
months…different groups, presidium advise how to do things in certain situations -  
so it is an exchange of opinions…and when [muftis] meet properly – they think it 
over and come to decisions (Interview 21). 
  
The SMR’s chairman is not generally elected by the people or a broader conference 
of Muslim delegates, but its candidature is voted on and endorsed by a rather small 
governing council committee of regional muftis in charge of their respective 
centralised Muslim boards. The Council’s spokesmen have argued that ‘this is 
exactly the form of governance which reflects the principle of Islam, when authority 
in the Central core is not usurped or abused by specific officials or clerics, but is 
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concentrated in the hands of the [governing] council (Interview 7). Based on the 
Islamic concept of shura, such an arrangement helps ensure that that the head of the 
council discusses its decisions with the members who are ‘the most equal, most 
authoritative scholars who are financially independent from each other’ (Ibid). 
Moreover, the leader is hired to undertake certain governing obligations and if 
needed is expected to listen to the council’s members and act ‘in accordance with the 
received statutes’ (Ibid).  
 
Interestingly, the lack of direct consultation with Muslim communities, coupled with 
discussions with (or among) the heads of the DUMs who make up the governing 
body of the Council, reflects the Russian corporatist context. While the senior 
representatives from the centralised organisations report to the chairman, the council 
works out a common agenda. In his address at the senior-level of the Council, its 
leader reiterated that the ‘SMR was created…to develop a common position [for 
Muslims in Russia] based on information from local organisations and to coordinate 
activities of voluntarily affiliated DUMs’ (Gainutdin 2011d). 
 
However, apart from its administrative functions and closed plenary sessions, the 
Council plays an active part in organising wider Muslim forums and congresses. On 
one hand, it continues past traditions of Tatar forums initiated before the Revolution. 
As was noted by some respondents, this demonstrates a sense of continuity of 
grassroots engagement and self-organisation, which had been interrupted by the 
Revolution of 1917 (Interview 16). On the other hand, it is an opportunity for the 
SMR to reconfirm its position within the Russian ummah as an organisation that is 
not removed from Muslim communities. The joint statements and resolutions made 
at the end of the forums illustrate that any new directions and initiatives are being 
confirmed by the representatives attending the forums. In a move to improve 
institutional transparency, speeches and discussions from some of the forums and 
congresses were recorded and broadcast on the SMR’s website. For example, the 
official report on the All-Russian Muslim Congress that took place on 24 November 
2011, highlighted that the event ‘provided the first ever platform of such a scale after 
the Revolution for Muslims from all over Russia to come together for work and 
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discussion’ (SMR, 2011b). Moreover, it stated that it was a ‘result of cooperation 
between Muslim spiritual boards with public organisations and state authorities 
under the leadership of the Council of Muftis’ (Ibid).  
 
 
Muslim empowerment: education and consolidation 
 
Similarly to the MCB’s rhetoric of ‘community under threat’ the SMR advocated the 
need to educate Russian Muslims and consolidate Muslim institutions to empower 
Muslim communities. The SMR has made extensive references to the need to 
improve the standards of Islamic education and consolidate Muslim organisational 
structures to improve the image of Muslim communities and combat Islamophobia.  
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, with the help of state funding, the SMR 
embarked on rebuilding Islamic education in Russia. However, poor training of 
imams continued to present a serious barrier to the development of an enlightened 
and empowered Russian ummah. By acknowledging the problem and seeking to 
improve the system of education within the institutional framework of the DUMs, the 
SMR leaders demonstrated their willingness to bridge the gap between the older 
generation of muftis and young Muslims. In his official blog, Damir Mukhetdinov 
framed this issue in two ways. First, he emphasised the role of the DUMs in 
facilitating the development of Islamic education in Russia. Second, he noted that not 
all centralised muftiyats have been able to empower young members of their 
communities which is damaging to the cohesiveness and unity of the ummah 
(Mukhetdinov 2012b).  
 
Moreover, unable to use their skills and get employment within the existing 
organisations, young imams tended to be disillusioned, thus creating internal sources 
of opposition (Ibid). By publicising the ongoing cooperation between young Muslims 
and the older generation within the SMR and developing further opportunities for 
training within its affiliated Islamic universities (e.g. in Moscow and Kazan), the 
Council emphasised its contribution to the development and consolidation of the 
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Russian ummah. The council’s inclusion of young Muslims and attempts to use their 
energy and expertise to help the older generation of leaders to reconnect with Muslim 
communities will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
 
The discourse of consolidation was aimed to demonstrate to Russian society that 
Muslim minorities are an organised force ready to protect their rights within the 
Russian institutional framework. As with the idea of unity and solidarity, the SMR 
used the notion of community consolidation to show that it was leading the way and 
empowering Russian Muslims by helping them organise their interests within the 
existing structure of the DUMs. For example, at the All-Russian Muslim Congress in 
2011, the SMR’s spokesmen argued that ‘their most important task is the 
consolidation of the Muslim community in the face of contemporary challenges 
faced by Russian society’ (SMR 2011b). A series of conversations took place to 
discuss the issue of consolidation and it was agreed that that it required ‘official 
religious institutions, religious communities and groups’ to work on their ‘common 
values, goals and objectives... to conduct regular… meetings, debates, discussions 
[and] develop remote interaction with the use of the modern media’ (Ibid). 
 
Despite the obvious overlap between the ideas of Muslim unity, solidarity and 
consolidation, there was discursive variation. Whereas the SMR made references to 
unity and solidarity as a way of overcoming intra-communal tensions, the notion of 
consolidation had more organisational connotations and was aimed at developing 
institutional mechanisms to represent Muslim interests within the Russian corporatist 
context.  
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Internal restructuring: the Modernisation programme (2011-2012) 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the SMR’s strategies to mobilise support through 
a series of discursive frames and individual measures. By fusing together the rhetoric 
of Muslim activism and Islamic values, the Council sought to publicise its work and 
try to heal some of the intra-communal tensions. However, a key decision taken by 
the SMR to improve its legitimacy was to realign its own institutional practices not 
only with Muslim demands for greater inclusiveness but also in line with external 
corporatist rules for greater administrative efficiency. As an already established 
organisation the SMR embarked on a series of internal reforms in order to improve 
its organisational capacity and engage with Muslim communities. 
 
The SMR’s programme of organisational restructuring was officially announced at 
the All-Russian Muslim Congress organised by the SMR on 24 March 2011. In his 
opening address to over 500 delegates and guests, the SMR’s chairman voiced the 
need to fight extremism, improve relations with local authorities and develop the 
programme of Islamic education. He also focused on the question of reforming the 
organisational structure of the DUMs. In particular, Gainutdin (2011b) criticised the 
centralised Muslim organisations for the lack of human resources and spiritual 
credentials to engage with young Muslims and deal with contemporary challenges. 
While the chairman acknowledged that the DUMs were ‘in need of deep and large-
scale modernisation’, he also noted that such reforms should ‘involve[e] the younger 
generation, and …effective communication with the public’ (Ibid). 
 
The need to introduce reforms was dictated partly by the changing nature of Muslim 
communities and partly by internal pressure from other Muslim organisations, 
increasingly critical of the SMR’s style of leadership. Similarly to the MCB’s 
approach, the proposed measures provided an attempt to make the organisation more 
inclusive, to engage with its regional members and improve internal communication 
between the executive committee and regional organisations. Essentially, the 
programme of modernisation was designed to improve its internal legitimacy and 
show that the SMR’s senior leaders were receptive to new ideas from the younger 
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generation. The proposed reforms focused on three areas: cooperation and 
consultation with younger generations and Muslim intellectuals on the everyday 
running of the SMR (and eventually its affiliated members), regional consolidation 
of member muftiyats, and a better communication strategy between the SMR’s head 
office in Moscow and regional DUMs. 
 
 
Engaging with young Muslim experts  
 
Over the last couple of years, the SMR has become aware of the need to work closer 
with younger generation of Muslims activists and intellectuals to breathe new life 
into its organisational practices and improve its reputation. The first impetus for 
reforms came from a group of young leaders from the DUM in Nizhny Novgorod, 
who had first joined the ranks of the DUMER and then the SMR in 2011 (see 
previous chapter). In his statements on modernisation, Ravil Gainutdin (2011c) 
praised their professional skills and Islamic diplomas and expressed hope that their 
energy and qualification would reform the institution and build support within 
Muslim communities: 
 
We have largely started to rely on the younger generation of 
Muslims. We have repeatedly stated that the reformed structure of 
the council’s head office will be represented mostly by young 
professionals. 
 
By working within the SMR, they gained an opportunity to undertake internal 
restructuring of the council in close consultation with its senior leaders. Their 
previous work on publishing Islamic texts, developing the system of Islamic 
education and their theological and rhetorical grounding in Jadidist (progressive) 
Islamic tradition helped present the reforms not as externally-imposed, but rather as a 
natural home-grown tradition, particularly relevant to the Muslim Tatars and 
Muslims in Central Asia. During the VII Muslim Forum on ‘Modernisation in Russia 
and the CIS countries’, the SMR’s leader Gainutdin (2011e) highlighted the 
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importance of reformist rhetoric of Jadidist Islam. He made an explicit link between 
Islamic reformist spirit and the current needs to modernise Muslim governance: 
 
In the late 19th - early 20th century Tatar intellectuals raised the 
slogan that modernisation (Jadidism) comes from the Hadith in 
which Allah at the beginning of every century sends a reformer. In 
our time, such a reformer is a collective mind of the ummah.  
 
The SMR’s older generation had been brought up within the same Tatar traditions 
and Islamic training. However, they were out of touch with an increasingly 
international outlook of younger Muslims and their more thorough Islamic and 
secular education.  
 
Evidence from official statements suggests that the SMR’s leaders took on board 
their reformist rhetoric. Gainutdin’s speeches made direct references to the articles of 
this group of young scholars on how to modernise Muslim organisations from within. 
Echoing President Medvedev’s more general rhetoric on modernisation of Russian 
society, Gainutdin (16 March 2011) suggested that young Muslim scholars were the 
first to sense the need to introduce modernisation to the Muslim sphere. Notably, in 
one of his speeches he quoted directly from the arguments developed by Yusupov 
(2009) and later by Mukhametov and Kurbanov (2011) on ‘the needed modernisation 
of Russian Islamic space…[required]…to transform frozen society into a mobile, 
developed, pluralist social system…flexible enough to respond to… the challenges’ 
(Ibid). The idea of modernisation implied an interesting strategy of fostering and 
developing the pluralist expression Islam within the centralised, vertical structures of 
Muslim administrative practices. 
 
The programme of internal reforms was aimed at improving the Council’s 
organisational efficiency and communication with member organisations. A key 
change involved the creation of new departments within the SMR’s head office 
under the leadership of young experts. For example, under the direction of Rushan 
Abbyasov, three new departments were set up to deal with international relations, 
economic and social affairs, and educational matters (Abbyasov 2011a). Moreover, 
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another department was added to ‘engage with public and particularly with youth 
organisations’ (Ibid). Commenting on a series of reforms implemented within the 
DUMER and SMR, one interviewee remarked:  
 
We didn’t come alone, we came with our teams….my team 
consists of 25 people, they head different departments, they have 
all graduated from Islamic Higher Education institutions – and the 
same can be said about the SMR… when you have young people 
who are educated, have contact between themselves…that’s all you 
need to work on the issues (Interview 7).  
 
Drawing attention to the generational gap and the problem of authority in the eyes of 
young Muslims he remarked that ‘the leaders cannot govern the way they are used to 
and the congregation does not want to live in the old way’ (Interview 7).71 The 
majority of the respondents praised the gradual rejuvenation of the SMR. For 
example, an older representative from the SMR spoke in favour of the ‘renewal of 
people…new faces, people who are around 30 years old’ (Interview 5). However, he 
also highlighted that the SMR needed ‘the old guard…to counterbalance the energy 
of the young, because they could appreciate the situation better’ (Ibid). Another 
respondent outside of the SMR appreciated Gainutdin’s efforts to attract young 
people from the North Caucasus, for example, the late Muhammad Karachai, and to 
engage with more radical figures, who would speak their mind but channel their 
religious fervour through moderate activities of the Council (Interview 19).  
 
The SMR’s cooperation with young Muslim scholars, such as Mukhametov, 
Kurbanov, and Khabutdinov, and publication of their work on Islamic reformers and 
Muslim communities in Russia provided a scholarly foundation for the SMR’s 
reformist agenda. Moreover, rather than being a redundant relic of the outdated 
system of Muslim representation, the SMR used their support to position itself as a 
moderniser and a benefactor of the long-established tradition of Tatar-Bashkir 
reformers, such as Ismail Gasprinsky, Rizaeddin Fakhreitdinov or Abu Nasr 
                                                 
71 Here, he is paraphrasing Lenin’s famous revolutionary statement that ‘the ‘lower classes’ do not 
want to live in the old way and the ‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way’. 
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Kursavi.72 By incorporating their ideas on Muslim consolidation and unity into their 
own agenda the council aimed at bridging the gaps within the divided Russia ummah. 
In presenting his ideas on the current state of Islam in Russia and commenting on the 
general direction of reforms the Council should take, Mukhametov (2012) wrote: 
 
Modernisation is the next stage in the development of Islam... the 
stage of ‘coming together and assembling’ which meant restoration 
of mosques and establishing the initial ritual and community and 
educational activities is now completed ... Today, the Russian 
ummah faces tasks relating to theology, ideology, social services, 
culture and science. This is what can be called modernisation. 
 
The Council’s strategy of harnessing support for its own modernisation agenda was 
to position itself at the centre of the process and invite the DUMs within and, more 
importantly, outside of its usual jurisdiction to ‘embark on the same path as well’ 
(Gainutdin 2011b). The significance of such an invitation was two-fold. First, it 
provided an opportunity to apportion some of the blame for being a rather outdated 
institution on the historically developed patterns of Muslim representation through 
the DUMs. Presenting itself as an institutional successor of the same system of 
interest mediation, the SMR would be justified for sharing the systemic weaknesses 
as well as strengths of the current patterns of Muslim representation.  
 
The interview data suggests a common feeling within the Muslim elites that in their 
current form the DUMs could no longer cater for the needs of Russian Muslims. 
However, there is also a shared understanding among the Muslim clergy that the 
DUMs provide a unique form of Muslim self-organisation. For example, Damir 
Mukhetdinov (2012b) depicted the system of the DUMs as the only viable option for 
representing Muslim interests in Russia ‘because it provided a mechanism developed 
by the state, which allowed to structure and organise Muslim community.’ A similar 
                                                 
72 Kursavi (1776-1812) was a famous Tatar theologian. He is credited with the revival of Islam in 
Tatarstan and the founding of the Jadidist movement. Fakhretdinov (1859-1936) was a Tatar Islamic 
thinker, writer and historian. 
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sentiment was echoed by a Tatar spiritual leader who saw the DUMs as a prototype 
of a Muslim state within the Russian state: 
 
For us, the Spiritual Board is a kind of a spiritual caliphate, so to 
speak, it is a structure which forms a skeleton of the nation around 
which we can all unite, and this is a very important aspect… it is 
our kind of statehood’ (Interview 16). 
  
Second, by showing readiness to embrace change and to lead by example, the SMR 
has attempted to mobilise support within the Russian ummah. By doing so, it 
positioned itself at the heart of the process designed to unify Muslim communities, 
consolidate their organisational structure and provide leadership on dealing with 
external challenges of Islamophobia. For example, friendly scholars and Muslim 
activists made a direct connection between the SMR’s willingness to implement 
reforms and its ability to counteract extremism. Such academic accounts were 
designed to help the council to convince a wider range of organisations that they 
should join the council’s ranks and not support its competitors. In an article aimed at 
mobilising Muslim support for the SMR’s leadership, Kurbanov and Mukhametov 
(2011) defended the SMR’s process of internal reforms against its critics by warning 
that:  
 
a blow to Gainutdin sends an alarming signal to Muslim youth. If 
such a moderate and loyal mufti will be ‘made to leave’…it would 
mean…a direct threat of the radicalisation of young people who 
cannot find their place in the archaic structures and reactionary 
‘spiritual’ leaders. 
 
They went on to add that ‘only modernised DUMs and other Islamic structures can 
have authority to influence the outlook of the believers’ (Ibid). 
 
 
Regional consolidation, internal communication and positive publicity  
 
The SMR’s measures to coordinate the work of regional DUMs under its jurisdiction 
and consolidate its own position followed some of the earlier initiatives, such as the 
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opening of the SMR’s regional offices in the Ural region, Siberia and the Far East in 
2008, as well as in the Volga region, North-West region, South and Central regions 
two years later (Interfax Religion 2010). The regional heads in each of the four 
newly created offices were given a rank of a mufti and a status of being a deputy 
chairman of DUMER. In line with the aforementioned pivotal role of the DUMER 
within the running of the SMR, each mufti was also responsible for promoting the 
SMR’s agenda. Arguably, this was indicative of the DUMER acting as a pilot project 
for reforms which would be then introduced within the SMR’s other members. 
 
The measures to improve the council’s organisational capacity and cohesiveness 
were similar to the previous efforts to structure the work of the DUMER. 
Highlighting the need to improve internal communication between the DUMER and 
its regional members, one of the interviewees noted that:  
 
because of particular weaknesses of our structures before, we could 
not deal with regional issues, we did not have enough 
resources…and so over the last 15 years many issues accumulated 
in terms of the relations and communication between the centre and 
the regions…so we have to deal with this and make things right 
today’ (Interview 7). 
 
With the chairman of the SMR heading up the DUMER, it is not surprising that there 
is an exchange of expertise on improving communication and standardisation 
practices. For example, in line with the Russian approach of vertical, rather than 
horizontal engagement, top leaders of the DUMER developed a strategy of internal 
communication between the central office and regional bodies. The centralised 
approach was designed to channel a particular set of messages down to the regional 
level. In his speech during a high-level meeting at DUMER, Gainutdin (2012b) 
praised the usefulness of such a top-down, corporatist approach:  
 
I think that this [vertical] structure based on the establishment of 
centralised regional Muslim organisations in the form of regional 
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DUMs and mukhtasibats73 within the DUMER is the best and most 
acceptable to all. This is the work which needs to continue … First 
and foremost I would like to call upon everybody present here….to 
spread the influence of our muftiyats. 
 
Echoing a rather bureaucratic discourse of organisational restructuring, designed to 
infuse confidence in the proposed steps, Gainutdin expressed conviction that the year 
2012 would be ‘a year of changes in the religious sphere’ (Ibid). Moreover he urged 
religious leaders to ‘actively support…all the projects, to come up with new 
initiatives to strengthen faith and increase … the level of education’ (Ibid). While 
any suggestions were welcome, the idea of active participation was aimed at the 
heads of the DUMs rather than independent bottom-up contribution from ordinary 
Muslims. 
 
Within this reformist spirit of the ‘ummastroitel’stvo’ (i.e. construction or 
consolidation of the ummah, Mukhametov 2011) the leaders of the DUMER and the 
SMR developed guidelines to facilitate the work with regions and to keep them up to 
date with the modernisation agenda. Close cooperation with the registered Muslim 
communities was aimed at providing regional bodies with opportunities to share best 
practices and express their concerns on administrative matters to the senior muftis. 
This process was set up as a two-way communication which was made easy by the 
same senior figures working within the central administration of the SMR, and 
heading up regional Muslim administrations.  
 
For example, during one of the meetings, Rushan Abbyasov (Head of staff in the 
SMR but also imam-mukhtasib74 in the Moscow Region) presented the SMR’s 
leaders with a list of local grievances over land allocation and difficulties in securing 
permits to build mosques in his jurisdiction (Abbyasov 2012). This provides a good 
illustration of the SMR’s modernisation programme in action. As was already 
mentioned, young leaders were put in charge of individual projects or departments 
                                                 
73 Mukhtasibat is an Islamic territorial division (of several Muslim congregations) which makes up a 
larger regional unit of administration: Muslim Spiritual Board (or muftiyats). 
74 Mukhtasib is a Muslim official in charge of religious and administrative affairs of the mukhtasibat. 
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which would focus on particular issues (e.g. mosques and relations with municipal 
authorities). They sought to empower local organisations to engage with municipal 
authorities by holding regular meetings. Such activities were also designed to 
uncover the institutional weaknesses of local organisations, such as passivity of 
leaders or insufficient training in public relations and legal expertise (Ibid). 
 
While the regional DUMs were actively encouraged to take part in the SMR’s 
programme, the Council’s leaders wished to show that they did not force anybody to 
work with them, nor would they tolerate working with organisations that refused to 
introduce changes. For example, while commenting on the centralised organisation 
in the Chuvash region leaving the Council’s jurisdiction, Abbyasov (2011b) 
remarked that whereas the SMR offered support and guidance ‘there were also some 
‘passive’ DUMs which could not cope with the programmes developed by the 
Council of Muftis.’ He went on to add that ‘there was little point to keep 
organisations if they did not do anything [and] had no authority in their region’ 
(Ibid). 
 
Within the highly competitive environment of new organisations and mosques being 
created and registered under different jurisdictions, the extent to which the SMR 
could afford to focus on the quality rather than the quantity of its organisations 
remains debatable. For example, in the words of its critics, the SMR lost its authority 
and prestige when some of its own affiliated organisations switched loyalty and 
either simply left the SMR or joined the TsDUM (Interview 15 and Interview 18). 
Moreover, a number of the interviewees, regardless of their attitude towards the 
Council, noted that the SMR’s legitimacy has been based on the actual number of 
affiliated organisations. In the words of one respondent ‘the level of influence of 
each centralised organisation depends on the number of affiliated communities’ 
(Interview 15). Exact numbers of the currently affiliated organisations are difficult to 
ascertain. However, official figures suggest that over 1,400 are affiliated to the SMR 
and 2,500 to the TsDUM (see Introduction). 
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The SMR’s own approach to building support took into account the need to create 
and register new communities under its jurisdiction. For example, one of the 
strategies involved the creation of new local religious organisations within the 
jurisdiction of DUMER and consolidating them into centralised organisation or a 
mukhtasibat. As was noted in the DUMER Resolution of 1 March (DUMER 2012), 
the aim was to ‘create no less than ten centralised religious organisations and up to 
100 local organisations during the course of 2012…And speed up the work of the 
central apparatus with the regions.’  
 
An integral part of regional consolidation was not simply the creation of new 
organisations and the centralisation of the existing ones, but also efforts to publicise 
such actions.  In order to improve the public image of their organisation, young 
leaders of the DUMER promoted the extent to which their work with the regions was 
popular with local organisations. The DUMER’s Annual Report had a specific 
section dedicated to positive feedback from the regions and their praise of such 
activities. Some of the cited statements included comments by the imam-mukhtasib 
of the Ryazan region on Gainutdin’s work in the international arena. He saw his 
efforts ‘as an undeniable proof of invaluable role the SMR and its chairman…play, 
acting as a leader of Russia’s Muslims’ (DUMER, 2012c). Similarly, the chairman of 
a local organisation in the Ivanovskaya region noted a ‘feeling of movement, [and] 
the real work of DUMER’s departments’ (Ibid). Moreover, the head of a local 
Muslim organisation of Smolensk commented on the importance of better 
understanding the ‘work, achievements and mistakes in the regions’ and that ‘now, 
thanks to the technology of mass media, there was an opportunity to stay in contact’ 
(Ibid). While these comments may have reflected the process of streamlining 
communication between the centre and the periphery, they were used by the SMR to 
boost its authority and consolidate its position, at least among its affiliated 
organisations. 
 
In line with these comments, the newly created PR department focused on 
publicising the modernisation and consolidation initiatives through the use of online 
technologies. With the help of internal marketing campaigns and a new website they 
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aimed to develop online awareness of the SMR’s key activities for the broader 
audience. In her annual report on the department’s achievements, Dilara Akhmetova 
(2012) noted that ‘the press service of the DUMER was established within the 
modernisation programme of the Council of Muftis of Russia and the DUMER in 
May 2011’. The key contribution to the overall process of reforms was to deliver: 
 
coverage to the widest spread of Muslim life and local 
organisations, to provide a high quality, objective and truthful 
information…with a particular emphasis on the Council of Muftis 
of Russia as the largest and most serious centralised religious 
organisation in Russia’ (Ibid). 
 
The website was developed to create a space under the auspices of the SMR where 
Muslim organisations could learn more about each other, exchange information and 
mobilise support for individual projects. In a way, this was similar to the previous 
efforts to disseminate information about Russian Muslims by publishing reference 
books on individual regions and Muslim communities to create a sense of unity. In 
her speech to the delegates of the DUMER, she went on to say that the aim was to 
‘showcase the good work of our organisations on the ground in a positive light, but at 
the same time to convey…the activities of our staff unit’ (Ibid). 
 
By inviting organisations to use the electronic resources developed by the SMR and 
to share their news and achievements with member organisations, the SMR 
spokespeople sought to engage with regional muftis and their teams. While this 
reflected the overall intention of the SMR to consolidate the Russian Muslim space, 
it also provided an attempt to improve its legitimacy and standing within the 
communities. In her closing remarks, Akhmetova expressed regret that: 
 
sometimes…instead of talking to us and cooperating with us, you 
give preference to certain websites, which in recent years engaged 
in defamation, slander and attack on the Council of Muftis of 
Russia (Ibid). 
 
This was a direct appeal to regional organisations to support the SMR and its 
leadership on the grounds that, unlike its competitors, it had embraced the spirit of 
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reform. Moreover, it was an attempt to show that the SMR cared for its affiliated 
organisations and was ready to help them deal with the everyday challenges of 
Muslim representation. As was noted earlier, within the Russian vertical context, the 
SMR has seen its role not so much in empowering Muslims as individuals but rather 
directing and consolidating the work of Muslim organisations.  
 
A new generation of leaders also dedicated time to engage with Russian Muslims 
through personal blogs and discussion forums.75 This was clearly a more direct 
approach to discussing such issues as migration, Islamic values and ideas on 
modernising the outdated forms of Muslim representation with the computer-literate 
audience. However, institutional measures and communication rhetoric were largely 
designed to improve legitimacy through organisation maintenance on a more general 
administrative level. By 2013, the head of the SMR (Gainutdin 2013b) reported on 
the first results of the modernisation to the All-Russian Muslim Congress:  
 
I am pleased to note that the course on modernising the Council of 
Muftis of Russia and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the 
European part of Russia ... has brought tangible benefits. Young 
qualified specialists and graduates from the leading Russian 
universities joined the ranks of the SMR and DUMER which has 
led to an increase in publishing activity and research work. 
 
  
                                                 
75 For example, see the two blogs available on Livejournal.com: Damir Mukhetdinov (http://damir-
hazrat.livejournal.com/) and Rushan Abbyasov (http://rushan-abbyasov.livejournal.com/). Dilyara 
Akhmetova is a regular contributor to Islam RF. 
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Internal resistance to change and historically entrenched interests  
 
Organisational theories shed light on the SMR’s efforts to modernise its internal 
processes in response to the challenges of building support and engaging with 
Russian Muslims. However, just as in the British case, they do not provide a 
sufficient explanation as to why the proposed reforms were rather limited in scope 
and not always welcomed by all member organisations. The interview data reveals a 
common assumption that Muslim leaders in charge of the regional DUMs have 
tended to resist changes because of their own old-fashioned, conservative views and 
reluctance to see their powers challenged by the younger generation (with DUMER 
and its young muftis being a notable exception). Moreover, whereas the institutional 
framework of the DUMs has been traditionally associated with the spirit of Muslim 
autonomy and self-organisation, in reality its everyday work was hampered by 
divided loyalties and inability to develop a consolidated position. 
 
A strong preference for centralised processes and internal efficiency in line with the 
corporatist preferences of the external context has lent the SMR’s programme of 
reforms a technocratic character. A series of more profound changes based on 
improving the SMR’s democratic credentials and bottom-up representation based on 
direct elections may have been discussed but they remained on hold. While some 
argued that the Russian ummah was not ready for such changes (Interview 7), others 
suggested that there was no leader who could appoint himself and ‘claim to speak on 
behalf of all Muslims’ (Interview 20). In the words of another respondent, ‘to 
modernise the Russian Muslim community you need large-scale reforms for which 
nobody is ready yet – neither the Russian state, nor Muslim religious leaders’ 
(Interview 13).  
 
Historical institutionalism provides a series of helpful insights to understand the 
extent to which historical legacies of entrenched power configurations and past 
practices may have created significant barriers to consolidate Muslim interests. 
While the concepts of critical junctures and positive feedbacks help explain how and 
why traditionalist interests had become entrenched within the system of DUMs in the 
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first place, the notion of gradual change is particularly useful in understanding the 
extent to which the vested interests and passive nature of the DUMs may have 
influenced the narrow scope of organisational changes. 
 
One of the things that distinguishes the Russian Muslim space from its British 
counterpart is its complex and enduring legacy of traditionalist and reformist 
approaches to Muslim representation and self-organisation within the Russian state. 
On one hand, there is an assumed reluctance of the DUM leaders to change their 
ways, share power and transform the system of Muslim administration into one based 
on representation. Similarly to the MCB case, no fundamental changes were 
attempted that could have upset the status quo. For example, the data suggests that 
the idea of unification which would have consolidated different muftiyats from 
competing jurisdictions was debated with great excitement. However, it was stopped 
in its tracks. 
 
On the other hand, the reformist spirit and rhetoric of the Tatar-Bashkir Islam and its 
emphasis on progressive modernisation and community self-organisation, grounded 
in the aforementioned ideas of the late 19th century Tatar thinkers, provided 
theological and moral backing for the reforms. In the next section, I will discuss how 
the bureaucratic nature of the DUMs, coupled with historically entrenched structural 
fragmentation and divisions into parallel muftiyats may have been responsible for 
creating institutional barriers and resistance to accept change. I will also consider 
how these factors were negotiated within the reformist rhetoric, which kind of 
gradual changes materialised and which did not. 
 
 
Regional muftis and ‘spiritual bureaucracy’ 
 
As was described in the introductory chapter, the existing system of mediating 
Muslim interests through the institution of Muslim Spiritual Boards was set up by 
Catherine the Great in 1789. Whether this was a top-down state initiative of 
establishing control over Muslim subjects and granting them Russian citizenship, or 
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whether the Empress simply institutionalised the already existing practices of 
Muslim self-governance introduced in the Ottoman Empire remains unclear. The 
interview data and academic sources indicate that this issue is still debated among 
Russian Muslims themselves. However, the inauguration of the first Orenburg 
Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly by the Empress on 22 September 1788 has been 
historically regarded as a ‘critical juncture’ paving the way for the current forms of 
official Muslim representation through the institution of the DUM. Moreover, the 
leadership of TsDUM (2012) has regarded itself as a direct successor of the Spiritual 
Assembly and dates its history from this point in time.  
 
The SMR was established in an attempt to develop a more progressive, less 
hierarchical system of governance. However, it was a product of the same system of 
Muslim administration, affected by the same historical legacies of bureaucratic style 
of leadership and internal rivalries. There were two reasons which help explain why 
the programme of modernisation was rather modest. First, it was held back because 
the old-style regional leadership was reluctant to change its internal processes of 
administration and open up their institution to young leaders. Second, the 
institutionalised divisions and personal rivalries between the TsDUM’s supporters 
and the followers of the SMR created a significant barrier to creating a single system 
of Muslim representation in the same regional jurisdiction.  
  
The regional DUMs had been created within the Russian historical tradition of 
corporatist, top-down engagement with Muslim communities and have remained 
rather bureaucratic institutions with close connections to local and regional 
authorities and strong vested interests to preserve their own authority. Open elections 
of muftis were rare and in many instances they were selected and endorsed by the 
DUM’s council or by the chief mufti. This has been a particularly common practice 
for the DUMs under the jurisdiction of the TsDUM. Many senior leaders in charge of 
the DUMs today belong to an older generation educated within the Soviet system. 
They have typically been brought up in a tradition that required the ability to 
compromise with authorities without showing excessive initiative and enterprising 
spirit. Being used to managing their organisations in a rather passive way, many have 
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remained reluctant to let in new faces and embrace new ways of engaging with 
ordinary grassroots. In his evaluation of the original structures of the DUMs, 
Kurbanov (2010) noted that they excluded ‘any degree of co-optation of new leaders 
from the Muslim community’ and were ‘far from the modernisation 
process…tak[ing] place in a Muslim environment.’ In light of historically close 
relations between the DUM leaders and state authorities, be it in the Tsarist period or 
during the Soviet era, young Muslim intellectuals had found themselves excluded 
from these organisations and ‘have increasingly tried to use their own knowledge and 
energy outside official religious structures’ (Ibid).  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I noted that the system of the DUMs was increasingly 
perceived as a highly bureaucratic institution, especially by young Muslims. Some 
commentators, such as Markus (2011), suggested that it had been based on a 
‘prototype of the Orthodox Church corporation with strong subordination and a 
president at the top.’ Authoritarian practices of governance and excessive 
bureaucratisation of the DUMs are an integral part of the corporatist rules of interest 
mediation in Russia. Although this makes it easier to engage with civil servants, little 
power is shared within the DUMs and the major decisions are taken at the senior 
level. Markus concludes therefore, that ‘the corporatist nature and authoritarianism 
creates an insurmountable barrier for people, who view the waiting room of the 
spiritual board as that of Gazprom or Lukoil’ (Ibid). 
 
Over time, these hierarchical forms of Muslim representation became an 
institutionalised practice which was difficult to reverse. The political turmoil of the 
1990s may have resulted in a rather chaotic proliferation of Muslim bodies. 
However, their organisational governance followed similar bureaucratic patterns of 
being far removed from Muslim communities and their everyday concerns. For 
example, in her assessment of the Muslim clergy and regional leadership Akhmetova 
(2011) remarked that ‘over the last few years we have seen an obvious crisis of 
spiritual boards as an institution at the regional level: for community it is just a 
spiritual bureaucracy….which does not care for the interests of ordinary Muslims.' A 
similar view was expressed by one respondent who suggested that the ‘clergy’ 
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cannot deal with today’s problems, they belong to a different era – Soviet days…a 
period of stagnation’ (Interview 13). The same respondent also remarked that the 
current attempts to modernise the system reminded him of ‘preventive half measures, 
when the body needs surgery’ (Ibid). 
 
The extent to which representation of Muslim interests through the centralised 
organisations has become institutionalised is supported by the SMR’s rather cautious, 
national-based approach to introducing only gradual changes rather than attempting a 
complete institutional makeover. For example, Akhmetova (2011) expressed a view 
shared within the circle of young Muslim intellectuals working with the SMR that:  
 
it is only by reformatting the existing system…by strengthening it 
from within that we can save it from collapsing…we argue in 
defence of the system not from the point of defending ‘muftiyats 
for their own sake’ but because the system…provides Russian 
Muslims with a sense of autonomy to regulate spiritual life, to take 
the initiative into their hands, to revive and create a cultural and 
spiritual space. 
 
Damir Mukhetdinov (2012b) also acknowledged that over-bureaucratisation of 
power structures within the large DUMs has contributed to generational conflicts and 
aloofness of religious leaders. The DUMs may be difficult to reform, but they are 
believed to represent a backbone, the official channel of Muslim representation to 
state authorities. The reformist leaders of the SMR believe that they provide the only 
way to preserve Muslim autonomy from the state and their institutional weaknesses 
must be addressed.  
 
 
Parallel structures and institutionalised fragmentation  
 
As was already mentioned, before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there 
were only two organisations responsible for administering Muslim affairs on the 
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territory of the Russian Federation.76 One was called DUMES, which was later 
renamed the TsDUM. It was based in Ufa and was responsible for managing Muslim 
religious life in the European part of the USSR and Siberia. The other was the 
Muslim Spiritual Board of the North Caucasus (DUMSK) and was established in 
Dagestan. However, since then the muftiyats sprang up in different regions and were 
largely (albeit not exclusively) grouped under the jurisdiction of one of the three 
centralised organisations. The self-reinforcing pattern has continued unabated.   
 
Internal competition between the Tatar and Bashkir organisations such as the SMR 
and the TsDUM resulted in internal divisions and further fragmentation of the 
Muslim organisational field. As new leaders sought to create administrative units to 
represent their local interests, they would join one organisation or the other, often 
depending on their personal loyalty to Ravil Gainutdin or Talgat Tadjuddin. In her 
assessment of Muslim organisations, Hunter (2004: 46) noted fluidity in the ‘patterns 
of allegiance of these spiritual boards vis-à-vis the centralised religious 
organisations.’ This practice of registering local organisations under the jurisdiction 
of the SMR or the TsDUM resulted in a rather confused picture. Based on personal 
preferences, such an illustration of Muslim pluralism inadvertently weakened the 
authority of individual muftis and undermined the institution of the spiritual board.  
 
In an attempt to increase their influence, the centralised DUMs looked to create and 
register an even greater number of local organisations under their respective 
jurisdictions. As a result, a series of parallel institutions sprang up in the same region, 
representing the rights of the same local communities, administering their affairs and 
engaging with local authorities on their behalf. In an interview on the challenges of 
Muslim unification in Russia, Damir Khairetdinov (2009) noted that ‘up till now we 
have such a crazy situation when, for example, two muftis living in one street of the 
same village report to the two different centralised organisations.’ Within the 
                                                 
76 The other two regional organisations were the Muslim Spiritual Board of Kazakhstan and Central 
Asia, based in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and the Muslim Spiritual Board of Transcaucasia, based in Baku 
(Azerbaijan). 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The SMR’s engagement with Muslim communities  247 
Russian corporatist context and its centralised dynamic, such a way of representing 
Muslim interests has only deepened internal divisions and hindered any attempts by 
the SMR to empower Muslim communities within the official framework of Muslim 
governance. 
 
A key critical juncture in the process of fragmentation was the departure of Ravil 
Gainutdin and like-minded muftis from the TsDUM and the subsequent creation of 
the SMR itself. While personal ambitions and rivalry may have fuelled the ongoing 
dispute within the Muslim leadership, generational conflict and different approaches 
to the way Muslim organisations should be run played a part in this decision. For 
example, in 1994, young leaders such as Mukaddas Bibarsov, Nafigullah Ashirov 
and Abdul-vahed Niyazov77 supported Gainutdin’s relatively democratic approach 
based on greater consultation and regular elections of the chairman and its deputies 
by the Muslim Council (mejlis).78 Although the newly formed organisation would 
also become constrained by previous patterns of power-sharing and strong 
preferences for endorsement of the appointed leaders without proper community-
wide elections, by the mid-1990s the SMR stood for a more progressive form of 
Muslim representation.  
 
The extent to which the internal split had become locked in became apparent in 2009, 
when (as noted above) the joint efforts to create a single structure of Muslim 
administration came to nothing. The inability to come together and reconcile internal 
differences also exposed the extent to which the organisational structure of the 
DUMs struggled to present a common Muslim agenda. In his study on the history of 
Muslim forums in 2005-2012, Khabutdinov (2013) noted a degree of internal 
disillusionment:  
 
                                                 
77 Bibarsov is the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Saratov Region, Ashirov is in charge 
of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Asian part of Russia, while Abdul-vahed Niyazov is 
President of the Islamic Cultural Centre in Russia. All three are important figures in the SMR. 
78 The leader of the TsDUM is elected for life in accordance with its organisational statutes (TsDUM 
1999: 9). 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
The SMR’s engagement with Muslim communities  248 
By 2010…the inability to create an All-Russian body, the process 
of the ever-deepening schism within the Muslim Spiritual Boards 
and the slowing down of the real integration within the Eurasian 
space felt oppressive. 
 
 
Reformist opportunities and implemented changes 
 
To better understand the scope of reforms and their level of success within a 
particular set of historically entrenched barriers, it is useful to focus on which 
measures were eventually introduced and which were not. Similarly to the MCB, the 
SMR undertook a series of changes, which can be described as layering new 
institutional rules, without completely displacing the existing ones. This is in line 
with theoretical expectations of gradual change suggested by Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010) which is typical of the constraining context of strong veto players and low 
enforcement of rules.  
 
As in the British case, the Russian Council did not replace institutional principles of 
power sharing within the DUMs with something radically different. For example, 
one interviewee mentioned the idea of Islamic centres as an unwelcome alternative 
(Interview 20). This would have meant a displacement strategy and would have 
offset the vested interests of the Muslim clergy. Another alternative could have been 
just to leave everything as it was (the drifting scenario) which would have implied 
simply waiting for a gradual change in the Muslim elite without opening the doors 
for a younger generation of leaders. Widening the voting rights to ordinary members 
of Muslim communities or grassroots organisations, rather than the heads of the 
centralised DUMs, would have corresponded to the idea of conversion, or a complete 
reinterpretation of the rules.  
 
The data suggests that the SMR’s style of modernisation corresponded to the 
layering pattern of reforms. The creation of new departments within the central office 
of the SMR and stronger engagement with young leaders working alongside the ‘old 
guard’ (Interview 5) created an additional set of rules without upsetting the already 
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established practices. Similarly, the idea of inviting regional organisations to share 
their concerns and expertise online worked alongside the existing offline framework 
of Muslim forums. 
 
In 2005, the late deputy mufti of Tatarstan, Valiula Yakupov (2005) criticised the 
SMR and the TsDUM for being ‘far removed from the principle of Muslim 
democracy.’ In particular, he regretted the absence of direct elections within the 
SMR and the lack of national Muslim congresses. The Council addressed the second 
criticism by calling the All-Russian Muslim Congress every 5 years and holding 
regular work meetings and consultations. This was partly designed to reflect the 
SMR’s adherence to Islamic principles of consultation and partly as a legal 
organisational requirement introduced by the Ministry of Justice.79 However, the 
accountability and transparency of the selection process and endorsement of the 
SMR’s chairman and his deputies remained largely unchanged.   
 
The latest elections of the Chairman of the SMR and his deputies took place in 
August 2012 during the VI Mejlis of the SMR (i.e. the meeting of the SMR’s 
governing body). The press release from the DUMER stated that ‘following 
preliminary consultations among members of the SMR and representatives of its 
member organisations…delegates voted unanimously for the candidature of Ravil 
Gainutdin’ (DUMER 2012d). Interestingly, the right to vote was only given to 28 
delegates, with five of the votes allocated to the DUMER and six to the DUMAChR. 
The remaining 17 votes were, therefore, distributed among the remaining regional 
DUMs within the jurisdiction of the SMR. The same congress approved the proposed 
figures for the chairman’s deputies. Thus, the top leadership of the SMR was 
reconfirmed for another 5 years in line with the reformed organisational statutes 
(DUMER 2012e).   
 
                                                 
79 In response to legal claims that the SMR’s statues and code of practice was out of step with state 
requirements, the SMR stipulated that it would run its Congress every five years and its working 
sessions not less than once a year (SMR Press Release 2 October 2009). 
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Although it was possible to increase the number of meetings and consultations with 
Muslim delegates, no serious attempts were made to change the power-sharing 
arrangements within the SMR or ensure that its leaders would go through a more 
democratic style of elections. Similarly to the MCB, the programme of 
modernisation was not designed to change the internal power structure of the SMR 
but rather to introduce a gradual change that would consist of creating extra layers of 
rules and practices rather than undoing the existing ones. One respondent claimed 
that it was important to ‘prepare a gradual transition within the Muslim elite’ 
(Interview 7). Moreover, it had to be done in such a way that ‘muftis with 
considerable experience, who have worked over the last 20 years have not 
been….crossed out from history… but so that their experience would serve new 
leaders in the spiritual boards’(Ibid).  
 
Finally, in light of the existing bureaucratic inflexibility and the inability to work out 
a unified position, the reforms were successful in improving administrative rather 
than democratic legitimacy of the institution. It is difficult to gauge the extent to 
which the reforms helped the SMR to secure stronger support among Russian 
Muslims. However, alongside the constraining legacy of bureaucratic structures and 
the dynamic of fragmentation, past patterns of Muslim mobilisation and self-
organisation may have provided the basis for further consolidation, which, in turn, 
would strengthen the links between the Muslim clergy and Muslim communities. 
 
The young intellectuals working with the SMR wished to resurrect the reformist 
legacy of the Jadidist teachings and channel it to support the modernisation efforts. 
For example, they were strong advocates of the idea of recreating an interrupted 
tradition of the All-Russian Muslim Forums. While the Medina publishing house 
organised conferences on influential Tatar thinkers, the SMR’s leaders used reformist 
rhetoric to build a sense of Muslim unity. For example, a special event was organised 
to celebrate the ideological legacy of Ismail Gasprinsky and build on his ideas of 
Muslim integration and the value of education. A special attention was paid to the 
autonomous nature of a local Muslim community with its own independent clergy. 
Gasprinsky (1881, reprinted in Mukhetdinov, ed. 2011: 88-89) argued that such units 
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of Muslim administration represented a ‘miniature state with its own laws, customs 
and traditions kept fresh by the spirit of Islamism.’  
 
Drawing a parallel between his ideas and the present challenges of modernisation, 
Khabutdinov (2011: 34-36) emphasised the creation of a new national group of 
Muslim secular intelligentsia and the establishment of network engagement between 
small communities through education and cultural activities. Similarly, Makarov 
(2011: 67) argued that Gasprinsky’s ideas on positioning the Russian Muslim 
identity above ethnic markers would be beneficial today to unite and bring together 
Muslim communities, particularly in ethnically-mixed cities. A closer engagement 
with progressive ideas on modernisation and Muslim self-organisation created an 
opportunity for the SMR leaders to embrace the reformist spirit by re-engaging with 
the positive ideology of Muslim representation and self-organisation within the 
Russian context. 
 
Although it may be too early to see the extent to which the internal restructuring was 
beneficial to the SMR’s attempt to be seen as an authoritative and representative 
institution, a closer engagement with a younger generation of Muslims and a series 
of introduced and widely-publicised measures were used to restore at least some of 
the previously lost influence. This was further exemplified by a series of articles 
published by the council-friendly internet resources and portals such as Medina, 





The chapter addressed the challenges faced by the SMR in positioning itself as an 
authoritative and credible voice of Muslim communities. While its official status 
ensured support from the government and historical legacies implied that it was one 
of the few platforms available for Muslim organisations to come together and lobby 
for common interests, it had a rather mixed level of support from Muslim 
communities.  
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The data suggested that there were three possible reasons for this. First, the SMR’s 
own organisational structure was not robust enough to respond to the changing 
expectations of the Russian Muslims, overcome criticisms and diffuse internal 
tensions. Second, the council’s leadership was increasingly criticised by other 
centralised organisations, also seeking to increase their influence and boost a number 
of registered communities. Third, in spite of the SMR’s determination to make its 
organisational structure more inclusive and efficient, its efforts were constrained by 
the existing forms of Muslim representation, the bureaucratic nature of the Muslim 
clergy (which it was an integral part of) and the highly fragmented field of Muslim 
official organisations.  
 
These barriers help account for the limited nature of reforms. The conservative 
interests of the traditional elite in the DUMs, coupled with the Russian corporatist 
context, made it difficult to introduce more direct forms of Muslim representation. 
Within the existing set of constraints, the work of the SMR centred on developing 
stronger administrative and communication mechanisms aimed at representing 
collective Muslim interests in their organisational, rather than the individual 
dimension. In other words, the SMR’s programme of consolidating the Muslim civil 
society was aimed at empowering Muslim communities by strengthening the role of 
Muslim organisations and bringing them together under its leadership. The Council 
aimed at both quantitative and qualitative representation. While the former would 
give it a numerical advantage, a stronger sense of cohesion and better communication 
within its affiliated organisations, the latter would facilitate its role in uniting the 
Russian ummah. 
 
Organisational theories suggest that as new social movement organisations mature 
they realise that government officials prefer to deal with similarly-structured 
organisations. Therefore, they ensure that their own working processes fit within the 
same requirements. The SMR’s programme of internal restructuring partly fits this 
logic as it was strongly influenced by the external corporatist context and focused on 
issues of administrative efficiency. However, as an institutionalised challenger it 
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inherited the strengths and weaknesses of the previous patterns of representation, 
including a mixed bag of the reformist spirit of communal self-organisation and the 
passive style of bureaucratic governance of the Soviet era. 
 
Finally, another interesting finding was that the case of the SMR supports the claim 
that mature organisations engage in internal maintenance not only to fit within the 
external rules or to be better organised to deal with the state, but also to improve their 
reputation among those whose interests they seek to mobilise. By developing a more 
engaging and inclusive rhetoric to create a stronger sense of Muslim solidarity, the 
SMR managed to conjure up some of the mobilising spirit that was lacking in its own 
traditionally bureaucratic practices. In a way this suggests a degree of fluidity 
between a new social movement organisation and an already established one. While 
the former may lose some of its mobilising power as it becomes institutionalised, the 
latter can also try to reverse the process in case the process of institutionalisation has 
gone too far, as a way of restoring some of the lost trust. 
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Conclusion 
 
Comparative discussion and theoretical implications 
 
The project provided a detailed analysis of the ways in which the two Muslim 
councils engaged with state authorities and Muslim communities in the period 1997-
2013. Based on the written documents and statements, media articles, opinion polls 
and qualitative interviews conducted with members of the councils and 
representatives of Muslim elites in the two countries, I sought to develop a deeper 
understanding of the ways in which Muslim councils juggle the pressures of co-
optation by the state and representation of Muslim communities. The data collected 
in this way was triangulated to gain insight into the councils’ behaviour and 
rhetorical strategies used to reconcile the challenges of integration and representation 
in the different contexts of interest meditation.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I will first provide a comparative discussion of the 
empirical findings and suggest their implications for research on Muslim 
communities and the challenges of integration and representation. I will then revisit 
the conceptual framework of the project and outline the thesis’ theoretical 
contribution and comparative value. 
 
Muslim councils compared: co-optation, representation, mediation  
 
In this thesis, I explored the challenges of Muslim collective representation through 
the lens of Muslim councils acting on behalf of Muslim communities in the pluralist 
and corporatist contexts of state-religion relations. In light of shared security and 
integration concerns, both states have sought to accommodate religious rights of 
Muslim minorities and engage with particular Muslim organisations they could trust. 
I examined the two Muslim councils as particular interest group organisations 
entrusted with mediating between state interests and Muslim minority expectations. 
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The thesis discussed how the two organisations have dealt with the tension between 




The councils’ engagement with the state  
 
A key argument of this thesis is that the councils’ success in lobbying the state on 
behalf of Muslim communities was determined by the nature of their relations with 
the state, the level of access to state officials and the scope for taking a critical 
position towards state policies. A key finding was that close engagement with state 
authorities provided the dilemma of how to reconcile the pressure of co-optation with 
the need to openly challenge state policies if and when required. The complexities 
and shifts in how the two councils engaged with state authorities in Britain and 
Russia were discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 respectively. 
 
The first question was designed to explain the pluralist and corporatist nature of 
state-religion relations in Britain and Russia. The data on state-Muslim relations and 
the institutional processеs of integrating Islam in a wider organisational framework 
of state-religion relations provided sufficient evidence to suggest that this typology 
was applicable to the two cases. Consequently, the British pluralist context was 
characterised by low levels of state intervention into religious life and a well-
developed civil society; a strong preference for dealing with religious issues on the 
local level and institutional provisions for interfaith cooperation; a high number of 
voluntary civil society organisations and alternative, independent platforms for 
lobbying the state.  
 
Conversely, the Russian corporatist context was exemplified by high levels of state 
intervention and a rather weak civil society; a strong centralising dynamic of 
hierarchically structured interest mediation and limited interfaith cooperation; and 
finally strong state paternalism and institutionalised rivalry for state patronage 
among official religious organisations. While the two cases were differentiated in 
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relation to these features in light of the empirical data, the research also revealed 
rather atypical, albeit short, periods of corporatist and pluralist elements of state-
religion relations in Britain and Russia respectively. While these were rather brief, 
this suggests that some occasional blurring of the two types of arrangements was also 
possible (see next sections).  
 
The typology used in the thesis corresponded to the pluralist and corporatist patterns 
of interest mediation, more traditionally used to delineate political and economic 
contexts, but not so much the politico-religious one.80 However, it provided a useful 
way to discuss the nature of council-state engagement in light of the institutional and 
organisational dimensions of state-religion relations. Against the backdrop of the 
different approaches to accommodating Islam as a minority religion in the two 
institutional contexts, both cases showed convergence in policies aimed at 
recognising faith in the public sphere. Moreover, they also revealed similar tensions 
in council-state relations on the issue of Muslim religious rights and freedom of 
expression. Real or perceived feelings of Muslim religious identity being under 
threat were at the centre of the councils’ peaceful as well as more confrontational 
negotiations with the state.  
 
The second question of the thesis addressed the nature of the councils’ engagement 
with the state. In light of the diverging nature of state-religion relations I examined 
the ways in which the councils’ strategies to lobby the government and articulate 
Muslim claims were affected by these conditions. My initial expectation was that in 
Britain, the pressures of co-optation would be lower than in Russia. This was based 
on the assumption that in the pluralist context, interest group organisations are less 
compelled to work closely with the state than they are in the corporatist one. The 
research indicated that over the period in question, the MCB was generally less 
restricted in its actions and rhetoric towards the government than the SMR.  
                                                 
80 A notable exception is a study on Islamic councils and their role in the neo-corporatist context of 
Europe by Laurence (2006). 
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To unpack the differences in how the two institutions responded to the pressures of 
co-optation I examined a series of conditions under which they engaged in 
cooperation and contention with state authorities. In the British pluralist context, the 
MCB was found to have more independence from the state but did not manage to 
retain its initial status of the leading Muslim partner. This was conditioned by a 
weaker level of state intervention in the religious sphere, a more decentralised 
approach to interest mediation and the presence of different allies and alternative 
channels to lobby the state. Conversely, its Russian counterpart managed to position 
itself as arguably the most influential interlocutor of Muslim interests while its 
interaction with state officials was largely based on close cooperation and co-
optation. This was exemplified by the centralised structures of state-Muslim 
relations, a strong paternalistic approach and the lack of alternative platforms and 
alliances with other faiths which could have given the Council more independence 
from the state.  
 
However, the findings also confirmed the dynamic nature of the engagement process, 
as it was subject to negotiation and interpretation by both parties. A key expectation 
of the thesis was that changes in external opportunities and constraints alter the 
behaviour of interest group organisations. The research revealed that the ways in 
which the two councils interpreted and managed the pressures of co-optation were 
conditioned by institutional shifts in state approaches to establishing partnerships 
with Muslim organisations and ideological changes in state policies on religion. The 
councils’ strategies were also affected by how the two organisations interpreted and 
mobilised the changing salience of religious cleavages. Their behaviour and rhetoric 
were determined by whether they believed the government was taking care of 
Muslim concerns or whether Muslim religious freedoms were being infringed. 
Therefore, both institutions cooperated with the government as institutionalised 
partners and both challenged state authorities as representatives of Muslim minority 
interests. 
 
For example, the councils’ cooperation with the government was stronger when their 
leaders saw the state taking steps to recognise the importance of faith in the public 
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sphere. In Britain, this was under Labour’s first administration during the 
government’s attempts to mainstream religion to achieve social cohesion. In Russia, 
the SMR established close contacts with state officials: first when Islam was 
recognised as one of Russia’s traditional religions under Yeltsin and second when 
Muslim senior clergy were integrated into the corporatist bureaucracy of state-
religion relations under Putin’s first (and increasingly second) presidency. Increased 
cooperation in both cases was facilitated by corporatist-inspired ideology, matched 
expectations and good informal relations between the council leaders and state 
officials.  
 
In the Russian corporatist context, this was not surprising. However, in the British 
pluralist context, Labour’s neo-corporatist values and willingness to endorse the 
MCB as the main Muslim voice was a rather atypical development. Positive 
promotion of religion in the public sphere initially helped pacify some of the existing 
religious cleavages. Consequently the two councils adapted conciliatory rhetoric and 
acted in partnership with the state. This was evident in the analysis of the MCB’s 
participation in the campaign to introduce religion in the 2001 Census and the SMR’s 
cooperation with the government on the issue of creating and funding a centralised 
system of Islamic education. In the British pluralist context, the MCB engaged on the 
issue with a variety of interfaith and civil society groups, whereas in the Russian 
corporatist context, the nature of council-state partnership was reinforced by 
paternalistic relations between the state and the Muslim clergy. 
 
A comparison between the two cases also revealed periods of tensions which 
overshadowed the previous collaboration efforts. In both cases, the salience of 
previously somewhat pacified religious divisions was exacerbated by the lack of 
agreement between the councils and the government on what needed to be done. In 
the British context, there was a clash of interests over ways of dealing with 
extremism, particularly when the government accused the MCB of not doing enough 
to denounce terrorism. In the Russian case, tensions were high in capital cities over 
the lack of mosques and the influx of Muslim migrants from Central Asia. During 
these periods the Council’s use of confrontational rhetoric towards state officials was 
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motivated by the need to defend the threatened rights of Muslim minorities. In the 
British case, the presence of allies and alternative platforms meant that the risk of 
disengaging from the government was low. Conversely, in the Russian centralised 
context, permeated by paternalism and riddled not only with rivalries between 
centralised Muslim organisations but also complicated by competition between Islam 
and the Orthodox Church, the risk of a more permanent disengagement was too high.  
 
The research highlighted that the MCB openly criticised government policies on 
extremism and regained its independence from the government. However, security 
concerns increased the co-optation pressures on the MCB, while the gradually 
worsening relations with government ministers resulted in disengagement from the 
government. In the British pluralist context the risk of losing government backing 
was relatively low because there were other venues to lobby the government, 
including interfaith organisations and broader Muslim coalitions, such as the 
MINAB. However, the extent to which the critical rhetoric and the breakdown in 
relations were welcomed by Muslim communities remains debatable.  
 
The SMR’s relatively confrontational behaviour towards the Russian authorities on 
the issue of mosque shortages was rather unusual under corporatist conditions. It was 
shaped by the increasingly negative perceptions of Muslim migrants in Russian 
society and the individual attitudes of state officials engaged in religious affairs. The 
Council’s willingness to challenge government officials openly in the media was also 
in response to what it believed to be attempts to undermine its own reputation by its 
rivals. By 2010, the Council’s leaders felt their messages being increasingly ignored 
by state advisors. Internal rivalries between Muslim centralised organisations have 
been an integral part of the Russian context. However, under a short phase of 
Medvedev’s administration, the Russian corporatist system acquired a slightly 
pluralist colouring, not so much in the democratising nature of the state, but rather a 
more diversified method of state engagement with religious leaders. With the 
introduction of new players into the narrow arena of state-Muslim relations (e.g. 
RAIS and the Moscow office of TsDUM), the SMR felt it was being punished for its 
rhetoric on building mosques for Muslim migrants. Tougher words were also needed 
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to fight its competitors who tried to benefit from state advisors distancing themselves 
from the council. The SMR’s confrontational rhetoric was bolstered, however, by the 
like-minded supporters from the DUM in Nizhny Novgorod joining its ranks in 
Moscow. 
 
The final phase of council-state relations under the Coalition government in Britain 
and Putin’s third presidency was marked by the return to more traditional forms of 
pluralist and corporatist interest mediation. The MCB’s disengagement from the 
Labour government over its securitised policies towards Muslim communities and 
the worsening personal relations marked an end to a rather atypical corporatist phase 
in the council’s engagement with the state. A change in government in 2010 
signalled a return to pluralist engagement with religion under the Coalition and 
another shift in state policies on religious governance. On one hand, Conservative 
ministers favoured stronger engagement with the Anglican Church and a more local 
approach to resolving minority issues on the individual, rather than the national level. 
This has marked a key departure from Labour’s corporatist way of organising faith 
interests associationally.  
 
The MCB could still engage with individual ministers and lobby the government 
from a variety of platforms. However, a close engagement between the MCB and the 
British government was constrained not only by Conservatives’ distrust of what was 
perceived as the Council’s Islamist agenda, but also by their ideological differences. 
The MCB’s leaders believed that Muslim interests were best represented collectively, 
while the Coalition ministers saw Muslims as individual citizens. Their policies and 
statements on social cohesion and community integration indicated that they did not 
view Muslims as a bounded faith community. During this later period, the MCB did 
not so much respond to the pressures of co-optation, but rather had to re-evaluate its 
engagement with the government in light of this cooling in relations. Under the 
conditions of decreased cooperation, the Council’s direct access to the government 
was reduced. However, the increasingly pluralised organisational landscape of state-
religion relations and a well-developed civil society encouraged it to build new 
alliances with Muslim and non-Muslim groups. 
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In the Russian context based on the ‘vertical of power’, the tensions were eventually 
resolved by taking Muslim grievances all the way to the top, thus bypassing the 
middle level of state bureaucracy. The council vowed to ‘clean up’ its act, while the 
‘newly’ elected President Putin promised that nobody would intervene in Muslim 
affairs and the Council’s sphere of influence by backing new players and deliberately 
pluralising Muslim organisational landscape. Therefore, following this short-lived 
confrontation, the SMR has re-engaged with the Russian state and continued to lobby 
the government in a more conciliatory fashion, in fitting with an institutionalised 
Muslim organisation. It responded to the pressure of keeping in line with state 
demands by demonstrating that it was skilled in navigating the centralised landscape 
of corporatist interest mediation, marked by strong personal connections with top 
officials and rivalries with competitive players. Although the Council leaders 
acknowledged that close proximity to the state was not always rewarded by support 
from Russian Muslims, they believed that the lack of direct access to the government 
would be detrimental to representing Muslim interests and protecting their rights in 
Russian society. 
 
The pluralist and corporatist contexts of state-religion relations created different 
levels of pressure on the councils to cooperate with the state, based on how much 
contention each organisation could afford, without damaging its chances of having 
sufficient access to the government. The availability of good personal connections 
was an equally important factor in the two cases of engagement, whereas the 
centralising or decentralising dynamic of informal approaches to governance helped 
account for the different strategies used by the two councils. The research also 
suggested that the changing nature of state ideology on religion, combined with the 
religious cleavages and the extent to which they were pacified or sharpened, played a 
key role in the changing nature of council-state relations.  
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The councils’ engagement with Muslim communities  
 
The issue of Muslim representation and the challenges associated with the lack of 
legitimacy were addressed in Chapters 4 and 6. In these chapters, I focused on the 
issue of Muslim collective representation and discussed the ways in which the two 
Muslim councils struggled to legitimise themselves in the eyes of Muslim 
communities in Britain and Russia. The pluralist nature of Islam and its forms of 
representation, based on individual religious figures and very diverse ethnic, 
religious, social and cultural perspectives, are problematic for state efforts to pick a 
particular interlocutor with whom to engage. While the two organisations have never 
claimed to be the most representative Muslim institutions, they engaged with the 
government and general public on behalf of Muslim communities. The research 
revealed that Muslim communities, including different groups and organisations, 
questioned the extent to which the councils had enough authority and community 
support to represent their interests.  
 
The third question identified the challenges and constraints of gaining and 
maintaining Muslim support in the two contexts in order to unpack how the councils 
interpreted and tried to tackle their legitimacy deficit. I also examined the strategies 
and rhetoric the two councils used to rehabilitate themselves and improve their 
reputation. In spite of the different national contexts of Muslim representation, the 
changing nature of Muslim communities and the increased competition from other 
organisations provided converging challenges and undermined their credibility as 
representative institutions. At the same time, the growing disconnect between the 
councils’ own outdated organisational structures and historically contingent 
approaches to power-sharing and community leadership constrained their ability to 
keep up with the changing nature of Muslim expectations.  
 
The growing diversity of Muslim communities and the difficulty of providing 
inclusive yet differentiated representation of Muslim interests revealed the first 
challenge, shared by the two councils. Over the last decade, the nature of Muslim 
identity in Britain has become increasingly plural, whereas the original calls for 
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collective representation at the national level were challenged by the growing 
number of Muslim organisations, associations and groups. A shift from Muslim 
community to Muslim communities was accompanied by stratification along 
religious, ethnic and generational lines, as well as a different level of self-
identification with mainstream society or the global ummah, secular ideology or 
sectarian interests. The interviews revealed that the MCB’s style of leadership and 
representation was perceived as too narrow. Increased monitoring of Muslim 
communities under the anti-terrorist legislations and Islamophobic attacks following 
the 9/11, 7/7 and the murder of Lee Rigby, may have increased the need to stand 
together as a single Muslim community. However, the growing diversity of Muslim 
interests undermined collective patterns of representation, encouraging the MCB to 
become a less sectarian and more inclusive organisation.  
 
The SMR faced a similar challenge stemming from the changing nature of Muslim 
communities and stratification of their expectations along ethnic, religious and 
generational lines. It also struggled to represent a variety of Muslim interests and 
particularly those who had become particularly critical of its style of leadership and 
religious authority. However, the need to provide a more inclusive representation 
was dictated not so much by the pluralisation of the Russian ummah, but rather its 
increasing polarisation. The data suggests that the changes over the last ten years 
have led to widening cleavages along generational, ethnic and sectarian lines. Intra-
communal ethnic tensions over the shortages of religious spaces and the negative 
image of Muslim minorities in the press became a particularly divisive issue between 
the Tatar community and the groups of Muslim migrants from Central Asia. The 
Council claimed to speak in the name of all Muslims in Russia, regardless of their 
ethnic origin or Islamic tradition. However, the highly polarised nature of Muslim 
minorities indicated that a more inclusive approach was required to redress internal 
divisions. Additionally, these intra-communal tensions were counter-productive to 
the SMR’s efforts to consolidate the Russian ummah under its leadership. 
 
The second challenge was the growing competition from other Muslim organisations 
which criticised the councils’ approach to representation and community leadership. 
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In the British pluralist context, the MCB was criticised by religious and non-religious 
Muslim organisations because of its close relations with the state and its position on 
radical extremism. Some also questioned its sectarian legacies and ideology, its 
narrowly-based approach to identity politics and its internal electoral procedures. In 
the Russian corporatist context of centralised Muslim institutions and limited 
unofficial channels to make Muslim voices heard, there were fewer opportunities to 
challenge the SMR. On one hand, this meant that other centralised organisations 
could launch more personal attacks, aimed at discrediting the council in the eyes of 
the Russian ummah and the state. On the other hand, many Russian Muslims found 
themselves already disengaged from the Council and its bureaucratic approach to 
representation.  
 
In response to these challenges, the two councils developed a series of strategies to 
mobilise support and improve their reputation. Both engaged in activities aimed at 
engaging with different segments of the Muslim population. The documentary 
analysis suggested that the MCB widened its interaction with women, young people 
and the business community. The SMR invited young educated Muslims and also 
developed special adaptation programmes for Muslim migrants from Central Asia. A 
detailed study of the councils’ rhetoric towards Muslim communities showed that 
both institutions sought to unite Muslims under their leadership by combining 
Islamic discourses on Muslim solidarity, consultation and empowerment. 
 
The logic of solidarity and consultation was used to communicate the message of 
becoming inclusive and aware of the changing needs of Muslim communities. Even 
though the nature of the words was similar, the end message was different. The MCB 
talked about unity in diversity to reconcile Muslim collective representation as a 
bounded faith community with its internal diversity. The SMR emphasised Muslim 
unity to heal the existing ethnic tensions. The MCB used an Islamic concept of 
consultation to show that it welcomed a variety of opinions in an open and inclusive 
fashion. The SMR differentiated between consultations amongst the DUM’s senior 
leaders and all-Muslim forums aimed at building more general support. The rhetoric 
of empowerment was also coloured by the pluralist and corporatist connotations. For 
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the MCB, the focus was on self-governance and empowering British Muslims to 
represent themselves. For the SMR, the empowerment was linked to improving the 
educational standards of the Muslim elite and consolidating the outdated system of 
the DUMs to make it more compatible with the centralised patterns of governance. 
 
The research also revealed that the external norms of pluralist and corporatist 
approaches to interest representation permeated the councils’ internal strategies. The 
project identified the issue of institutional reforms as the most tangible and direct 
effort by the councils to improve their legitimacy. Both institutions showed readiness 
to modify their own organisational structures to put their own house in order. 
Together with the previously described measures and the rhetoric of engagement, 
these steps were designed to reject the growing criticisms that the councils were 
unable to represent Muslim interests in an inclusive and accountable/efficient 
manner. This is an area where the findings show divergence. The influence of 
external factors helps explain why the nature of reforms was so different. In the 
British context, the constitutional review was designed to convince the MCB’s critics 
of its democratic credentials and institutional accountability. In the Russian context, 
the SMR was more concerned with the lack of administrative legitimacy and 
effective ways to consolidate Muslim spiritual boards under its own leadership and 
modernise the outdated system of Muslim administration in line with managerial or 
technocratic principles. 
 
The two councils took significant steps to restructure their respective institutions. 
The MCB consulted its affiliates on how to improve its electoral procedures and 
membership arrangements, as well as increase participation from the under-
represented segments of Muslim population. The SMR’s approach involved listening 
to young leaders and restructuring its internal communication with affiliated DUMs 
to overcome the bureaucratic weaknesses and organisational passivity of these 
bodies. The SMR’s central office wanted to lead by example, to streamline its own 
processes and administrative practices and communicate them down to their 
affiliates. Alongside these measures, it registered and affiliated more Muslim 
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organisations to have a numeric advantage of representing more organisations than 
its rivals. 
 
A key finding of the thesis was that in Britain, the MCB attempted to make its 
organisation more inclusive and democratically accountable to Muslim communities. 
This was in line with pluralist norms of strong civil society, competition and a large 
number of organisations. In Russia, the SMR strived to make its institution equally 
inclusive, but also administratively efficient to gain influence within the increasingly 
fragmented Muslim organisational landscape. This was more in line with corporatist 
patterns of consolidated forms of interest mediation and few hierarchically structured 
units of administration. 
 
The research also indicated that the two councils were rather cautious about 
modernising their institutions too much too soon. The MCB introduced quotas on 
female participation and opened up the process of elections by making the 
procedures more democratic. However, for now, it stopped short of radically 
changing the affiliation structures by introducing individual membership (as was 
suggested during consultations). The SMR created new departments in its central 
office in Moscow and put in charge young leaders who were energetic, educated and 
believed to be in touch with young Muslims. It also instigated further consultations 
between the central office and regional organisations. However, it stopped short of 
changing the power-sharing arrangements and democratising its electoral procedures. 
 
A closer evaluation of how these measures were discussed and implemented revealed 
an important constraint on the institutional behaviour of the two councils. The 
organisational development of the MCB was restricted by the entrenched, 
conservative approaches to representation and community leadership. Traditionalist 
views and the numerical advantage of Islamist-based institutions among the MCB’s 
affiliates have prevented more progressive leaders from having more say. Moreover, 
the data indicated that while local mosque committees made up a large proportion of 
the MCB’s affiliates, their senior leaders sat on the MCB’s committees as Muslim 
representatives, often without having been previously elected. More extensive 
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reforms would have threatened the entrenched interests, which arguably resisted 
more democratic forms of representation.  
 
In the Russian context, the history of highly fragmented and over-bureaucratised 
regional DUMs and local organisations meant that their senior representatives were 
reluctant to embrace change and let in younger leaders. While this was not the case 
with the SMR’s own organisational changes, the presence of these interests 
hampered the efforts to cascade the reforms down to the individual DUMs in order to 
create a more consolidated, modernised and administratively efficient system of 
Muslim administration. Moreover, historically institutionalised rivalries between the 
SMR and the TsDUM encouraged the creation of parallel muftiyats which frustrated 
the SMR’s ambition to consolidate the field of Muslim organisations under its 
leadership. 
 
In light of the aforementioned challenges and constraints, the research demonstrated 
that the MCB attempted to establish itself as a democratic institution, whereas the 
SMR was more concerned with improving its administrative legitimacy. Arguably, in 
the corporatist context, close connections with Muslim communities may have been 
less important for the Council than building a more flexible yet effective structure to 
outmanoeuvre its rivals. In the pluralist context, the MCB’s legitimacy was more 
affected by the apathy and the lack of interest from Muslim communities, while in 
light of the plethora of different organisations, securing an advantage over other 
Muslim actors was less desirable or indeed feasible.  
 
Therefore, the research indicated that as minority interest organisations, Muslim 
councils vary their community engagement strategies. As they become more aware 
of the changing expectations and their own organisational limitations, they show 
more willingness to adapt to the existing rules of interest mediation. In particular, 
they try to balance collective efforts to lobby on behalf of Muslim minorities as a 
unified group with the increasingly pluralising and polarising nature of Muslim 
interests. The extent to which they succeed in these efforts is contingent on their own 
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internal resources and the ways these steps are received and interpreted – externally 
by state officials and internally by Muslim communities and Muslim organisations. 
 
The study focused on the councils themselves and how they interpreted Muslim 
aspirations and reacted to the changing nature of these opportunities and constraints. 
Although there are some opinion polls which reflect Muslim attitudes towards the 
MCB, this kind of data is scarce in relation to the SMR. Further research is required 
to gauge whether the two councils were perceived as more representative in light of 
their reformist efforts and whether this had the desired effect of making these 
organisations popular with their constituents.  
 
 
The co-optation and representation nexus 
 
The main question of the thesis was designed to examine how the two intermediary 
institutions engage with the state and seek support from Muslim communities under 
different conditions. A final consideration worth discussing is whether the two 
processes of council-state and council-community engagement were interconnected. 
Put differently, was the councils’ respective interaction with the state somewhat 
conditioned by the real or perceived sense of being a representative institution? 
Conversely, did the councils struggle to be accepted as representative Muslim 
organisations because of their relations with the state? 
 
There is an expectation by some state officials that Muslim councils are designed to 
be an effective instrument to facilitate state-Islam relations, provided that the 
councils cooperate fully with the government. While this may vary in relation to 
more democratic/pluralist or authoritarian/corporatist approaches to managing 
internal social cohesion, in periods of increased security tensions such demands on 
the councils increase. Inevitably, this creates tensions with Muslim communities who 
tend to see such actions as increased interference into their affairs. The research 
emphasised the key dilemma facing Muslim councils in their mediatory capacity 
between state demands for integration and community expectations for 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Conclusion  269 
representation. To be a reliable partner of the state, they had to show that they had 
sufficient support and legitimacy among Muslim communities. In order to position 
themselves as a representative voice of Muslim interests, they were expected to have 
sufficient access to the state and cooperation with its officials without losing their 
independence and becoming a state instrument for managing Muslim affairs.   
 
The study contributed to the existing literature on Muslim organisations and their 
participation in religious governance by providing a more dynamic analysis of the 
challenges involved in building partnerships between Muslim councils, state actors 
and civil society in the areas of integration and minority representation. A series of 
studies on participatory governance highlighted the positive and negative aspects of 
the co-optation processes that such a mode of relations inevitably entails (see 
discussion in O’Toole and Gale 2014). The empirical data revealed that a 
participatory mode of governance based on the idea of partnership between state 
authorities and civil society actors was not limited to decentralised systems of 
governance In can also be present in more centralised or vertical modes of state-
Muslim engagement, albeit with increased pressures of meeting state expectations on 
security and integration.  
The research also indicated that in instances where the state imposed the excessive 
pressure to cooperate, the protesting activities of the councils and their mobilising 
rhetoric increased. While this was evident over the MCB’s handling of the ‘Prevent’ 
agenda, it was also apparent in the SMR’s increasingly militant rhetoric over the 
issue of mosque shortages and protection of Muslim migrants and their religious 
rights. The study uncovered that following the periods of increased contention with 
the government, the councils intensified their efforts to win more support from 
Muslim communities. However, the research was inconclusive as to whether the use 
of mobilising and protesting rhetoric has really helped the councils to be accepted as 
legitimate representatives and defenders of Muslim interests. The data collection of 
the project was limited to identifying the ways in which the two councils have dealt 
with the opportunities and constraints of Muslim integration and representation 
between 1997 and 2013. With the councils’ fluctuating fortunes, more detailed 
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research and opinion polls with Muslim communities are required to determine 
whether in the long run, their internal institutional changes will help improve their 
popularity among Muslim communities and their credibility among state officials 
and other religious groups.  
 
Interestingly, the research demonstrated the importance of the changing nature of 
Muslim civil society and the ways in which this affected the councils’ ability to 
mediate between state and community interests. For example, both councils 
benefited from the developing landscape of Muslim civil society and the increasing 
pool of potential partners engaged in collective lobbying for social justice, 
recognition of Islamic faith in public sphere, as well as creating a sense of ‘social 
cohesion’ in Britain and ‘civic consolidation’ in Russia. However, while the level of 
support has been important in determining the councils’ critical stance on 
government policies, the very existence of Muslim civil society was a double-edged 
sword for the two institutions. The pluralist nature of Muslim civil society in Britain 
and its diversified framework of horizontal ties and alternative platforms from which 
to lobby the state resulted in a series of checks and balances on the MCB’s own 
claims to speak on behalf of Muslim communities, thus questioning its institutional 
legitimacy. In the Russian context, exemplified by a rather fragmented Muslim sector 
of civil society, less-developed civil society and strong patterns of paternalistic 
dependency on state officials, the RCM’s room for dissent was more constrained.  
Fewer opportunities for building bottom-up partnerships with grassroots 
organisations help explain not only a more active role played by the Muslim elites in 
Russia, but also highly competitive conditions at the top of the Muslim leadership 
pyramid. By focusing largely on the organisational level of Muslim elites and state-
endorsed organisations, rather than ordinary Muslim citizens, the study highlighted 
particular legitimacy challenges faced by this type of Muslim institutions, struggling 
to navigate top-down and bottom-up processes of engagement between state actors 
and Muslim communities. Similarly, in the British case, a study of the MCB’s 
activities through the prism of Muslim political elites revealed some tensions 
between state-endorsed initiatives of Muslim engagement and bottom-up, grassroots 
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activities of Muslim civil society. Moreover, the study indicated different 
expectations of Muslim political elites and civil society actors in the two countries. 
Further research, however, is required to ascertain the extent to which different 
political culture and state-society relations can help explain the nature of these 
differences. 
The analysis of the two councils in their contrasting contexts also helped identify 
possible conditions in which collective forms of Muslim representation through such 
national umbrella bodies become more feasible and (if not desirable) at least more 
justifiable. The first condition refers to the presence of a real or perceived threat that 
the interests of Muslim community (as a group or a category) are undermined. In 
particular, such was the context in which the MCB was formed in the aftermath of 
the Rushdie Affair. In light of the British pluralist and decentralised forms of interest 
organisations, this was a rather unexpected development. However, at that stage it 
was welcomed by the government and Muslim communities alike. Consequently, in 
spite of its shortcomings, the MCB has continuously tried to prove its worth once the 
political, social and religious conditions for Muslim communities in Britain have 
changed. For the MCB, the idea of ‘community under threat’ was associated with the 
need for collective representation of the Muslim agenda on the national level. 
However, in the British context characterised by local level initiatives and network 
engagement this objective proved rather difficult to achieve. 
 
The second condition is linked to the organisational or administrative necessity for 
such a particular organisation to exist in the first place, based on the state approach to 
managing religious diversity. This was illustrated by the Russian case. The 
corporatist approach to religious governance creates the administrative need for such 
an identity-based institution to manage and govern a particular segment of interests. 
In other words, in the corporatist context, the role of such a Muslim institution can be 
considered as functional in light of the associationally-organised interests.  
 
Arguably, the corporatist nature of the state requires Muslim communities to 
establish unified structures with whom the state can interact in a similar way as it 
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engages with other religious groups. The federal specificities of the Russian context 
and historical legacies resulted in a series of centralised Muslim bodies with different 
regional jurisdictions. To be successful in this context, a Muslim organisation tries to 
model (or bring inline) its own institutional set-up in relation to the bureaucratic 
practices of the state, while trying to reconcile this with the Islamic principles 
governing the state of living in the non-Muslim environment. To an extent this may 
also apply to other corporatist or neo-corporatist cases of associationally-organised 
interests, including more democratic examples, such France or Germany. 
 
In line with some of the findings advanced by the POS-based studies about 
mobilisation and accommodation of minority groups, the research demonstrated the 
value of understanding the ways in which divergent political contexts can create 
different scenarios of mobilising minority claims. And yet, while acknowledging 
these important differences, the research also uncovered a series of less expected 
similarities in relation to internal strategies used by the two Muslim councils to 
address the issues of their organisational maintenance and the changing external 
environment of state-religion relations. Some of these internal aspects of 
organisational structures have been neglected by the existing POS-based approaches 
to minority groups. The implications of establishing these areas of convergence were 
two-fold.  
 
First, the findings emphasised an important link between the external processes of 
interest mediation in pluralist and corporatist contexts and the ways in which these 
principles permeated the internal environment of organisational reforms. The 
contextualised comparison used in this project was particularly interesting in 
uncovering the extent to which the external rules and organisational values of 
mainstream society have affected the councils’ own internal self-legitimating 
practices. Not only did this emphasise the importance of individual contexts and 
institutional setting in shaping the actors’ behaviour, but it also brought to light the 
important dimension of informal patterns of Muslim integration. The two councils 
may have engaged in organisational maintenance in response to the pressure from 
communities for more inclusive representation. However, by doing so they revealed 
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the extent to which they have absorbed the informal practices of pluralist and 
corporatist approaches, thus indicating to state officials their credibility and worth as 
institutionalised partners. 
 
Second, the research revealed the dynamic nature of the political opportunities and 
constraints, emphasising not only the previously acknowledged structural nature of 
formal and informal opportunity structures, but also a series of internal shifts and 
fluctuations that help account for the changes in how interest group organisations 
formulate and execute their strategies (as will be discussed in the next section). The 
study examined how the two Muslim councils developed their strategies and rhetoric 
of engagement not only under different conditions of interest mediation, but also in 
light of their own organisational resources and limitations. Moreover, it 
demonstrated that the character of Muslim collective representation was influenced 
by the ways in which it was interpreted and framed by interest group organisations.  
 
These findings are beneficial to the future POS-based research on religious or ethnic 
minority representation as they provide further empirical evidence on how these 
types of Muslim organisation adapt their mobilisation strategies and rhetoric in light 
of the changing political context. A better understanding of these challenges and how 
Muslim councils attempted to deal with them contributes to a wider research on 
Muslim umbrella organisations in particular and the processes of integration, claims-
making and minority representation in general. 
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Theoretical contribution  
 
From the outset, the project aimed at exploring the behaviour of the two Muslim 
councils as interest group organisations balancing state and community expectations 
under different opportunities and constraints. The study sought to examine the 
inherent tension between the councils’ agency as a representative voice of minority 
claims and the structuring context of state-religion intermediation shaping their 
behavioural strategies. 
 
To better understand these processes in light of existing theoretical approaches, the 
study combined a series of insights from social movement theories (Kriesi et al. 
1995, McAdam et al. 1996, Tarrow 1998) and institutionalist approaches (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Pierson 2004). Each approach was tailored 
to conceptualise different aspects of this tension and examine the extent to which the 
councils’ actions and rhetoric have conformed to these expectations. Consequently, 
the notions of contention and political opportunity structures were used to 
conceptualise the changing institutional context of state-religion relations, while 
organisational and historical insights were applied to examine the nature of internal 
legitimacy and institutional resistance to change within the two organisations.  
 
 
Political opportunities, state-religion typologies and institutionalist approaches 
 
The project sought to contribute to the existing use of POS-based theories by using 
the basic pluralist/corporatist dichotomy to conceptualise the organisational and 
institutional aspects of state-religion relations. Previous frameworks were based on 
typologies of state-church relations characterised by political, religious and legal 
dimensions of institutionalising Islam in the Western context (Fetzer and Soper 
2005). Other studies focused on more dynamic ways of exploring citizen regimes and 
their impact on claims-making processes of ethnic and religious migrants (Koopmans 
and Statham 2000). In this thesis, I integrated the two approaches to conceptualise 
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the institutional dimensions of state-religion relations as a series of political 
opportunities and constraints. 
 
The data on state-religion relations under the pluralist and corporatist conditions of 
interest mediation corroborated the proposed theoretical expectation concerning the 
importance of institutional contexts as a key factor accounting for the different 
outcomes and changes in council-state relations (McAdam et al. 1996, Tarrow 1998). 
Drawing on existing literature, the pluralist and corporatist arrangements were taken 
as a working typology of the thesis to contrast the two institutional contexts of state-
religion relations. The differentiation between the pluralist and corporatist conditions 
helped capture many variations between different elements of the POS-based 
approach. In particular, it helped to differentiate between formal institutional 
structures in the two countries and identify a series of opportunities and constraints 
associated with different alliance structures.  However, the different nature of 
religious cleavages and informal structures in the two contexts proved to be less 
clear-cut, as was revealed by a series of similar developments in state-religion 
relations in the two contexts. 
 
For example, the influence of the established Church and opportunities for Muslim 
councils to introduce new conflicts were different in the two contexts. To an extent, 
the research confirmed that in the pluralist context, the mobilising potential for the 
Muslim council was higher than in the corporatist case. However, the changing 
nature of religious tensions in both cases was also an important factor in the 
councils’ engagement with the state. The councils’ behaviour was shaped by the 
degree to which these divisions were pacified or securitised in the two cases. 
Notably, both councils used less militant rhetoric in periods when the importance of 
different faiths groups was publicly acknowledged and promoted through state 
policies. Conversely, their rhetoric would become equally more aggressive in periods 
when Muslim leaders felt that Islamic faith was securitised and Muslim religious 
rights were not sufficiently protected. 
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Similarly, a close analysis of informal structures in the two cases confirmed 
differentiation between horizontal and vertical preferences for state engagement with 
religious groups. These informal practices corresponded to the pluralist or corporatist 
arrangements and contributed to a weaker or stronger cooperation between Muslim 
leaders and state officials respectively. However, both cases showed that council-
state engagement was also conditioned by reliance on personal connections and 
informal relations between government figures and Muslim representatives. Good 
working relations were equally important in the two cases, regardless of the 
centralised or the network-based approach to engagement.  
 
Moreover, the process of exploring the extent to which the councils’ behaviour 
conformed to the pluralist or corporatist expectations reveals that the two 
institutional contexts are not static: at certain points of time, they can shift to 
incorporate elements of the other. This was the case of the atypical phases of 
corporatist state-religion relations under Labour in Britain and more pluralist 
elements introduced during Medvedev’s presidency in Russia. Although the 
exception tends to prove the rule, the empirical evidence indicated that in reality the 
pluralist/corporatist distinction was messier than its ideal typology. Internal shifts in 
the two institutional settings highlighted further linkages between the meta-typology 
and theories of social movements. For example, the research supported the claim that 
contention happened in the mixed systems where the challengers’ claims were 
neither fully accommodated nor fully repressed (Eisinger 1973). This was partly 
corroborated by the changing nature of state engagement with religion in general and 
Muslim communities in particular. Consequently, the two councils’ decisions to 
engage with state authorities or disengage from them were facilitated and constrained 
by the changes in state-religion relations. 
 
The project offered further evidence to the claim that structural shifts in formal 
structures of political opportunities continued to influence the behaviour of the 
already established interest group actors and social movement organisations 
(McAdam et al. 1996: 13). For example, the changes in formal structures and 
religious cleavages played a key role in the creation of the two councils. However, 
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internal shifts and fluctuations over a period of time revealed that the institutional 
conditions continued to affect the behaviour of the two councils. In line with 
theoretical expectations, the project revealed linkages between the changes in 
institutional conditions and the actors’ choice of strategies. For example, the 
securitisation of religious divisions resulted in the instances of increasingly 
mobilised and confrontational rhetoric used by the two councils (Kriesi et al. 1995).  
 
The findings also highlighted the linkages between the external and internal 
institutional environment in relation to the nature of organisational maintenance and 
self-legitimating rhetoric (Kriesi 1996). In the two cases, the councils attempted to 
do both: to integrate themselves with their constituents and absorb pluralist or 
corporatist organisational practices to gain access to the state and other channels of 
representation. While this helps explain the behaviour of the two councils, it also 
supports the claim of organisational theorists that actors incorporate already 
institutionalised external practices to legitimate their conduct (Meyer and Rowan 
1977).  
 
The analysis of the historical dimension of power relations within the two institutions 
confirmed the initial expectation that historically entrenched interests represented a 
more powerful barrier to change than everyday organisational inertia. Moreover, the 
nature of these constraints was indicative of the kind of internal self-legitimating 
measures the two organisations were likely to implement. The concept of gradual 
change, provided by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), was particularly useful in its 
application to the micro-level of institutional reforms implemented by each 
organisation. On one hand, it helped understand the pressure interest group 
organisations face in light of their own past practices and entrenched interests. On 
the other hand, it also revealed how, in spite of these locked-in institutional 
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A combination of insights from social movement theories and institutionalist 
approaches helped conceptualise Muslim intermediary councils as already 
established organisations and thus better understand the pressures such institutions 
have to manage. Although they are no longer newcomers trying to challenge the 
existing context of state-religion relations, they still mobilise on behalf of Muslim 
communities and lobby the state to articulate their claims. Although they still use 
mobilising rhetoric and strategies and engage in contention, they have become 
institutionalised within the context of state-religion relations and, therefore, their 
behaviour is now shaped by the context as well as their own resources and 
organisational capacities. My historically sensitive perspective on organisational 
change helped examine a series of challenges and limitations they can face in 




Between mobilisation and institutionalisation 
 
The study of the two Muslim councils contributed to the debate on how interest 
group organisations participate in making claims and challenging authorities, while 
eventually appropriating organisational practices of the institutional settings in which 
they operate. The data collected on the two councils supported this claim, 
particularly by providing a more detailed analysis of Muslim councils not only as 
new challengers, entering the context of state-religion relations, but also as already 
institutionalised organisations.  
 
The behaviour of the two councils was explored through the dual lens of mobilisation 
and institutionalisation. Their attempts to satisfy the changing demands for 
representation were benchmarked against the measures to overcome their own 
organisational limitations. The use of the dual vantage point while exploring the 
changing strategies of the intermediary institutions has required a more dynamic 
theoretical framework. On one hand, I needed a way to explain the multifaceted 
behaviour of the councils (agency). On the other hand, I wanted to take into account 
Muslim Councils in Britain and Russia 
Conclusion  279 
the ways in which their behaviour was facilitated and constrained by their external 
and internal environment (structure).  
 
By exploring the pressures of mobilisation and institutionalisation, the study has tried 
to contribute to the general debate on the interplay between agency and structure. 
The research demonstrated that the institutional context influenced the level of 
contention or cooperation between minority group organisations and the state. 
However, interest group organisations used their own resources to engage with their 
context, modify their behavioural strategies or dress them in self-legitimising 
rhetoric. The thesis emphasised that in spite of their limitations, the two Muslim 
councils have demonstrated ability to adapt their organisational behaviour to the 
changing conditions.  
 
The project’s more general theoretical contribution was thus an attempt to develop an 
analytical approach based on a combination of static and more dynamic aspects of 
structuralist and organisational theories. First, the project contributed to integrating 
some insights on discursive framing and structural opportunities, thus building on 
similar work carried out by Koopmans and Statham (2000) on migrant groups. 
Second, the project incorporated the idea of gradual change from historical 
institutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and used it in a more dynamic way on a 
micro-level. This provided an opportunity to delineate a series of historically locked-
in institutional practices acting as organisational constraints and undermining the 
likelihood of change. 
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Comparative value of the project 
 
The flexible conceptual framework used in the project allowed for more substantial 
theoretical contributions to be made in relation to behaviour of Muslim councils in 
different institutional contexts. The project developed a more innovative approach to 
better understand the mediatory capacity and predicament of these interest group 
organisations working under pressure. At the same time, the thesis attempted to 
extend the comparative leverage of the pluralist and corporatist labels, which have 
become considered slightly outdated. 
 
The use of the paired comparison provided an opportunity to revisit the original 
debate on the pluralist and corporatist forms of interest intermediation. Some 
scholars have suggested that this dichotomy may have become less relevant for the 
contemporary context of interest group organisations in Western Europe (Beyers et 
al. 2008: 1104). However, the basic way of differentiating between the two types of 
institutional arrangements allowed for the incorporation of the Russian example into 
the comparative framework, previously limited to less contrasting cases. For 
example, different comparative studies on claims-making strategies of different 
ethnic and religious groups have explored the bottom-up dynamic of social 
movement organisations in the pluralist context of Western democracies (Cinalli and 
Giugni 2013, Statham et al. 2005).  
 
The project’s conceptual framework has thus contributed to widening the scope of 
the comparison, as the Russian experience of representing Muslim minority groups 
was largely ignored in comparative literature on political opportunity structures, 
claims-making and institutionalisation of Islam. The study demonstrated the value of 
such a wider comparison, while acknowledging the importance of the individual 
specificities of each context and the obvious caveats such a comparison can bring. 
For example, in light of Russia’s geographical diversity and particular regions with 
majority Muslim population, the project was limited to discussing the issues in 
relation to the areas where Muslim communities were in a minority so that the issues 
would be comparable to the British case. 
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As was suggested earlier, considering the atypical periods in the two cases, the two 
institutional contexts might not fit the pluralist or corporatist types completely. 
Interestingly, the data showed that the two cases were flexible enough to 
accommodate internal variation. This helped identify some potential limitations of 
the pluralist/corporatist dichotomy for understanding the behaviour of Muslim 
councils – if the two institutions were studied in isolation from each other. 
 
For example, the limitations of the pluralist approach to understanding the British 
context of state-religion relations were demonstrated by the process of moving away 
from integrating Muslim communities on the basis of their ethnic and racial 
differentiation to accommodating the religious dimension of Muslim faith within the 
increasingly corporatist approach to religious diversity. This has become particularly 
apparent under the New Labour administration which had given full backing to such 
corporatist activities as the introduction of faith-schools, provisions for halal food or 
prison chaplains. However, the corporatist elements of state-religion relations went 
hand in hand with the pluralist forms of horizontal engagement, multiplicity of 
religious actors within each faith community and their autonomy from the state.  
 
Similarly, the Russian case revealed some inherent tensions within the corporatist 
approach in light of state efforts to accommodate religious diversity. In particular, 
there was an important policy shift from safeguarding ‘managed pluralism’ of the 
early years of Putin’s presidency to incorporating four ‘traditional’ faiths into the 
increasingly corporatist framework of religious governance. In spite of the limited 
attempts to somewhat pluralise the vertical structures of state-religion engagement 
under Medvedev, the underlying mechanisms of paternalistic relations and the lack 
of organisational autonomy remained the persistent features of the corporatist mode 
of religious governance in general and state-Muslim relations in particular.  
 
While these internal variations in the two approaches to interest mediation within the 
individually-conceptualised cases are quite significant, the pluralist/corporatist 
distinction proved useful when the two councils and their institutional contexts were 
compared. In contrast to its Russian counterpart, the British case displayed more 
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features associated with the pluralist approach to interest mediation, whereas the 
Russian case fitted better the corporatist conditions of state-religion engagement.  
 
Moreover, the process in which the Russian context was contrasted with the British 
context helped better understand the similarities and differences in the two cases. In a 
way, each context served as a magnifying glass for the other. For example, the 
Russian corporatist setting brought to light the less obvious corporatist elements in 
Blair’s ideology and policies on religion. Conversely, the British pluralist context of 
multiple interfaith platforms and a better developed civil society highlighted the 
importance of horizontal networks as an alternative dynamic to strong dependence on 
state patronage.  
 
At the same time, while both organisations used Islamic rhetoric, each council 
complemented it with particular connotations believed to resonate with its respective 
Muslim audiences in Britain and Russia. For example, in the British case, this was 
linked to the ideas of self-organisation and individual empowerment, while the 
Russian council used the notions of modernisation, efficiency and empowerment of 
Muslim organisations. Similarly, both institutions struggled to implement internal 
reforms, but in each case, the nature of historically entrenched constraints was 
different. 
 
Notwithstanding the inevitable contextual differences, the project revealed that the 
councils’ strategies and rhetoric were also affected by other factors, such as 
exogenous events (e.g. terrorist threats and increased migration), particular decisions 
of individual actors, and the changing nature of Muslim communities. This is 
particularly important in the current climate of converging security concerns, 
pressures of immigration and secular practices of developing and maintaining good 
working relations between state officials and Muslim representatives. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis of the two different institutions in Britain and Russia 
yielded a series of comparative insights on state-Islam relations, including tensions 
between collective forms of Muslim representation and accommodation of Muslim 
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diversity, mobilisation of Muslim interests and institutionalisation of Muslim 
organisations in the secular processes of religious governance. While some of these 
findings can be extrapolated to other kinds of institutions, further comparative 
research in this area is needed to make a more substantial contribution to the 
disparate studies on Muslim councils in Europe, America and Russia.  
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